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„Es ist eine Frage, ob den Wissenschaften und Künsten ein Bestes möglich sei, über welches 
unser Verstand nicht gehen kann. Vielleicht ist dieser Punkt unendlich weit entfernt, 
ohnerachtet bei jeder Näherung wir weniger vor uns haben.“ 
 
 
[“The question arises as to whether the sciences and the arts can reach a pinnacle that can 
never be eclipsed by reason. We are, perhaps, infinitely far removed from this point, although 
our striving continually brings us closer.”] 
 
 
– Georg Christoph Lichtenberg – 
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Summary 
This thesis investigates the relationship between eye movements, memory and thinking in five 
studies based on eye tracking experiments. The studies draw on the human ability to spatially 
index multimodal events as demonstrated by people’s gaze reverting back to emptied spatial 
locations when retrieving information that was associated with this location during a 
preceding encoding phase – the so called “looking-at-nothing” phenomenon. The first part of 
this thesis aimed at gaining a better understanding of the relationship between eye 
movements and memory in relation to verbal information. The second part of this thesis 
investigated what could be learned about the memory processes involved in reasoning and 
decision-making by studying eye movements to blank spaces. 
The first study presented in this thesis clarified the role of eye movements for the 
retrieval of verbal information from memory. More precisely, it questioned if eye movements to 
nothing are functionally related to memory retrieval for verbal information, i.e. auditorily 
presented linguistic information. Eye movements were analyzed following correct and 
incorrect retrievals of previously presented auditory statements concerning artificial places 
that were probed during a subsequent retrieval phase. Additionally, eye movements were 
manipulated as the independent variable with the aid of a spatial cue that either guided the 
eyes towards or away from associated spatial locations. Using verbal materials elicited eye 
movements to associated but emptied spatial locations, thereby replicating previous findings 
on eye movements to nothing. This behaviour was more pronounced for correct in comparison 
to incorrect retrievals. Retrieval performance was higher when the eyes were guided towards 
in comparison to being guided away from associated spatial locations. In sum, eye 
movements play a functional role for the retrieval of verbal materials. 
The second study tested if the looking-at-nothing behaviour can also diminish; for 
example, does its effect diminish if people gain enough practice in a retrieval task? The same 
paradigm was employed as in the first study. Participants listened to four different sentences. 
Each sentence was associated with one of four areas on the screen and was presented 12 
 x 
times. After every presentation, participants heard a statement probing one sentence, while 
the computer screen remained blank. More fixations were found to be located in areas 
associated with the probed sentence than in other locations. Moreover, the more trials 
participants completed, the less frequently they exhibited the looking-at-nothing behaviour. 
Looking-at-nothing behaviour can in this way be seen to indeed diminish when knowledge 
becomes strongly represented in memory. 
In the third and fourth study eye movements were utilized as a tool to investigate 
memory search during rule- versus similarity-based decision-making. In both studies 
participants first memorized multiple pieces of information relating to job candidates 
(exemplars). In subsequent test trials they judged the suitability of new candidates that varied 
in their similarity to the previously learned exemplars. Results showed that when using 
similarity, but not when using a rule, participants fixated longer on the previous location of 
exemplars that were similar to the new candidates than on the location of dissimilar 
exemplars. This suggests that people using similarity retrieve previously learned exemplars, 
whereas people using a rule do not.  
Eye movements were used yet again as a tool in the fifth study. On this occasion, eye 
movements were investigated during memory-based diagnostic reasoning. The study tested 
the effects of symptom order and diversity with symptom sequences that supported two or 
three contending hypotheses, and which were ambiguous throughout the symptom sequence. 
Participants first learned information about causes and symptoms presented in spatial 
frames. Gaze allocation on emptied spatial frames during symptom processing and during the 
diagnostic response reflected the subjective status of hypotheses held in memory and the 
preferred interpretation of ambiguous symptoms. Gaze data showed how the diagnostic 
decision develops and revealed instances of hypothesis change and biases in symptom 
processing. 
The results of this thesis demonstrate in very different scenarios the tight interplay 
between eye movements, memory and thinking. They show that eye movements are not 
automatically directed to spatial locations. Instead, they reflect the dynamic updating of 
internal, multimodal memory representations. Eye movements can be used as a direct 
behavioural correlate of memory processes involved in similarity- versus rule-based decision-
making, and they reveal rich time-course information about the process of diagnostic 
reasoning. The results of this thesis are discussed in light of the current theoretical debates on 
cognitive processes that guide eye movements, memory and thinking. This thesis concludes 
by outlining a list of recommendations for using eye movements to investigate thinking 
processes, an outlook for future research and possible applications for the research findings. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Interaktion von Blickbewegungen, Gedächtnis- und 
Denkprozessen. In fünf experimentellen Untersuchungen, die auf der Messung von 
Blickbewegungen beruhen, wurde die menschliche Fähigkeit zum räumlichen Indizieren 
multimodaler Ereignisse untersucht. Diese Fähigkeit manifestiert sich u.a. im sogenannten 
„Looking-at-nothing“ Phänomen, das beschreibt, dass Menschen beim Abruf von 
Informationen aus dem Gedächtnis an Orte zurückblicken, die in einer vorhergehenden 
Enkodierphase mit den abzurufenden Informationen assoziiert wurden, selbst wenn diese 
räumlichen Positionen keinerlei erinnerungsrelevante Informationen mehr enthalten. 
In der ersten Untersuchung wurde der Frage nachgegangen, ob Blickbewegungen an 
geleerte räumliche Positionen den Abruf von Informationen aus dem Gedächtnis erleichtern. 
Während ein solches Verhalten für den Abruf zuvor visuell dargebotener Informationen bereits 
gezeigt werden konnte, ist die Befundlage für die Erinnerungsleistung bei auditiv 
dargebotenen, linguistischen Informationen unklar. Um diesen Zusammenhang zu 
untersuchen, wurde das Blickverhalten zunächst als Folge von richtigen und falschen 
Antworten untersucht. In einem weiteren Schritt wurde das Blickverhalten experimentell 
manipuliert. Dies geschah mit Hilfe eines räumlichen Hinweisreizes, der die Blicke entweder 
hin zu der Position leitete, die mit dem abzurufenden Stimulus assoziiert war, oder weg von 
dieser Position. Die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung konnten bisherige Befunde zum Looking-
at-nothing Verhalten replizieren. Zudem zeigte sich, dass beim korrekten Abruf von 
Informationen aus dem Gedächtnis vermehrt Looking-at-nothing gezeigt wurde, während das 
bei fehlerhaften Abrufen nicht der Fall war. Die Blickmanipulation ergab, dass die 
Gedächtnisleistung besser war, wenn der Hinweisreiz den Blick hin zur assoziierten räumlichen 
Position leitete. Im Gegensatz dazu war die Erinnerungsleistung schlechter, wenn der Blick von 
der assoziierten räumlichen Position weggeleitet wurde. Blickbewegungen an geleerte 
räumliche Positionen scheinen demnach auch den Abruf verbaler Stimuli zu erleichtern. 
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In der zweiten Untersuchung wurde erforscht, ob das Looking-at-nothing Verhalten 
nachlässt, wenn das experimentelle Material stark gelernt, d.h. stark im Gedächtnis 
repräsentiert ist. Dazu wurde das gleiche experimentelle Paradigma, wie in der ersten 
Untersuchung verwendet. Vier verschiedene Sätze wurden während der Enkodierphase mit vier 
verschiedenen räumlichen Positionen assoziiert. Nach jeder Präsentation aller vier Sätze, 
wurde einer der Sätze getestet. Diese Prozedur wiederholte sich in zwölf Durchgängen. In den 
ersten vier Durchgängen sahen die Versuchspersonen beim Abruf häufiger in das Feld, dass 
mit der getesteten Information assoziiert war, d.h. sie zeigten wie erwartet das Looking-at-
nothing Verhalten. Je mehr Durchgänge die Versuchspersonen bearbeiteten, desto seltener 
blickten sie zu der assoziierten räumlichen Position. Demnach verschwindet das Looking-at-
nothing Verhalten, wenn Informationen stark im Gedächtnis repräsentiert sind.  
In der dritten und vierten Untersuchung wurden Blickbewegungen an geleerte 
räumliche Positionen als Methode verwendet um Denkprozesse zu untersuchen. In der dritten 
Untersuchung lernten Versuchsteilnehmer zunächst Informationen über fiktive Bewerber 
(Exemplare) für eine freie Position in einem Unternehmen. Jedes Exemplar wurde mit seinen 
Eigenschaften während der Lernphase mit einer distinkten räumlichen Position verknüpft. In 
einer nachfolgenden Entscheidungsphase beurteilten die Versuchsteilnehmer neue Bewerber. 
Diese neuen Bewerber variierten in ihrer Ähnlichkeit mit den zuvor gelernten Bewerbern. 
Versuchsteilnehmer die eine ähnlichkeitsbasierte Entscheidungsstrategie verwendeten, sahen 
an die geleerten räumlichen Positionen zurück, die in der Lernphase mit den Exemplaren 
verknüpft wurden. Wendeten sie jedoch eine abstrakte Regel an, um die neuen Bewerber zu 
beurteilten, so zeigten sie kein Looking-at-nothing Verhalten. Dieses Ergebnis lässt darauf 
schließen, dass eine ähnlichkeitsbasierte im Gegensatz zu einer regelbasierten Strategie den 
Abruf zuvor gelernter Exemplare bewirkt. 
Auch in der fünften Untersuchung wurden Blickbewegungen als Methode eingesetzt, 
diesmal zur Untersuchung gedächtnisbasierter Schlussfolgerungsprozesse, wie sie beim 
Finden von Erklärungen für eine Anzahl gegebener Informationen auftreten. Manipuliert 
wurden die Reihenfolge der präsentierten Informationen und die Diversität der möglichen 
Erklärungen. Die getesteten Symptomsequenzen unterstützen stets mindestens zwei mögliche 
Erklärungen. Die Versuchsteilnehmer lernten in einer vorangestellten Lernphase die Symptome 
und ihre möglichen Erklärungen. Symptome und Erklärungen wurden mit räumlichen 
Positionen verknüpft. In einer anschließenden Diagnosephase wurden verschiedene 
Symptomsequenzen getestet. Das Blickverhalten während der Diagnosephase reflektierte die 
Interpretation der Symptome im Sinne der subjektiv wahrscheinlichsten Erklärung. Die 
Aufzeichnung und Analyse der Blickbewegungen erlaubte es die Entwicklung dieser 
Interpretation über die gesamte Sequenz hinweg zu beobachten und Hypothesenwechsel 
lokalisieren zu können. 
xiii 
Insgesamt stützen die Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation die Annahme einer engen 
funktionalen Verbindung von Blickbewegungen, Gedächtnis- und Denkprozessen. Sie zeigen, 
dass Blickbewegungen nicht automatisch an alle assoziierten räumlichen Positionen gerichtet 
werden, sondern dass sie vielmehr den situations- und aufgabenabhängigen Abruf von 
Informationen aus dem Gedächtnis widerspiegeln. Blickbewegungen können als direktes 
Verhaltensmaß zur Messung von Gedächtnisprozessen beim ähnlichkeitsbasierten 
Entscheiden herangezogen werden und liefern wertvolle Prozessdaten über die Integration von 
Symptominformationen beim diagnostischen Schließen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation 
werden im Lichte der aktuellen theoretischen Diskussion über kognitive Prozesse beim 
Bewegen der Augen, beim Gedächtnisabruf und beim komplexen Denken betrachtet. 
Abschließend werden Empfehlungen für die Verwendung der Methode der 
Blickbewegungsmessung als Prozessmaß zur Untersuchung gedächtnisbasierter 
Denkprozesse gegeben, ein Überblick über zukünftige Forschungsmöglichkeiten präsentiert 
und Ideen für Anwendungsmöglichkeiten der präsentierten Befunde aufgezeigt. 
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1 Introduction 
How do we encode and combine information from multiple modalities like vision and audition? 
How do we keep track of the encoded information through space and time? There is wide 
agreement that we achieve this by constructing mental representations of events, storing 
them in memory and accessing them when needed (e.g., Markman, 2012). These 
representations however are not entirely abstract in nature but incorporate perceptual 
information, such as the location of the information intake (Barsalou, 2008; Spivey, 2007; 
Wilson, 2002). In order to describe the interaction between cognitive processes when keeping 
track of multi modal events through space and time, Richardson and Kirkham (2004) have 
coined the term dynamic spatial indexing of multimodal events. This concept is based on 
several findings: (1) Spatial information is encoded with a high degree of automaticity 
(Andrade & Meudell, 1993; Postma & Kessels, 2006); (2) The visual system can dynamically 
track the locations of multiple objects as they move through space (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; 
Pylyshyn, 2001); (3) Location information is not just encoded but can be used to pick up 
information about visual objects or multimodal events (Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997; 
Richardson & Spivey, 2000).  
One consequence of dynamic spatial indexing of multimodal events is the recruitment 
of the oculomotor system (e.g., Theeuwes, Belopolsky, & Olivers, 2009). This can be observed 
in the phenomenon that multimodal memory retrieval leads the eyes back to associated 
spatial locations, even if the visual scenery has changed or is absent (Ferreira, Apel, & 
Henderson, 2008; Richardson, Altmann, Spivey, & Hoover, 2009). This tight coupling of eye 
movements and the dynamic updating of multimodal memory representations through spatial 
indexing has been called the looking-at- nothing phenomenon. This phenomenon is shown to 
occur under a variety of cognitive tasks, like mental imagery (Johansson, Holsanova, & 
Holmqvist, 2006; Johansson, 2013; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Martarelli & Mast, 2013, Spivey 
& Geng, 2001), language processing (Altmann, 2004, Hoover & Richardson, 2008; Richardson &  
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Spivey, 2000) and even higher order thinking processes like reasoning and decision-making 
(Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Platzer, Bröder, & Heck, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012). 
Despite the extensive empirical evidence demonstrating the tight interplay of eye 
movements and memory retrieval of multimodal events, many questions relating to this topic 
remain unanswered. For example, is directing the eyes to emptied spatial locations during the 
retrieval of multimodal events from memory functional in the way it facilitates memory 
retrieval? What information is accessed during thinking? Are eye movements automatically 
directed to all associated spatial locations when parts of the memory representation are 
accessed, or do eye movements reflect the current processing status of information held in 
memory? 
The focus of this thesis will continue in line with research investigating the interplay of 
eye movements and memory. Additionally, this thesis aims to investigate dynamic spatial 
indexing of multimodal events in more complex cognitive tasks in order to deepen the 
understanding of how memory processes shape our thoughts. Chapter 1 will first review 
existing findings and discuss current opinions on the interrelations between eye movements 
and memory. Secondly, this section will explain why it is important to study memory 
processes in order to shed light on human thinking. Thirdly, the chapter will report on existing 
findings in the study of eye movements and thinking. Chapter 1 concludes with an outline of 
the questions that prompted this research, followed by an overview of the work conducted to 
investigate these questions. Chapters 2 to 5 describe in detail the motivation, methods and 
results of five experiments and discuss their implications. These chapters are written in the 
style of journal articles. Chapters 2 and 4 are published in peer-reviewed journals, whilst 
chapter 3 is based on an article published in conference proceedings. Chapter 6 integrates the 
research findings and provides an outlook for future research. 
1.1 Eye Movements and Memory 
Why do we move our eyes? Restricting higher acuity vision to a small region of the retina and 
shifting the processing focus from one location to another is the solution nature has devised 
to cope with the vast amount of visible information barraging our visual perception 
(Liversedge, Gilchrist, & Everling, 2011). Eye movements are quick, frequent and highly 
automatic actions (Irwin, 2004; Spivey & Dale, 2011; van Gompel, Fischer, Murray, & Hill, 2007).  
Eye movements are not however randomly distributed. Alternatively they reflect both stimulus-
driven (bottom up) and goal-driven (top down) cognitive processes (Theeuwes, 2010; van 
Zoest & Donk, 2004). Bottom-up processes that attract attention are object features like color, 
orientation, size, motion and depth (Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). The eyes are also guided by top-
down processes like task demands. Among the first who demonstrated such top-down driven 
eye movements were Buswell (1935) and Yarbus (1967). In Yarbus’s study participants were 
presented with the same painting seven times, but with a different question asked prior to 
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each viewing. He, like Buswell, observed that the given instructions radically changed the 
places in which the participant fixated (see Wade & Tatler, 2011). 
When moving the eyes, humans use a “saccade-and-fixate” strategy (Land, 2011). 
Saccades are fast eye movements – they are the fastest movements the body can produce – 
which redirect the gaze to a new point in space. They take 30 to 80 ms to complete and vary in 
their velocity and amplitude. Between saccades gaze is held almost stationary. The time in 
which the eyes remain relatively still is called a fixation. Fixations can last between tens of 
milliseconds to several seconds (Holmqvist et al., 2011)1. 
1.1.1 Eye Movements and Cognitive Processing 
Whereas cognitive processing of visual information essentially ceases during a saccade, a fact 
that has been termed saccadic suppression, information is processed during fixations 
(Gilchrist, 2011). This correlates with the observation that people usually look at something 
when they wish to gather information from that area. In general it is assumed that when we 
measure fixations, we gain information from or associated with the location subject to the 
fixation (e.g., Holmqvist et al., 2011; Irwin, 2004; Theeuwes et al., 2009). Therefore, eye 
fixations (fixation location and duration) seem to be ideal dependent variables in the study of 
cognitive processing (Irwin, 2004).  
The assumption that fixation measures correspond to the duration of cognitive 
processing of information derived from the point of fixation was proposed in the “eye-mind 
hypothesis” (Just & Carpenter, 1976). This has however been an issue of debate. Irwin (2004) 
summarizes the discussion in highlighting four major problems to the eye-mind hypothesis. 
Firstly, the focus of cognitive processing can be wider than the 2.5° visual angle (De Valois & 
De Valois, 1980) that the fovea fixates upon (functional field of view). Secondly, the locus of 
cognitive processing can be separated from the fixation location, thus attention shifts earlier 
to a new location than the focus of the eyes shift (covert shifts of attention). Thirdly, bottom 
up processes can guide the eyes to a different location while processing continues 
(oculomotor capture). Finally, cognitive processing takes place both during eye movements 
and eye fixations (cognitive processing during saccadic eye movements). 
 On the other hand, it has been argued that the focus of cognitive processing is indeed 
accompanied by corresponding eye movements (Kristjánsson, 2011; Liversedge & Findlay, 
2000). When task-demands necessitate it, the focus of cognitive processing can indeed be 
separated from eye movements. Such task-demands can take the form of an explicit 
                                                        
1 Other movements of the eyes exist that serve functions beyond memory retrieval and thought processes, and 
will therefore only be mentioned for the sake of completeness. Those eye movements stabilize the eyes (micro 
movements, vestibule-ocular reflex, optokinetic reflex), allow for the following of moving items (smooth pursuit), 
or for the visualization of a target moving towards or away from a viewer (vergence movements; for an overview 
see Holmqvist et al., 2011 and Land, 2011). 
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instruction (e.g., Thomas & Lleras, 2009), or be undertaken to widen the field of view, e.g., while 
driving (e.g., Castro, 2009). Rich empirical evidence however suggests that before the eye is 
moved, attention shifts to the upcoming saccadic landing point (e.g., Deubel & Schneider, 
1996; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995). Furthermore, eye movements and attention share the 
same neural resources (Kristjánsson, 2011). Holmqvist et al. (2011) suggest therefore that the 
relation between eye fixations and cognitive processing can be described as an analogy to a 
rubber band. Stretching the rubber band to one point (the point of cognitive processing) 
means the other end of the rubber band (the eye fixations) will naturally follow. Thus, the 
fixation location and the duration a location is fixated can be used as an approximation of 
what information is actually being processed. Nevertheless, eye movements capture cognitive 
processes only indirectly and skillful experimental manipulation is warranted to draw valid 
conclusions (Holmqvist et al., 2011). 
 The tight coupling of eye movements and cognitive processing are just one factor 
leading to eye movements becoming a popular topic of study in cognitive science. Another 
factor is due to measuring equipment becoming more reliable and effective in the last decades 
(Holmqvist et al., 2011). By combining video recordings of the pupil with the cornea-reflection 
(recorded with an infrared light) eye and head-movements can be separated (see Figure 1.1 as 
an example of an eye-tracking system using the cornea-reflection method). This allows for the 
monitoring of eye movements while people look at real or virtual visual displays. Furthermore, 
because people are free to move, it also allows for the studying of eye movements whilst a 
viewer interacts with presented objects (Henderson & Ferreira, 2004). These possibilities have 
prompted a significant increase in eye movement studies, with the topic having been 
intensively studied in relation to reading, scene perception and visual search (see Rayner, 2009 
for an overview). Eye movements have not only been used to study cognitive processing in 
such visual tasks, but they have also been studied in the context of spoken language 
comprehension, in which eye movements are recorded whilst people listened to spoken 
information and watched visual objects on a screen (Henderson & Ferreira, 2004; Huettig, 
Olivers, & Hartsuiker, 2011; Liversedge & Findlay, 2000). Research in this particular field 
concluded that during the processing of temporarily ambiguous linguistic input, eye 
movements revealed developing and changing interpretations (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, 
Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). Eye movements can also be reliably directed towards visible objects 
and characters mentioned in speech (e.g., Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998). Altmann 
and Kamide (2007) showed that participants looked at the locations at which objects had 
previously been 
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Figure 1.1 Left: Eye tracker setup of a remote eye tracker (SMI, Teltow) as used in the studies reported 
in this thesis. Auditory materials were presented via headphones. Right: Data collection performed by 
the iViewX software (SMI, Teltow). The picture displays parameters of eye tracking quality. From top 
left to bottom right: RED tracking monitor, the result of a validity test, system logger data, and eye 
image. 
 
present on a computer screen at the moment the objects were mentioned in a spoken 
sentence. They further demonstrated that the eyes move towards object locations that are 
likely to be mentioned next during the unfolding of a spoken sentence (Altmann & Kamide, 
2009). 
1.1.2 Looking-at-nothing Phenomenon 
Eye movements are not only directed towards objects present in the visual environment; they 
can also be directed to objects no longer present. Language-induced eye movements are for 
example directed to objects that have been present, but which are no longer present at the 
time they are retrieved from memory. In such studies, participants look at a blank screen when 
retrieving information during memory retrieval. This eye movement behaviour is said to be top-
down driven (Henderson, 2007; Johansson, 2013; Spivey & Dale, 2011). Among the first to 
show a close link between eye movements, linguistic information processing, and spatial 
information processing in an information-retrieval task were Richardson and Spivey (2000). 
They presented participants with a spinning cross (Experiment 2) in one of four equal-sized 
areas on a computer screen, together with spoken factual information. After four facts were 
presented, participants heard a statement testing one of the presented sentences and were 
asked to judge the truth of the statement. Even though the computer screen remained blank 
during this retrieval phase, participants fixated more often in the spatial area where the 
sought-after information had been presented (relevant area) compared to the other three 
areas on the screen (irrelevant areas). 
 Since this first empirical investigation, a growing empirical source of evidence has 
demonstrated the existence of the so-called “looking-at-nothing” phenomenon in a variety of 
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situations (Altmann, 2004; Brandt & Stark, 1997; Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Johansson, Holsanova, 
Dewhurst, & Holmqvist, 2012; Johansson et al., 2006; Laeng, Bloem, D’Ascenzo, & Tommasi, 
2014; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Martarelli & Mast, 2010, 2013; Platzer, Bröder, & Heck, 2014; 
Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012; Spivey & Geng, 2001). Studies using visuospatial information 
presented participants with information in a visual array, for instance, shape and color of 
symbols (Spivey & Geng, 2001), different kinds of tropical fish (Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002) or 
rich visual scenery (Johansson et al., 2006), and later probed participants on the visualized 
information whilst the screen was blank. Studies employing verbal information presented 
participants with abstract symbols, as demonstrated in the study by Richardson and Spivey 
(2000), or alternatively as carried out in the work of Johansson et al. (2012), participants were 
confronted with an empty screen while they listened to a statement or description. During a 
subsequent retrieval phase, memory of the verbal material was tested. Interestingly in these 
situations, eye movements reflect content and spatial relations of a mental image built during 
the auditory description of the scenery.  
 The above described scenario is based on a remembered event that takes place 
immediately prior to retrieval. Spatial indexing of multimodal events can however also take 
place during long-term episodic memory retrieval, where a set of information is first learned by 
heart and tested during subsequent trials – even one week following the learning  (Jahn & 
Braatz, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Martarelli & Mast, 2013). This ability does not reflect a 
temporarily stored event, but on the contrary, it means that episodes are stored in the long-
term memory whilst demonstrating the robust and durable nature of eye movements to 
nothing (Spivey, 2007). Furthermore spatial indexing also occurs during mental imagery of 
auditorily presented information (Johansson et al., 2006), where no visual reference frames 
have been presented during a preceding encoding phase. There are consequently multiple 
scenarios in which spatial indexing of memorized information occurs (Jahn & Braatz, 2014). 
 What are the mechanisms underlying looking-at-nothing? Most authors agree on the 
assumption that looking-at-nothing reflects retrieval from a multimodal memory 
representation (Figure 1.2) that is built during the encoding of information from the 
environment. More precisely, during encoding, input from multiple modalities (e.g., visual, 
auditory) is stored in an episodic trace (Altmann & Kamide, 2007, 2009; Altmann, 2004; 
Hommel, 1998, 2004) in working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2000), together 
with conceptual knowledge derived from long-term memory (e.g., Huettig et al., 2011). 
 The activation however of a multimodal memory representation alone is not sufficient 
to cause eye movements to revert back towards associated spatial locations. Some sort of 
spatial pointer (Ballard et al., 1997; Henderson, 2003) or index (Altmann & Kamide, 2009; 
Pylyshyn, 2001; Richardson, Dale, & Kirkham, 2007) is required to trigger gaze behaviour. 
Spatial indexing demands that the location of information presentation is encoded together 
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with the multimodal memory representation (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; Richardson & 
Kirkham, 2004; Spivey & Dale, 2011). The spatial index is rather based on spatiotemporal 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Framework of a multimodal memory representation, its interaction with long-term memory 
and the execution of eye movements. 
 
constraints rather than object features (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; Jahn & Braatz, 2014). The 
activation of an episodic trace spreads to and activates the motor system, triggering the 
execution of an eye movement that is prepared in the linked spatial index (Spivey & Dale, 
2011). The stronger the association in the multimodal memory representation, the higher “the 
probability of triggering a saccadic eye-movement” (Huettig et al., 2011, p. 5). 
1.2 Thinking and Memory  
Holyoak and Morrison (2012) describe thinking as: “systematic transformation of mental 
representations of knowledge to characterize actual or possible states of the world, often in 
service of goals” (p. 1). From this perspective, we have some internal description that can be 
manipulated in order to form other descriptions. These manipulations are systematic. The 
internal descriptions created by thinking describe states of the external world (e.g., a 
constructed image of the room you are in) and they are directed to achieving some desired 
state of affairs that motivate the thinker to carry out mental work (e.g., sitting down at your 
office chair). Furthermore, thinking summarizes cognitive processes involved in planning, 
remembering, conceptualizing, decision-making, and reasoning (Holyoak & Morrison, 2012). 
1.2.1 Thinking Processes and Mental Representations 
Describing how mental representations interact with cognitive processes involved in 
perceiving and storing information has received more and more attention in order to explain 
thinking (e.g., Manktelow, 2012 writes in his introduction of his book on thinking and 
reasoning: “Explaining reasoning: the ‘new paradigm’ “, p. vii, see also Markman, 2012).  
Evans (2012) gives two reasons for this development: Firstly, numerous examples 
have been encountered were humans deviate from purely logical or rational predictions. For 
example, in the Wason-Selection Task (Wason, 1966), participants had to decide which of four 
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cards they would choose in order to test the truth of a sentence.  Participants could see on the 
visible side of the cards either a “D”, a “K”, a “3”, or a “7”. They were then informed that: “If there 
is a D on one side, then there is a 3 on the other side”. A significant number of participants 
selected the D card (modus ponens), however a large proportion of participants also chose the 
3 card, which constitutes a confirmation of the consequent, opposed to the selection of the 
card featuring the number 7 (modus tollens) (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). By selecting in this 
manner, participants in this task did not behave according to logical norms.  
Secondly, it has been found that the outcome of a thinking process depends on the 
content of the task. This is epitomized in the Selection Task, in which people are less likely to 
confirm the consequent if the task is framed as violating a regulation (e.g., “If a letter is sealed, 
then it has a 50c stamp on it”; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972). One explanation for 
content effects lies in the assumption that different contents engage different kinds of 
reasoning, i.e. true/ false judgments versus reasoning about regulations (Manktelow, 2012). 
This means that from a logical point of view identical tasks that only differ in their framing 
result in different outcomes. Theories that therefore aim to explain thinking processes must 
include differences in cognitive processes elicited by different contents. 
Another reason why it is potentially interesting to investigate the nature of mental 
representations underlying thinking is the assumption that cognition can be better understood 
if studied in the context of its relationship to a physical body that interacts with the world, i.e. 
from a grounded perspective on cognition (Barsalou, Kyle Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003; 
Barsalou, 2008; Spivey & Dale, 2011; Spivey, 2007; Wilson, 2002). Grounding cognition in space 
and time comprises several approaches: (1) The situated perspective on cognition assumes 
that during cognitive processing, perceptual information is continuously drawn upon and 
affects processing, and motor activity is executed that affects the environment in a task-
relevant way (Wilson, 2002); (2) Cognition comprises mental simulations. This means the 
“reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during experience with 
the world, body, or mind” (Barsalou, 2008, p. 618); (3) The embodiment of cognition approach 
sees cognitive processes as directly involving modal sensorimotor systems, for instance, 
visual, somatosensory, and auditory perception, as well as oculomotor and skeletomotor 
planning (Spivey & Dale, 2011). All approaches share the assumption that cognitive processing 
is not independent from modal representations. Theories that therefore aim to explain thinking 
processes should therefore incorporate sensorimotor and modal representations held in 
memory. 
1.2.2 Memory-based Reasoning and Decision-Making 
Many of our everyday thinking activities draw upon information that is currently absent from 
the world, and hence has to be retrieved from memory. An example of such is the situation in 
which a medicine is chosen to treat a likely explanation for a set of observed symptoms from 
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memory (Johnson & Krems, 2001). Research on sequential diagnostic reasoning has shown 
that inferences drawn from memory elicit different cognitive processes than inferences based 
on on-line available information. For example, when studying memory-based reasoning 
processes, the order in which information is presented during sequential diagnostic reasoning 
changes the explanation status of hypotheses held in memory (Baumann, Krems, & Ritter, 
2010; Rebitschek, Scholz, Bocklisch, Krems, & Jahn, 2012). Moreover, the set of contending 
hypotheses depends on the availability of information in working memory (Mehlhorn, Taatgen, 
Lebiere, & Krems, 2011). 
Research on judgment and decision-making has shown that inferences from memory, 
in comparison to inferences from givens, induce selective and heuristic processing (Gigerenzer 
& Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC research group, 1999), and result in less 
compensatory strategy use (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003, 2006), more sequential memory-search 
(Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007) and more recognition-based decision-making (Pachur, Bröder, & 
Marewski, 2008). A strategy that recently received a considerable amount of attention in the 
field of decision-making is the similarity-based decision strategy. Similarity-based decision 
strategies assume that in order to decide between alternatives, each option is compared to 
past instances stored in memory (Bröder, Newell, & Platzer, 2010; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Hahn, 
Prat-Sala, Pothos, & Brumby, 2010; Juslin & Persson, 2002). Whereas recent findings assume 
that people use a trade-off between accuracy and effort in order to decide when to use a 
similarity-based strategy (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013, 2014; Hoffmann, 
2014), the underlying cognitive processes remain difficult to tease apart (Ashby & O’Brien, 
2005; Barsalou, 1990; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Markman et al., 2005; Pothos, 2005). 
To sum up, in order to understand thinking behaviour involved in reasoning and 
decision-making, it is essential to study memory processes (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; Bröder, 
2005; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012), or as Weber and Johnson (2009) state: 
“the brain that decides how to invest pension money and what car to buy is the same brain 
that also learns to recognize and categorize sounds and faces, resolves perceptual conflicts, 
acquires motor skills such as those used in playing tennis, and remembers (or fails to 
remember) episodic and semantic information.” (p. 54). 
1.3 Eye Movements and Thinking 
To track cognitive processes, proper process measures are required (Johnson, Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, & Willemsen, 2008; Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, & Ranyard, 2011). Eye 
movements are one such measure that can be used to trace cognitive processes underlying 
thinking (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013; Peterson & Beck, 2011), 
because oculomotor processing is assumed to be coextensive with cognitive processing 
(Spivey & Dale, 2011). That is, during thinking, the brain recruits low-level sensorimotor neural 
subsystems, like eye movements, to assist in cognitive computations. For example, in the 
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domain of problem solving it has been shown that eye movements are informative about the 
encoding superiority assumed in chess experts. Expert chess players make fewer fixations 
than novices and place fixations in between individual pieces on a chess board (Reingold & 
Sheridan, 2011). In a study testing Duncker’s radiation problem, Grant & Spivey (2003) found 
that participants that solved the task spent more time looking at the stomach-lining portion of 
the diagram than unsuccessful solvers (see also Thomas & Lleras, 2007, 2009). 
1.3.1 Eye Movements and Decision-Making 
Eye movements have also been studied in the domain of decision-making, ranging from 
perceptual decisions of which stimulus to gaze at next (Ludwig, 2011), to principles of 
decision-making that apply to more complex decision problems (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; 
Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013), like deciding which of two cities is larger, who will win the next 
elections, or consumer choices (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Concerning more complex 
decisions, eye movements have been shown to be a useful tool to explore the underlying 
processes. For example, alternatives that are fixated first and last have a higher probability of 
being chosen, as these have more accumulated evidence. The more similar alternatives, the 
more information is sampled, leading to longer gaze durations for these alternatives and the 
favored alternative (for an overview see Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013).  
Most of these results have been obtained by studying decision-making when 
information was visible or could be collected by turning cards or clicking on information 
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). The information required therefore had not been recalled from 
memory. Evidence is accumulating however that cognitive processes involved in inferences 
from givens differ from inferences drawn from memory (Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Bröder & 
Schiffer, 2003, 2006; Pachur et al., 2008; Platzer & Bröder, 2012, 2013). Until recently, it was 
thought to be not possible to study memory-processes involved in decision-making. To make 
memory-based decision processes visible and the study of them more viable, Renkewitz and 
Jahn (2010, 2012) developed a process tracing method called memory indexing (see also 
Scholz, 2011). 
Memory indexing is based on the looking-at-nothing phenomenon and thus utilizes the 
human ability to spatially index multimodal events. In the memory indexing experiment by 
Renkewitz and Jahn (2012), participants first learned information concerning six decision 
alternatives (fictive mushrooms). Alternatives were described by four cue values (e.g., elastic 
consistency, cell wall consists of cellulose, contains magnesium as mineral, and rare spread). 
In a learning phase, the mushrooms were repeatedly presented as abstract geometrical forms. 
Cue values were written in rectangles placed within the geometrical forms. After completion of 
the learning phase, participants were told which cue values indicated poisonous and how cue 
dimensions were ordered in terms of validity. During subsequent test trials, participants were 
presented with binary decision problems in which they had to indicate which of two 
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mushrooms were more poisonous. In each decision trial therefore two of the six mushrooms 
were presented next to each other. Importantly, in order to study memory-based decisions, the 
rectangular frames containing cue values during the learning phase were empty. Eye 
movements were recorded throughout the decision phase. Furthermore, there were two 
decision phases; in phase 1 participants spontaneously adopted a decision strategy, and in 
phase 2, they were instructed to either use the compensatory equal-weights strategy, or the 
non-compensatory take-the-best strategy (as outlined in Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). The 
take the best approach is termed a non-compensatory strategy because cues that are lower in 
validity are disregarded. Disregarded cues cannot compensate for differences in other cue 
values. Equal weights is recognized as a compensatory strategy because it takes all cue 
values into account but ignores their validity. Non-compensatory strategies are associated 
with a more cue-wise information search, whereas compensatory strategies are associated 
with alternative-wise information search (see Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012).  
Both transitions between alternatives, in addition to looking times at rectangular 
frames containing cue values during learning, revealed cue-wise information search for users 
of a non-compensatory strategy, and alternative-wise information search when applying a 
compensatory decision strategy. These findings provided the first evidence that eye 
movements can indeed be studied to trace memory processes during decision-making, in 
which information was based on linguistic input and cue values had to be retrieved from long-
term memory. 
1.3.2 Eye Movements and Reasoning 
Eye movements have also been used to investigate reasoning. In relational spatial reasoning, 
for instance, more vertical than horizontal eye movements are shown when solving a 
below/above inference problem (Demarais & Cohen, 1998). This especially occurs when 
participants are sitting in front of an empty screen. Eye movements thus generate some form 
of spatial mental model to assist with logical induction (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989), and eye 
movements are performed that are consistent with the spatial characteristics of that mental 
model (Spivey & Dale, 2011). Hegarty (2004) showed that during mechanical reasoning about 
movements of ropes in a pulley system, participants mentally animated small portions of the 
pulley system in sequential order, reflecting the causal chain of forces. 
Eye movements also function as a tool to investigate memory-based reasoning 
processes (Jahn & Braatz, 2012, 2014; Ruthsatz, 2009). In the study conducted by Ruthsatz 
(2009), participants first learned cue information concerning four flatmates. Each flatmate 
was described by two cues (for example flatmate A smokes and likes reading novels). Cues 
were either uniquely associated with one flatmate or alternatively shared by two flatmates, 
and were thus ambiguous (e.g., flatmate A and B smoke, whereas flatmate A likes reading and 
flatmate B likes playing computer games). In a preceding learning phase, participants learned 
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the cue information relating to each of the four flatmates. An abstract symbol of a head 
appeared in one of four spatial areas on a computer screen whilst simultaneously an auditory 
description of the cues was played. The four spatial areas were through this process 
individually associated with each of the four flatmates. During a subsequent reasoning phase, 
in which participants were shown the four empty spatial areas on the computer screen, 
participants were sequentially presented with the cues and had to infer which flatmate 
remained last in the common room of the flat. For example, participants heard the cue 
information cigarettes (flatmate A or flatmate B) and book (flatmate A); in this case, flatmate A 
was the last person to remain in the common room. There was always a single correct 
explanation, and in order to control for gaze biases, each of the four flatmates could have 
assumed the A-role. Eye movements were recorded throughout the reasoning phase. 
In order to test if eye movements can reveal memory processes in diagnostic 
reasoning throughout the sequence of sequentially presented cues, the author of this paper 
has reanalyzed the data by Ruthsatz (2009) (see Scholz, Mehlhorn, & Krems, 2011; Scholz, 
Mehlhorn, Ruthsatz, & Krems, 2011). Figure 1.3 shows results of 40 participants on fixation 
proportions based on the number of fixations for two cue sequences and only correct 
responses. Gaze pattern reflected the support that each flatmate received through the 
sequence of presented symptoms. When an ab symptom was presented, participants gazed 
more to flatmates A and B than to flatmates C and D. When an A-symptom was presented, 
participants gazed more often to flatmate A than to any other flatmate. When giving the 
response, participants gazed to the explanation they finally chose. Results of this pre-study 
showed that eye movements indeed reveal memory-based diagnostic reasoning of 
sequentially presented symptoms over time. 
Figure 1.3 Mean fixation proportions for the ab-a-response and a-ab-response sequences and the four 
spatial areas (A, B, C, and D). Error bars show standard errors of the mean. 
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Jahn and Braatz (2012; 2014) investigated gaze behaviour in sequential diagnostic 
reasoning with sequences consisting of four cues (henceforth called “symptoms”). 
Participants were told to imagine they were physicians identifying a chemical with which a 
worker in a chemical plant was affected during an accident (“chemical-accident task”, 
Mehlhorn et al., 2011). Information about chemicals, their respective symptom classes, and 
the symptoms they caused were learned during a preceding learning phase, for instance, the 
category “eyes” consisted of symptoms “eyelid swelling” and “lacrimation”. Categories of 
symptoms were associated to spatial locations and chemicals (hypotheses). During reasoning 
trials, symptoms were presented auditorily in sequence. Memory indexing showed the 
activation status of hypotheses in memory over the course of a reasoning trial (Jahn & Braatz, 
2014): At the beginning of a trial, eye movements matched the momentary probabilities of 
hypotheses given their differential support by the first symptom. During subsequent symptom 
presentations, eye movements reflected the changing subjective probabilities of competing 
hypotheses corresponding to the combined support that they received from symptoms 
presented so far in the experiment (integrated probability matching). In the study by Jahn and 
Braatz (2014), in most sequences a single final diagnosis was left outstanding until all 
symptom information had been presented.  
1.4 Overview and research objectives 
Recent research has outlined the tight coupling of eye movements and memory processes. 
However, this research mainly focussed on the relation between eye movements and 
visuospatial information processing. Evidence for a tight coupling of eye movements for the 
processing of verbal information is scarce. Understanding the relation between eye 
movements and memory retrieval for verbal information constitutes a precondition for using 
eye movements as a direct behavioural correlate to explore complex thinking processes by 
showing that the same set of mechanisms is operating when critical information is verbal in 
nature. Therefore, the first part of the thesis focuses on the relation between eye movements 
and memory retrieval for verbal information. The second part of this thesis uses eye 
movements, i.e. the looking-at-nothing phenomenon, to study memory processes involved in 
rule- and similarity-based decision-making and sequential diagnostic reasoning of ambiguous 
symptom sequences. In the following research objectives are outlined. More precise 
hypotheses are included in Chapters 2 to 5. 
1.4.1 Chapter 2: Functional Spatial Indexing of Verbal Information 
If motor patterns, like eye movements, feedback information into the cognitive system during 
memory retrieval, one could assume that eye movements improve memory retrieval for an 
object or event. Although research testing visuospatial materials and manipulating eye 
movements as an independent variable initially showed evidence for such a functional role of 
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eye movements for memory retrieval (Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014), the 
results however in relation to verbal materials are not conclusive (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; 
Richardson et al., 2009; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000). 
Research objective 1: Are eye movements to nothing functional for memory retrieval of verbal 
information?  
A series of three experiments were conducted using a similar methodology and all concluded 
with the same pattern of results (see Scholz & Krems, 2011; Scholz, Mehlhorn, & Krems, 2012a, 
2012b). The study reported in Chapter 2 will only report the last experiment in the series that 
incorporates all tested manipulations. Lars Eberspach assisted in the programming involved in 
the experiment and collected parts of the data (Eberspach, 2013). Chapter 2 is based on a 
published manuscript (Scholz, Mehlhorn, & Krems, 2014). 
1.4.2 Chapter 3: Looking-at-nothing and Practice 
This chapter aims at further exploring the relation between eye movements and memory 
retrieval for verbal information. It questions whether looking-at-nothing is an automatic 
behaviour that always occurs when verbal information that is associated with a spatial 
location is probed. Alternatively, looking-at-nothing behaviour could change, for example with 
varying degrees of strengths of the information held in memory.  
Research objective 2: Are eye movements automatically launched to spatial locations? More 
precisely, is looking-at-nothing behaviour stable under different levels of practice? 
The experiment reported in Chapter 3 explored looking-at-nothing behaviour and manipulating 
the degree of practice in a task, where auditory information, which is associated with contents 
from a visual scene, has to be retrieved from memory. Chapter 3 is based on a published 
conference proceeding (Scholz, Mehlhorn, Bocklisch, & Krems, 2011). 
1.4.3 Chapter 4: Access of Information from Multimodal Memory Representations 
Eye movements reflect information processing from memory. Can eye movements be studied 
in order to disentangle decision strategies on the process level? For example, to investigate 
when previous experiences stored in memory are retrieved and when they are not retrieved? 
This is epitomized in the following example; in order to find a correct explanation for a 
patient’s symptom, a medicine could be selected on the terms of either similar instances 
stored in memory or its selection could be derived from an abstract rule. There has been an 
extensive and long lasting debate concerning the differences in cognitive processes between 
such similarity-based and rule-based decision strategies. Recently it has been assumed that 
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both strategies draw on retrieval from a mental representation, but differ in the way in which 
information is accessed from memory (Bailey, 2005). 
Research objective 3: Can eye movements be used as a direct behavioural correlate to study 
differences in memory retrieval between a rule- versus a similarity-based decision strategy? 
The two experiments reported in Chapter 4 used memory indexing to study retrieval processes 
involved in similarity- and rule-based decision-making. Bettina von Helversen and Jörg 
Rieskamp advised in the study design and in conducting the experiments. Chapter 4 is based 
on a published manuscript (Scholz, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2015). 
1.4.4 Chapter 5: Eye Movements and the Development of Explanations over Time 
Eye movement recordings have been shown to provide continuous data about ongoing 
memory processes. For instance, by observing eye movements throughout the sequential 
presentation of symptoms, the activation status of different explanations in memory can be 
observed (Jahn & Braatz, 2014).  
Research objective 4: Can eye movements track the development of hypothesis over time, i.e. 
from the first symptom presentation until the participants’ response, especially in situations 
where the presented evidence is ambiguous, thus supports more then one hypothesis? 
In order to clarify this, one experiment has been conducted. Ricarda Fröde assisted in the 
generating of materials used in this experiment and was involved in data collection (Fröde, 
2012). Georg Jahn advised on study design and provided valuable feedback on the manuscript 
presented in Chapter 5. 
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2.1 Abstract 
People fixate on blank spaces if visual stimuli previously occupied these regions of space. This 
so-called “looking-at-nothing” phenomenon is said to be a part of information retrieval from 
internal memory representations, but the exact nature of the relationship between looking-at-
nothing and memory retrieval is unclear. While evidence exists for an influence of looking-at-
nothing on memory retrieval for visuospatial stimuli, evidence for verbal information is mixed. 
Here, we tested the relationship between looking-at-nothing behaviour and memory retrieval in 
an episodic retrieval task where verbal information was presented auditorily during encoding. 
When participants were allowed to gaze freely during subsequent memory retrieval, looking-at-
nothing occurred, and it was stronger for correct than for incorrect responses. When eye 
movements were manipulated during memory retrieval, retrieval performance was higher 
when participants fixated on the area associated with to-be-retrieved information than when 
fixating on another area. Our results provide evidence for a functional relationship between 
looking-at-nothing and memory retrieval that extends to verbal information.  
 
Keywords: verbal memory retrieval, eye movements, looking-at-nothing, spatial indexing, event 
file, encoding-retrieval relationship, situated cognition 
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2.2 Introduction 
While there is compelling evidence that eye movements are engaged in cognitive tasks like 
reading, scene perception and visual search (Rayner, 2009), eye movements also occur when 
the outside world is devoid of any task-relevant information. Coining the term “looking-at-
nothing” (LAN) phenomenon, Richardson and colleagues (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; 
Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000) have shown that the retrieval of 
verbal information from memory leads the gaze back to spatial locations that were previously 
associated with the retrieved information. Similar memory-driven eye movement behaviour 
during retrieval of past events has been shown in the context of language processing 
(Altmann, 2004), mental imagery (Brandt & Stark, 1997; Johansson et al., 2012, 2006; Laeng et 
al., 2014; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Martarelli & Mast, 2010, 2013; Spivey & Geng, 2001), and 
reasoning and decision-making (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Platzer et al., 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 
2012; Scholz, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2015). 
 Recently, a discussion has emerged as to whether such eye movements during 
memory retrieval are purely an epiphenomenon or whether they play a functional role in the 
retrieval of information from memory (Ferreira et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2009). That is, 
does returning the eyes to a spatial location, which is associated with the to-be-retrieved 
information, facilitate the retrieval of this information from memory? Indeed, it is possible that 
eye movements are functionally related to memory performance. The chain of events might 
occur as follows: While encoding of information from the environment, eye movements are 
stored as part of an episodic memory representation (in the form of a spatial index, Pylyshyn, 
2001; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004). Retrieving parts of the episodic trace, for instance, by 
probing for parts of the stored information, leads to the execution of the spatial index that 
elicits an eye movement to the location where a visual object was presented during encoding 
(Altmann & Kamide, 2007, 2009; Anderson, Chiu, Huette, & Spivey, 2011; Hoover & Richardson, 
2008; Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Renkewitz & Jahn, 
2012; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004 for overviews see Ferreira et al., 2008; Huettig, Mishra, & 
Olivers, 2012; Huettig et al., 2011; Richardson et al., 2009). The binding of information in an 
episodic trace is not limited to object-related features, but applies to action planning and 
sensorimotor processing (Hommel, 1998, 2004), i.e. the execution of an eye movement 
generated in the linked spatial index (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; Spivey & Dale, 2011). In 
recreating this eye movement, memory activation for other associated information increases 
(Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Huettig et al., 2011; Mayberry, Crocker, & Knoeferle, 2009), and 
therefore increases the chance of successfully retrieving the probed information (Johansson 
et al., 2012; Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). 
 Enhanced memory performance by reenacting processes that were engaged at 
encoding is consistent with the principles of “encoding-specifity” (Tulving & Thomson, 1973; 
Tulving, 1983) and “transfer appropriate processing” (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977), that 
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state that memory performance is a function of the degree to which cognitive operations 
engaged at encoding are reenacted at retrieval (see also Foulsham & Kingstone, 2013; Holm & 
Mäntylä, 2007; Mäntylä & Holm, 2006). Furthermore, it is in line with accumulating evidence 
demonstrating that retrieval activates the same brain regions that were active during encoding 
(for an overview see Danker & Anderson, 2010; Kent & Lamberts, 2008; Rugg, Johnson, Park, & 
Uncapher, 2008; Rugg & Wilding, 2000). Taken together, eye movements to empty spatial 
locations should be functional in the retrieval of both visuospatial and verbal information from 
memory. 
 Previous studies looking at looking-at-nothing during retrieval of verbal information 
have reported null results on the relation between eye movements and memory performance 
(Hoover & Richardson, 2008; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000). In the 
classic looking-at-nothing study, Richardson and Spivey (2000) auditorily presented 
participants with semantic statements, which were only loosely associated with a spatial 
location on a screen through a visual cue. For example, participants heard the sentence “Claire 
gave up her tennis career, when she injured her shoulder” while a spinning cross was 
presented in one of four areas of the screen (henceforth called the “relevant area”). 
Subsequently, the screen went blank and participants answered a question about one of the 
presented statements. Participants exhibited LAN, that is, they tended to look back to the 
relevant area during the retrieval phase, even though the to-be-recalled information had been 
presented auditorily and the visual cue was not relevant to the task (Hoover & Richardson, 
2008; Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014). Richardson and Spivey (2000) compared 
participants’ response accuracy between trials with at least one fixation on the relevant area 
(which they defined as “LAN trials”), to trials with no fixations on this area (“no LAN” trials). 
They found no significant difference between the trials. In a similar study also testing verbal 
memory retrieval, Hoover and Richardson (2008) correlated gaze duration on relevant spatial 
locations with response accuracy. Again, they found no effect.  
 There is evidence of a functional relationship between eye movements and memory 
from studies testing visuospatial material (Johansson et al., 2012; Johansson & Johansson, 
2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Martarelli & Mast, 2010). The general 
procedure in these studies was to first associate visuospatial information (e.g., characteristics 
of a tropical fish, see Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002) with distinct spatial locations during a 
preceding encoding phase. During a subsequent retrieval phase, the screen is blank and 
participants are instructed to retrieve the previously encoded information (e.g., the fish’s color 
or orientation in space, see Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). By analyzing participants’ 
spontaneous gaze behaviour during memory retrieval, Martarelli and Mast (2010) showed that 
children gazed more often at the location they were viewing while the respective information 
was encoded when answering correctly than when answering incorrectly. Some studies 
induced an eye movement manipulation, i.e. manipulated eye movements as an independent 
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variable, in order to clarify the relation between eye movements and memory retrieval 
(Johansson et al., 2012; Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Laeng & 
Teodorescu, 2002). For example, Johansson and Johansson (2014) asked participants to 
recall information about previously encountered objects while fixating on either an area 
associated with the to-be-recalled information (congruent) or while fixating on another area 
(incongruent). They found impaired retrieval performance when participants fixated on the 
incongruent area compared to when they fixated on the congruent area. Additionally, 
participants’ response times were longer when fixating on the incongruent compared to the 
congruent area. Taken together, these studies provide converging evidence that eye 
movements indeed play a functional role in memory retrieval of visuospatial information. 
 Can we, therefore, conclude that a functional relationship between eye movements 
and memory retrieval is restricted to the retrieval of visuospatial information and does not 
extend to the retrieval of verbal information? No, because the available evidence on the 
functional relationship between looking-at-nothing and the retrieval of verbal information from 
memory is inconclusive for several reasons. First, measures that have been used to 
investigate the relationship in studies with verbal material (e.g., comparison between one-
fixation and no-fixation trials) are not very sensitive: A single fixation in the relevant area could 
easily be caused by random gaze behaviour. Second, the analyses of the relation between eye 
movements and memory retrieval by Richardson and colleagues were correlational, and thus, 
do not allow for a causal conclusion, because they did not experimentally manipulate gaze 
behaviour. Therefore, Richardson et al. (2009) call for a stronger test of a possible functional 
relationship between looking-at-nothing and verbal memory retrieval: “Until evidence is 
reported where eye movements are manipulated as an independent variable, and memory for 
linguistic information is affected, we choose to remain agnostic.” (p. 235). Third, research 
findings from related fields suggest an interaction between visuospatial and verbal 
components of an episodic memory representation. For example, studies of spoken language 
comprehension found that object fixation can change the interpretation of spoken language 
(Allopenna et al., 1998; Tanenhaus et al., 1995 for an overview see Anderson & Spivey, 2009). 
These findings indicate a strong coupling between eye movements and verbal information 
processing, which is consistent with a grounded perspective on cognition (Barsalou et al., 
2003; Barsalou, 2008; Kent & Lamberts, 2008; Spivey, 2007; Wilson, 2002). Therefore, the 
findings suggest that the relationship between gaze behaviour and memory retrieval might 
also extend to the retrieval of verbal information. 
 The goal of the current study is to clarify the relationship between gaze behaviour and 
the retrieval of verbal information from memory. To do so, we use a variation of the original 
looking-at-nothing paradigm (Richardson & Spivey, 2000) in which memory of verbal 
information is tested by presenting auditory statements that are only loosely associated with a 
spatial location via a task-irrelevant visual cue. In order to clarify the relation between gaze 
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behaviour and verbal information retrieval performance, we test the relation in two different, 
but complementary, ways. During a first block of trials, effects of looking-at-nothing on 
retrieval performance are assessed under a free gaze condition (i.e. participants are allowed to 
gaze freely) by comparing looking-at-nothing trials with correct responses to those with 
incorrect responses. We hypothesize that if eye movements are related to the retrieval of 
associated verbal information, looking-at-nothing should be stronger during retrievals that 
result in correct responses than during retrievals that result in incorrect responses. A second 
block tests the effects of a gaze manipulation on retrieval performance, by comparing retrieval 
performance on trials where a spatial cue is shown in an area associated with the to-be-
recalled information (congruent) to trials where such a cue is shown in another area, i.e. 
adjacent or diagonal areas (incongruent). If eye movements are related to the retrieval of 
associated verbal information, response accuracy should be higher in the congruent than in 
any of the incongruent conditions. Furthermore, if the gaze manipulation affects the 
availability of information held in memory, response times should be shorter in the congruent 
compared to the incongruent conditions. 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Participants 
Twenty-eight native German speaking students from Technische Universität Chemnitz 
participated in the experiment (22 female, mean age 23.4 years, ranging from 19-39). All had 
normal or corrected to normal vision. 
2.3.2 Apparatus 
Participants were seated at a distance of 630 mm in front of a 22’’ computer screen (1680 x 
1050 pixels) with their head in a chin rest. Stimuli were presented with E-Prime 2.0 running on 
a separate computer. An SMI iView RED eye tracker sampled data from the right eye at 120Hz 
with a precision of 0.05° that were recorded with iView X 2.5 following 5-point calibration. Data 
were analyzed with BeGaze 2.3. Fixation detection had a dispersion threshold of 100 pixels 
and a duration threshold of 100 ms (cf. Richardson & Spivey, 2000). 
2.3.3 Material 
Visual stimuli in the encoding phase consisted of a grid dividing the screen into four equal-
sized spatial areas (Figure 2.1) and four black circles in the center of each spatial area. To 
associate spatial areas with the auditory stimuli, a symbol of a loudspeaker appeared in the 
circle of the respective area. During retrieval phases in the free gaze condition, participants 
saw the grid and circles only. During the retrieval phases in the gaze manipulation conditions, 
we manipulated gaze behaviour with a spatial cue (cf. Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010; 
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Theeuwes, 2010; Yantis & Jonides, 1981). The spatial cue was a red dot, blinking at 2 Hz that 
appeared in one of the four circles in the center of each spatial area.  
Auditory stimuli during encoding consisted of 28 sentences. Each sentence was 
comprised of a name and four attributes describing an artificial city (e.g., “In Velbert you can 
find a bicycle museum, a sickle-shaped bay, a red lighthouse and an inland port.”). City names 
were randomly selected small cities from an online resource for German postcodes 
(http://www.postdirekt.de/plzserver/). Attributes consisted of buildings, institutions, sights, 
leisure activities, and industrial sites. From the 28 sentences, seven were randomly selected to 
be used as test sentences during the retrieval phase. For those test sentences, we generated a 
true and a false version for each of the four attributes (e.g., True: “In Velbert you can find a 
bicycle museum”, False: “In Velbert you can find an aircraft museum”). This resulted in 56 test 
statements (7 sentences * 4 attributes * 2 correctness). To control for effects of city names, 
each sentence had two possible names (e.g., Velbert was replaced by Zehdenick for half of the 
participants). Eight additional sentences and their respective test statements were generated 
for the training block. 
2.3.4 Procedure 
The experiment starts with two practice trials, followed by a free gaze block (8 experimental 
trials), and a gaze manipulation block (20 experimental trials). Each trial consisted of an 
encoding phase, which was identical in all conditions, and a retrieval phase, which differed 
between conditions (see Figure 2.1). 
Encoding phase. In the encoding phase of each trial, four sentences were auditorily presented. 
For each sentence, a loudspeaker was shown in one of the four spatial areas. Importantly, the 
speaker symbol provided the only link between the sentence and the spatial area, and it was 
completely irrelevant for successful completion of the task.  
Retrieval phase. In the retrieval phase, participants were auditorily presented with a test 
statement for one of the four encoded sentences and had to press one of two keys on the 
keyboard to indicate whether the statement was true or false (forced choice). Pressing the key 
was possible from the beginning of the retrieval phase. There was no time limit for the 
response, but participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible.  
The retrieval phase differed between gaze conditions as shown in the lower part of Figure 1. In 
order to assess spontaneous looking-at-nothing as a function of response accuracy, the 
experiment started with the free gaze block consisting of 8 trials in which participants gazed 
freely during the retrieval phase. Subsequently, participants completed the gaze manipulation 
block that consisted of 20 trials in which we assessed the effects of gaze behaviour on 
response accuracy. In 12 trials of this block, gaze behaviour during retrieval was manipulated 
by the spatial cue. In the congruent condition, the cue appeared in the area associated with 
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Figure 2.1 Example trial with to-be encoded sentences and a true statement probing the test sentence 
in the retrieval phase. In this example, the relevant area is the top left area, as this is the location 
associated with the test sentence. At the bottom of the figure, eye movement conditions in the retrieval 
phase of the different experimental blocks are illustrated (see main text for a more detailed 
description). 
 
the tested sentence (4 trials). In the incongruent condition, the cue appeared either in the 
diagonal area (4 trials) or in one of the adjacent areas (clockwise or counterclockwise, 4 trials). 
Each participant saw the spatial cue only in one of the adjacent areas. Half of the participants 
saw it in the clockwise area, and the other half saw it in the counterclockwise area. Therefore, 
for each participant, the different cued locations (congruent, adjacent and diagonal) were 
tested equally often. In the remaining 8 trials of the gaze manipulation block, no spatial cue 
was presented. Trials with and without spatial cues were intermingled during the block. We 
selected this design, because it enabled us to maximize the salience of the spatial cue itself 
(because the gaze cue appeared only in 12 out of 20 trials) and ensured that the different cued 
locations were equally salient (because they were tested with equal frequency). Equal salience 
of the locations is important, because otherwise differences in gaze behaviour might be 
caused by differences in salience, rather than by effects of memory retrieval. 
The order of assignment of sentences to blocks and conditions was counterbalanced 
in four ways – the order of presentation and the position of the speaker symbol during 
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encoding, as well as the order of statement presentation and gaze manipulation conditions 
during retrieval. 
2.4 Results 
Mean fixation proportion, based on number of fixations (cf. Richardson & Spivey, 2000), was 
aggregated per trial and participant. Practice trials were not analyzed. A total of ten 
experimental trials were excluded (1.3 % of all trials), because participants pressed the answer 
button before listening to the statement (Response time < 1 s). 
2.4.1 Spontaneous Looking-at-Nothing During Memory Retrieval in the Free Gaze Block 
LAN across all trials. To assess spontaneous looking-at-nothing during memory retrieval, we 
analyzed fixation proportions in the 8 trials of the free gaze block. The spatial area that 
corresponded with the to-be retrieved sentence was coded as a relevant area and the other 
three areas as irrelevant areas 1-3 in a clockwise direction. Table 2.1 shows mean fixation 
proportions and results of contrast tests (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000). A contrast 
weight of three indicates the relevant spatial area in which participants were expected to fixate 
most if they exhibited LAN. The three irrelevant spatial areas were given a contrast weight of -
1. Overall, participants exhibited looking-at-nothing behaviour, as indicated by the higher 
proportion of fixations in the relevant area, than in any of the irrelevant areas. 
LAN for correct and incorrect responses. To test the relationship between spontaneous eye 
movements and response accuracy, we analyzed fixation proportions in trials with correct 
responses (74.1 % of trials in the free gaze block) and trials with incorrect responses (25.9 % 
of trials in the free gaze block). Looking-at-nothing behaviour was indeed stronger when 
participants answered correctly, than when they answered incorrectly. Strong looking-at-
nothing behaviour is defined as fixating most often on the relevant area during a correct trial. 
During incorrect trials, the proportion of fixations in the relevant area decreased and 
participants showed an increased tendency to gaze in the diagonal area (Table 2.1). To 
compare eye movement patterns between correct and incorrect trials, we analyzed the fixation 
proportions in the four spatial areas for those 24 participants who gave both correct and 
incorrect responses. A repeated-measures ANOVA testing fixation proportions confirmed a 
significant interaction between the Spatial Area (relevant, irrelevant 1, irrelevant 2, irrelevant 3) 
and Response Accuracy (correct, incorrect) factors, F(3,69) = 6.32, p = .001, ηp2 = .22, 
indicating that fixation patterns indeed differed between correct and incorrect trials. 
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Table 2.1 Mean fixation proportions (SD s); effect sizes (Hedges’ g), t statistics, and p values for the contrasts of 
spatial area for all cases, only correct and only incorrect responses during the free gaze block.  
Note: Bold values indicate the spatial area with a contrast weight of 3, i.e., in which participants were expected to 
fixate most in each condition. 
 
2.4.2 Eye Movements and Response Accuracy in the Gaze Manipulation Block 
Manipulation check. Before analyzing response accuracy and response times as an effect of 
gaze manipulation, we tested whether the gaze manipulation was successful. Therefore, we 
analyzed fixation proportions in each of the gaze conditions (congruent, incongruent 
clockwise, counterclockwise, and diagonal). In each of those conditions, the manipulation of 
gaze behaviour would be successful if participants showed more fixations in the area with the 
spatial cue than in any other area. To test this, contrast weights were set to +3 for the area 
where the cue was presented and to -1 for the other three areas. The upper part of Table 2.2 
shows mean fixation proportions and results of contrast tests for each location of the spatial 
cue in each of the gaze conditions. In each condition, participants fixated significantly more 
often in the area where the spatial cue was presented than in any other area, confirming that 
the gaze manipulation was successful. The lower part of Table 2.2 shows that in the absence 
of the spatial cue (i.e., during the free gaze trials of the manipulation block), participants 
showed looking-at-nothing as expected. 
Response accuracy. To test effects of the gaze manipulation on response accuracy, we 
compared response accuracy between congruent, incongruent adjacent and incongruent 
diagonal trials. As predicted, response accuracy was higher in the congruent than in both 
incongruent conditions (Figure 2.2, left panel). This result was confirmed by a contrast test 
assigning a weight of +2 to the congruent and -1 to the adjacent and diagonal conditions, t(27) 
= 2.209, p = .04, g = .42. Response accuracy in the  
free gaze trials of the gaze manipulation block was 81.5 % (SD = 16.4 %), which was right in 
between the congruent and incongruent conditions and did not differ significantly from either 
one (congruent: t(27) = 1.20, p = .24; g = .23; incongruent adjacent: t(27) = 0.76, p = .45, g = .14; 
incongruent diagonal: t(27) = 0.88, p = .39, g = .17). 
 
 
 Spatial area Contrast 
 Relevant Irrelevant 1 Irrelevant 2 Irrelevant 3 n t p g 
Contrast weight 3 -1 -1 -1   
Fixation proportions    
     All cases 0.36 (0.12) 0.23 (0.08) 0.21 (0.09) 0.20 (0.07) 28 13.0 <.001 2.5 
     Correct responses 0.38 (0.13) 0.26 (0.10) 0.18 (0.09) 0.18 (0.09) 28 12.2 <.001 2.3 
     Incorrect responses 0.30 (0.23) 0.14 (0.11) 0.36 (0.23) 0.21 (0.16) 24 4.9 <.001 1.0 
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Table 2.2 Mean fixation proportions (SDs); effect sizes (Hedges’ g), t statistics, and p values for the 
contrasts of spatial area for the congruent, incongruent and free gaze conditions during the gaze 
manipulation block. A contrast weight of three marks the spatial area in which participants were 
expected to fixate most in each condition.  
 Spatial area Contrast 
 Relevant  Irrelevant 1 Irrelevant 2 Irrelevant 3 n t p g 
Congruent   
     Contrast weight 3 -1 -1 -1   
     Fixation proportions 0.47 (0.23) 0.16 (0.09) 0.19 (0.09) 0.17 (0.10) 28 9.10 <.001 1.7 
Incongruent clockwise    
     Contrast weight -1 3 -1 -1   
     Fixation proportions 0.28 (0.19) 0.37 (0.27) 0.16 (0.09) 0.19 (0.15) 14 12.61 <.001 3.4 
Incongruent counterclockwise 
     Contrast weight -1 -1 -1 3   
     Fixation proportions 0.20 (0.15) 0.18 (0.12) 0.15 (0.10) 0.48 (0.27) 14 5.12 <.001 1.7 
Incongruent diagonal    
     Contrast weight -1 -1 3 -1     
     Fixation proportions 0.21 (0.16) 0.15 (0.10) 0.48 (0.25) 0.17 (0.11) 28 15.25 <.001 2.9 
Free gaze         
     Contrast weight 3 -1 -1 -1     
     Fixation proportions 0.29 (0.12) 0.22 (0.07) 0.25 (0.10) 0.24 (0.08) 28 9.11 <.001 1.7 
Note: Bold values indicate the spatial area with a contrast weight of 3, i.e., in which participants were expected to 
fixate most in each condition. 
 
Response times. As a second measure indicating the availability of information held in 
memory, we compared response times between the congruent and the two incongruent 
conditions (Figure 2.2, right panel). As expected, averaged median response times were 
shorter in the congruent condition, than in the incongruent adjacent and incongruent diagonal 
conditions. This result was confirmed by a contrast test assigning a weight of -2 to the 
congruent and +1 to the adjacent and diagonal conditions, t(27) = 2.210, p = .04, g = .42. 
Median response times in the free gaze trials of the gaze manipulation block was 1688 ms (SD 
= 283 ms), which was right in between the congruent and incongruent conditions and did not 
differ significantly from either one (congruent: t(27) = 0.61, p = .55; g = .12; incongruent 
adjacent: t(27) = 1.11, p = .28, g = .21; incongruent diagonal: t(27) = 1.33, p = .19, g = .25).  
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Figure 2.2 Mean percent correct responses (left) and average median response times (right) for the 
congruent, incongruent adjacent and incongruent diagonal conditions. Error bars represent one 
standard error. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Recent studies have found a functional relationship between eye movements and the retrieval 
of visuospatial information from memory (Johansson et al., 2012; Johansson & Johansson, 
2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). However, it is unclear whether such a 
relationship extends to the retrieval of verbal information (Richardson et al., 2009). Our results 
help to answer this question by clarifying the relationship between gaze behaviour and the 
retrieval of verbal information in two different ways: We tested (1) gaze behaviour as a 
function of retrieval performance by comparing looking-at-nothing during correct and incorrect 
responses and (2) retrieval performance as a function of gaze behaviour by comparing 
response accuracy and response times during congruent and incongruent fixation conditions. 
An analysis of looking-at-nothing as a function of response accuracy in the memory 
retrieval task revealed stronger looking-at-nothing when participants correctly retrieved 
information than when they responded incorrectly. This finding is comparable to results from 
Martarelli and Mast (2010), who demonstrated a similar effect for preschool children on 
visuospatial material. The decrease of looking-at-nothing during incorrect responses could be 
an indication of the utility of looking-at-nothing in the memory retrieval process. However, this 
effect should be interpreted with caution, because the direction of the assumed causal 
relationship is not clear. When responding incorrectly, a failure to retrieve the correct 
information from memory might have reduced the likelihood of activating the related spatial 
index, thereby causing reduced LAN. At the same time, a failure to activate the relevant spatial 
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index might have reduced the likelihood of retrieving the correct information, thereby causing 
an incorrect response.  
The only method that allows for drawing a causal conclusion about the effect of eye 
movements on memory retrieval is the explicit manipulation of eye movements as 
independent variable (cf. Richardson et al., 2009), as implemented in the second block of our 
experiment. Our results from this block provide evidence for a functional relationship between 
looking-at-nothing and retrieval of verbal information from memory. Response accuracy in the 
retrieval phase was higher and response times were shorter if participants’ gazes in the 
retrieval phase had been manipulated towards the relevant spatial location (congruent 
condition); compared to when gaze has been manipulated away from the relevant location 
(incongruent adjacent and diagonal conditions). To our knowledge, this is the first evidence 
that clearly shows a functional relationship between eye movements and the retrieval of verbal 
information from memory.  
The functional relationship between eye movements and memory retrieval for 
visuospatial information has previously been explained as an overlap between processes 
engaged in encoding and retrieval of a past event stored in episodic memory (Johansson et al., 
2012; Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). Our 
results extend this literature by showing that eye movements also play a functional role in the 
retrieval of verbal information from memory. This holds even if the spatial information is not 
relevant to the task and there is no demand to learn the spatial information (e.g., Richardson & 
Spivey, 2000).  
Furthermore, our results are consistent with a grounded perspective on cognition, 
which assumes that behavioural re-enactment (including body posture, hand- and eye 
movements) of the encoding stage aids retrieval (Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2008; Kent & 
Lamberts, 2008; Spivey, 2007; Wilson, 2002). Cognitive processes, like memory retrieval of 
verbal information, are not independent of oculomotor processing. Instead, they interact with 
each other and form continuous perception-action cycles out of which cognition emerges 
(Anderson & Spivey, 2009; Neisser, 1976; Spivey & Dale, 2011). Thus, oculomotor processes 
like gazing towards a presently empty, but previously associated spatial location can impact 
retrieval performance. 
Re-enactment of processes that occur during encoding can account for superior 
memory performance in the congruent condition. In the incongruent conditions, memory 
retrieval might have been disrupted, because the salient spatial cue that we introduced to 
manipulate gaze behaviour prevented participants from gazing at the relevant spatial location 
(Laeng et al., 2014; Postle, Idzikowski, Sala, Logie, & Baddeley, 2006). Thus, the gaze 
manipulation interfered with the participants’ tendency to look at the associated spatial 
location, thereby degrading memory retrieval performance. The fact that retrieval performance 
in the free gaze condition of our experiment was observed to fall in between the congruent and 
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incongruent conditions suggests that facilitation (in the congruent condition) as well as 
impairment (in the incongruent condition) might play a role. It should be noted that 
conclusions drawn from a comparison between gaze behaviour under free gaze conditions 
and gaze manipulation conditions are difficult, because gaze manipulation might impose an 
additional cognitive load, thereby reducing retrieval performance relative to free gaze 
(Johansson et al., 2012; Martarelli & Mast, 2013; Mast & Kosslyn, 2002). Still, future research 
should investigate the degree to which processes of facilitation and impairment affect 
retrieval performance in the looking-at-nothing paradigm, thereby advancing our 
understanding of the nature of the functional relationship between eye movements and 
memory retrieval. 
In the current study, gaze was manipulated by using a salient spatial cue, which 
attracted participants’ attention either towards (congruent) or away (incongruent) from the 
relevant location. Our results show that the effects of gaze manipulation on retrieval 
performance persist even with a primarily attention-driven manipulation. This finding is 
consistent with Richardson and Spivey (2000) who found that it is not the oculomotor 
movement of the eyes per se that guides the eyes back to associated spatial locations, but 
instead gaze is driven by shifts in visuospatial attention (see also Godijn & Theeuwes, 2012). It 
is also in line with research by Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Llears (2009), who 
showed that shifting ones’ attention, in comparison to moving ones’ eyes in a way that 
corresponds to the solution of an insight problem, was sufficient to raise success rates. A 
possible interpretation of the above results could be that it is the shift in attention, rather than 
the eye movements per se, that causes the functional relationship between looking-at-nothing 
and memory retrieval (cf. Huettig et al., 2011; Theeuwes et al., 2009). A more detailed 
investigation of this assumption will improve our understanding of the utility of gaze behaviour 
and should be a topic for future research. 
In conclusion, our results show that even if verbal information, that is only loosely 
associated with a spatial location, is retrieved from memory, the process of remembering is 
accompanied by eye movements to associated spatial locations. In addition, we found that 
retrieval performance varies as a function of gaze behaviour. Therefore, our results provide 
additional support for the idea that re-enactment of processes that occur during encoding 
increases the likelihood of successful episodic memory retrieval (cf. Tulving, 1983) and show 
that this phenomenon holds regardless of the nature of the to-be-retrieved information. 
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3.1 Abstract 
People fixate on blank locations if relevant visual stimuli previously occupied that location; the 
so-called “looking-at-nothing” effect. While several theories have been proposed to explain 
potential reasons for the phenomenon, no theory has attempted to predict the stability of this 
effect with practice. We conducted an experiment in which participants listened to four 
different sentences. Each sentence was associated with one of four areas on the screen and 
was presented 12 times. After every presentation participants heard a statement probing one 
sentence, while the computer screen was blank. More fixations were found to be located in 
areas associated with the probed sentence than in other locations. Moreover, the more trials 
participants had completed, the less frequently they exhibited looking-at-nothing behaviour. 
Fixations on blank locations seem to occur when an attempt is made to retrieve information 
associated with a spatial location as long as it is not strongly represented in memory. 
 
Keywords: Eye tracking, practice, spatial cognition, mental representation, working memory 
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3.2 Introduction 
When processing information from the visual world, human cognition integrates visual and 
auditory input with abstract, higher level mental representations (e.g., Huettig et al., 2011). 
Reactivation of such a memory representation leads the gaze back to spatial locations or 
areas that were previously occupied by relevant information. For example, when we mention 
something about a table presented on a whiteboard, we might point towards the whiteboard, 
even if the table is no longer there anymore.  
Richardson and Spivey (2000) were among the first to show a close link between eye 
movements, auditory information processing and semantic information processing, in an 
information-retrieval task. Participants were presented with a spinning cross in one of four 
equal-sized areas on a computer screen together with spoken factual information. After four 
facts were presented, participants heard a statement probing one of the presented facts and 
had to judge the truth of the statement. During this retrieval phase the computer screen was 
blank. Participants fixated more in the relevant area where the sought-after information was 
presented compared to other areas on the screen. 
This so-called “looking-at-nothing” behaviour (e.g., Hoover & Richardson, 2008; 
Richardson & Kirkham, 2004) also occurs when the probed information is presented visually 
(Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2010; Spivey & Geng, 2001), when information 
is anticipated (Altmann & Kamide, 2007), in light and in complete darkness (Johansson et al., 
2006), and for simple (Brand & Stark, 1997) and more complex pictures (Johansson et al., 
2006; Johansson, Holsanova, & Kenneth, 2010). 
Ferreira et al. (2008) assume a memory representation of an object or event that 
integrates visual, auditory and spatial information and leads to a corresponding visual, 
linguistic, spatial, and conceptual representation. When one part of this integrated memory 
representation is reactivated, other parts are retrieved, as well. This in turn causes gazing 
behaviour toward the location where the information was previously presented. For example, 
seeing a table on a whiteboard leads to the activation of a visual as well as conceptual 
representation of the table. Additionally, spoken language leads to the formation of a linguistic 
representation. The visual world leads to the activation of a spatial index (Pylyshyn, 2001), 
which can be used later to direct our gaze back to the area on a whiteboard, where the figure 
was previously presented.  
Huettig et al. (2011) recently proposed a general framework to describe how linguistic 
and visual representations are bound together in an integrated memory representation. Their 
model, like that of Ferreira et al. (2008), assumes the integration of information in a connected 
visual, linguistic, spatial, and conceptual representation. It further includes ideas proposed by 
Altmann and Kamide (2007), Knoeferle and Krocker (2007), and Spivey (2007). Here, we briefly 
introduce their framework. It is worthwhile to note that they include a detailed description of 
how integrated memory representations can be linked to existing theories of long-term and 
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working memory (cf. Baddeley, 2000). Huettig et al. (2011) propose that language-vision 
interactions are based on long-term memory, where conceptual representations (e.g., the 
concept of a figure or of a whiteboard) are derived from. Therefore, long-term memory serves 
as a stable knowledge base. It is then working memory that grounds cognition in space and 
time and leads to the formation of short-term connections between objects (e.g., spoken 
language, a figure, and a whiteboard). Contents of working memory are linked to contents of 
long-term memory via spatial indices. Because of this association working memory can 
instantiate a gaze back to the object. In describing connections between memory 
representations, Huettig et al. (2011) assume that the stronger the association between the 
linguistic and conceptual representations the higher “the probability of triggering a saccadic 
eye-movement” (p. 5). 
Richardson et al. (2009) share Huettig at al.’s (2011) general idea of an integrated 
memory representation. In contrast, however, they suggest that only sparse internal 
representations are built during the encoding of information. They assume that during 
information retrieval, an eye movement can be launched to the associated area in order to 
gather more information. This occurs when the spatial pointer (i.e., the visual part of the 
integrated memory representation) does not include the searched information: “If the pointer’s 
tag does not include the attribute, then the pointer’s address to the external environment is the 
next obvious resource” (Spivey, 2007, p. 298). The link between information sampling from the 
environment and eye movements can be understood as the covert orienting of visual-spatial 
attention (e.g., Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995). Targeting a position makes it necessary to 
allocate attention towards that place. Because it is impossible to make an eye movement 
without an attentional movement (Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986), attending to 
information stored in an integrated memory representation leads to eye movements towards 
associated spatial areas. 
Summarizing, we conclude that during the encoding of information a memory 
representation is formed from different modalities. However, theories diverge in terms of how 
much information is included in the memory representation and how this in turn affects the 
looking-at-nothing behaviour. Ferreira et al. (2008) assume that the probability of triggering an 
eye movement increases with the strength of the association between the linguistic and 
conceptual representation. Consequently, one could predict that looking-at-nothing behaviour 
becomes stronger with an increasing association between these representations. Spivey 
(2007), on the other hand, proposes that looking-at-nothing mainly occurs for the purposes of 
gathering information not yet included in the mental representation. In line with this one might 
conclude that looking-at-nothing diminishes as relevant information is included in the memory 
representation.  
To test these assumptions we varied the degree to which information is included in 
memory representation. More precisely, we manipulated the degree of practice in a task, 
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where auditory information, which is associated with contents from a visual scene, has to be 
retrieved from memory. With more practice, the strength with which retrieval-relevant 
information is represented in memory increases (e.g., Anderson & Schooler, 1991). If looking-
at-nothing increases with practice, then Huettig et al.’s assumptions would be supported. On 
the other hand, if looking-at-nothing decreases with practice, our findings would support 
Spivey (2007) and conclude that looking-at-nothing varies with the degree of relevant 
information included in the mental representation. 
3.3 Experiment 
To test looking-at-nothing behaviour under different levels of practice we conducted an 
experiment in which participants were presented with four different sentences. Each sentence 
described an artificial scene. The same set of four sentences was presented in each of 12 
experimental trials. After every presentation trial a retrieval phase followed in which one of the 
four sentences was probed. In every trial each sentence was associated with the same spatial 
location on a computer screen.  
3.3.1 Method 
Participants. Eighteen students (14 female; age M = 22.8) from Technische Universität 
Chemnitz participated in the experiment. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
with contact lenses. All participants were native German speakers. 
Apparatus and material. Participants were seated in front of a computer screen at a distance 
of 630 mm and instructed to position their head in a chin rest. The eye tracker system SMI 
iView REDpt was used to sample data of the right eye at 50 Hz with a precision of 0.05°. Data 
were recorded with iView X 1.7 and analyzed with BeGaze 2.3 and MatLab 7.0.1 software 
programs. Stimuli in the experiment were presented using E-Prime 2.0 on a 380 mm × 305 mm 
computer screen with a resolution of 800 × 600 pixels. 
The visual stimuli consisted of a grid dividing the screen into four equal-sized areas 
with a fixation cross at the center of the grid. Each set of four sentences was associated with 
the same symbol – a black circle with a white loudspeaker in it – which appeared in one of the 
four areas of the grid depending on the sentence that was presented. 
The auditory stimuli presented in the presentation trial consisted of four prerecorded 
sentences each describing three attributes of an artificial scene (e.g., “There is a place with a 
purple lighthouse, a sickle-shaped bay, and a wooden church.”). To test gaze behaviour in the 
retrieval phase, we generated 24 statements: A true and a false version for each of the four 
statements multiplied by three attributes (The false statement probing the example sentence 
from above was “There is a place with a wooden cottage.”). Figure 3.1 shows 1 of the 12 
experimental trials. 
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Figure 3.1 Example trial with the four experimental sentences (presentation phase) and a statement 
probing the first sentence (retrieval phase). Original materials were in German. 
 
Procedure. To mask study intentions, students were told they were participating in a study 
concerning pupil dilation that involved solving a memory task. No instructions concerning 
gaze behaviour were provided. The eye tracker was calibrated using a 9-point calibration 
method. This procedure lasted between 5 and 10 min. Subsequently, the 12 experimental trials 
started. In each of the 12 trials, the same four sentences were presented in random order. 
Every sentence always appeared with the symbol in the same area on the screen at 
presentation duration of 30 s. 
After presentation of the fourth sentence within a trial, the retrieval phase followed. 
Participants heard a statement, which referred to a fact from one of the four sentences, and 
judged it to be true or false. To observe participants’ gaze behaviour, they were intentionally 
not instructed to reply as soon as possible. Presentation of one statement lasted 4 s. 
Statements were randomly assigned to trials and participants with the restriction that every 
statement was probed once for each participant. Participants had to answer the true or the 
false version of a statement balanced across trials and participants such that every participant 
was presented with six true and six false statements. A true statement was recorded when 
participants responded verbally with “right” and a false statement with “wrong”. Immediately 
following this response, the investigator pressed a key signaling the start of the next trial. In 
this way, participants were not required to look at the keyboard (This procedure was chosen to 
prevent gazing away from the monitor towards the keyboard, which could have led to loss in 
quality of eye tracking data). After depressing the key, the investigator noted the participant’s 
response on a sheet of paper. During the 12 experimental trials and their retrieval phases, gaze 
data were recorded. Afterwards, participants filled out a questionnaire which interrogated 
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demographic variables and the assumed goal of the study. Before leaving, participants were 
informed about the true nature of the study. 
Analysis. To assess participants’ performance, we collected data on the accuracy of their 
responses and response times (i.e., the time beginning with the retrieval phase and ending 
with a participant’s reply as noted by the investigator). As reaction times are prone to error 
through outliers (e.g., when an investigator does not stop recording immediately upon a 
participant’s response) we did not exclude outliers but used median reaction times for further 
analysis. 
To assess looking-at-nothing, gaze data from the beginning of the retrieval phase to a 
participant’s reply (i.e., analogous to response time) was analyzed. Four adjacent “areas of 
interest” (AOIs) were defined corresponding to the four areas on the screen. Numbers of 
fixations in every AOI were counted per person and per trial. A fixation was defined as having a 
minimum duration of 100 ms and a maximum dispersion of 100 pixels (1.3° visual angle). The 
AOI associated with a probed sentence is called the “relevant area”. Gaze behaviour was 
analyzed, whereby trials were discarded in which tracking data was missing for > 40 % of the 
trial duration (8 % of all trials). Missing tracking data was caused by blinks, lost pupil or 
corneal reflectance, or looking away from the screen. 
To test the independent variable practice, we aggregated the number of fixations in 
the AOIs as well as the performance data over sets of four experimental trials. This allowed us 
to compare three conditions of practice: block 1 (consisting of trials 1–4), block 2 (trials 5–8), 
and block 3 (trials 9–12). 
Number of fixations and median reaction times were only analyzed for trials that were 
answered correctly. 
3.3.2 Results 
Performance measures. Overall, mean percentage of correct responses to the statements 
was M = 87.8 % (SD = 20.8 %), suggesting that the material was neither too difficult to 
memorize nor too easy to learn. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect for accuracy over the three blocks, F(2,34) = 11.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .40. Bonferroni post-
hoc tests showed an increase in performance from the first to the second block, Mb1 = 73 % vs. 
Mb2 = 93 %, p = .004, and from the first to the third block, Mb1 = 73 % vs. Mb3=97 %, p =.005. 
There was no significant change in performance from the second to the third block, Mb2 = 93 % 
vs. Mb3 = 97 %, p = 1.00. 
The median reaction time to the statement in the retrieval phase was 6206 ms (SD = 
1617 ms). Over the three blocks of practice participants became faster in correctly responding, 
Greenhouse-Geisser-corrected F(1,48;34) = 9.61, p = .002, ηp2 = .36.  
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Bonferroni post-hoc tests confirm a decrease in the median reaction times from the 
first to the second block Mb1 = 7211 ms vs. Mb2 = 5798 ms, p = .016 and from the first to the 
third block, Mb1 = 7211 ms vs. Mb3=5608 ms, p = .009. Again, there is no difference between the 
second and the third block, Mb2 = 5798 ms vs. Mb3 = 5608 ms, p = 1.00. Response accuracy and 
median reaction times showed that the practice manipulation was successful. With more 
practice, participants answered correctly more often and replied more quickly to the 
statements. 
Mean number of fixations. 
Exemplary gaze behaviour of a typical participant. Figure 3.2 shows scan paths of a typical 
participant for the presentation and the retrieval phase of three trials, where the relevant area 
was on the bottom right. Lines show saccades and circles represent fixations with bigger  
 
Presentation phase  Retrieval phase 
Block 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Block 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Block 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Scan paths of one participant for a trial in block 1 (top), a trial in block 2 (middle) and a trial 
in block 3 (bottom) with the critical area at the bottom right. Left: presentation phase (scan paths of 
four sentence presentations)2, right: retrieval phase. 
                                                        
2 Longer fixations at the bottom right area are only shown by displayed data and not systematically. To control 
for gaze biases the critical area was randomized across trials.  
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circles indicating longer fixations. Scan paths on the top left and right side of Figure 3.2 show 
a trial from block 1. In this trial, the sentence that was associated with the symbol in the 
bottom right area of the screen was probed for the first time. Scan paths on the left and right 
side in the middle of Figure 3.2 show a trial from block 2. In this trial, the sentence on the 
bottom right was probed for the second time. Scan paths on the left and right side on the 
bottom of Figure 3.2 show gaze behaviour when the sentence was probed for the third time 
(block 3). Comparing scan paths from top to bottom on the left side of Figure 3.2, scan paths 
reveal that throughout the experiment the participant kept on following the symbols during the 
presentation phase. In comparison, gaze behaviour in the retrieval phase (Figure 3.2, right) 
seems to change over the experiment. In block 1, the participant directs several gazes to the 
relevant area (Figure 3.2, top right). With increasing practice, fewer fixations in the relevant 
area are made (middle and bottom right). 
 
Aggregated gaze behaviour. Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of fixations in the relevant area 
during the retrieval phase. Proportions were aggregated for each block and across 
participants. Participants showing looking-at-nothing behaviour should fixate in the relevant 
area during the retrieval phase. To test this, for each block, we compared the proportion of 
fixations in the relevant area with a chance level of 25 %. In block 1, the proportion of fixations 
in the relevant area (37.2 %) is indeed above chance, tb1(17) = 2.09, p = .05, g = .99. In blocks 2 
and 3 the proportion of fixations in the relevant area were at chance levels, mean proportion 
block 2: 17.9 %, tb2(17) = -1.73, p = .10, g = .82; mean proportion block 3: 28.5 %, tb3(17) = 0.81, 
p = .43, g = .38. These results suggest that looking-at-nothing diminished from block 1 to block 
2 and that the proportion of fixations did not vary meaningfully from chance in block 3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Fixation proportions in the relevant area across blocks. Error bars represent one standard 
error, dotted line indicates chance level. Error bars show standard errors. 
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3.4 Discussion 
Theories on the link between eye movements and auditory and semantic information 
processing (Huettig et al., 2011) assume that during the encoding of information an integrated 
memory representation is formed from different modalities. However, these theories do not 
agree on how much information is included in the memory representation. Using the looking-
at-nothing paradigm, we tried to shed some light on this question. 
Assuming an integrated memory representation as proposed by Ferreira et al. (2008), 
the probability of triggering an eye movement during retrieval of information from memory will 
increase with the strength of the association between the different parts of the representation. 
Spivey (2007), on the other hand, proposed that only sparse internal representations are built 
during the encoding of information. Consequently, eye movements during memory retrieval 
occur mainly to gather information that is not yet included in the mental representation. 
According to Ferreira et al. (2008), looking-at-nothing should increase with practice, while for 
Spivey (2007) the same behaviour should diminish with practice. 
Practice was induced by presenting participants with a set of four sentences, 12 times. 
Each presentation phase was followed by a retrieval phase where one sentence was probed. 
To test whether the manipulation was successful, we first checked if participants showed 
increasing performance in the retrieval task. Results show that over the three blocks, 
participants indeed replied with increasing accuracy and speed to the facts probing the 
presented sentences. Accuracy as well as response times revealed that the performance 
increase was stronger from the first to the second block, than from the second to the third 
block. It seems that over the three blocks of practice memory associations for the sentences 
were strengthened leading to more correct and faster responses. Therefore, we conclude that 
the practice manipulation was successful. 
The question we wished to answer was how looking-at-nothing behaviour would be 
affected by the content of the memory representation. In block 1, participants looked more 
often to the relevant area on the screen than a chance level of 25 % would predict. In blocks 2 
and 3 looking-at-nothing diminished. In both blocks, fixations in the relevant area did not 
amount to more than that predicted by a chance level of 25 %. 
Results of the first block replicated results of Richardson and Spivey (2000), which 
showed a close relationship between gaze behaviour and language processing. In block 1, 
information was not strongly represented in memory. Eye movements were launched to the 
relevant area on the screen in order to collect information from the visual scene. For blocks 2 
and 3 we assumed that the looking-at-nothing behaviour would become stronger or diminish, 
respectively. Our results were not in line with the predictions of Huettig et al. (2011), which 
stated that looking-at-nothing becomes stronger as the association in memory is 
strengthened. While performance improved over the three blocks, looking-at-nothing did not 
increase in strength. Our results seem to support the assumption of Spivey (2007) that 
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looking-at-nothing behaviour is executed to gather more information from the environment. In 
blocks 2 and 3, the memory representation might have included all relevant information. Thus, 
addressing an eye movement to the relevant area on the screen became “unnecessary”.  
We found that looking-at-nothing varies with the content of the memory 
representation. This supports the work of Richardson et al. (2009), who assume the existence 
of an internal memory story, whereby all relevant information is stored in an integrated 
memory representation, and an external memory store (O’Regan, 1992), which assumes only 
sparse memory representations and uses a spatial index to address the visual world. 
Moreover, these are not mutually exclusive abilities of the cognitive system. Instead, the 
cognitive system can use both. The question is, when do we rely on an internal memory 
representation and when on an external memory store? Hoover and Richardson (2008) and 
Johansson et al. (2010) suggest that looking-at-nothing helps to relieve working memory when 
information is retrieved from memory. For example, Johansson et al. (2010) presented 
participants with an auditory description of a complex scene while participants had to fixate 
the center of a whiteboard. In a second condition they saw the picture of a complex scene but 
again had to fixate on the center of the picture’s scene. In both conditions, when they had to 
retell the information they had heard, and when they had to describe the visual scene, they 
drew the scene with their eyes on the whiteboard and did not maintain a central fixation. In 
contrast, in a study reported by Brand and Stark (1997), simple block patterns were used. 
During retrieval of the block pattern, participants were allowed to look freely around the scene 
but kept a central fixation. Therefore, Johansson et al. (2010) argue that looking-at-nothing 
behaviour can relieve working memory load when task demands (e.g., a complex scene 
description) require it.  
Applying the findings of Johansson et al. (2010) to our results suggests that when 
memory load is high, looking-at-nothing is shown. When memory load is low – because all 
relevant information has been learned – looking-at-nothing behaviour diminishes. Indeed, in 
block 1 of our study, when the presented material was new to participants, looking-at-nothing 
was shown. Later, when the material was strongly represented in memory, looking-at-nothing 
diminished. 
Decreased looking-at-nothing behaviour might also be explained as the result of 
participants realizing over the course of the experiment that the visual area they refixate on no 
longer includes relevant information and therefore, this behaviour becomes redundant. This 
implies that participants consciously control their gaze behaviour. However, eye movements 
as described in the context of the looking-at-nothing effect are a highly automatic and 
unconscious behaviour (Rayner, 2009). Furthermore, if change in gaze behaviour were due to 
conscious control (i.e., participants realize that during the retrieval phase, nothing is present 
anymore), we would then expect looking-at-nothing to diminish within the first block. Looking 
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at data of the first four trials, we could not find such a tendency. Moreover, in the post-
questionnaire participants did not report that they controlled their gaze behaviour. 
We also realize that looking-at-nothing might not only diminish because participants 
have learned the material, but because they have given an automatic response to the stimuli 
that does not include fixations to the relevant area. To rule out this alternative explanation one 
could present participants with the same sentences throughout the course of the experiment 
and sentences that change from trial to trial. If it is indeed the content of the integrated 
memory representation that is responsible for looking-at-nothing behaviour, our results should 
be replicated in a way that looking-at-nothing behaviour diminishes for stable sentences and 
does not diminish for new sentences. 
From the results of this study it can be concluded that information is represented 
internally, and that under certain conditions the external world is addressed in order to gather 
more information (Spivey, 2007). We have further shown that both ways of retrieving 
information are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Richardson et al., 2009). But, when is 
knowledge presented internally and when do we use an external memory store? We propose 
that working memory load may influence the decision to use either an internal or external 
memory store. However, a distinct boundary need not be imposed between these two modes 
of storage. Spivey (2007) proposes that knowledge representations can be described in a 
vague manner. That is, information can belong to both internal and external storages. 
(Bocklisch, Bocklisch, Baumann, Scholz, & Krems, 2010) highlighted a relationship between the 
concept of vagueness and knowledge representations. This link could inform future research 
that tests the usefulness of this approach for the investigation of mental representations. 
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4.1 Abstract 
Recent research suggests that when people retrieve information from memory they tend to 
fixate on the location where the information had appeared during encoding. We used this 
phenomenon to investigate if different information is activated in memory when people use a 
rule- versus a similarity-based decision strategy. In two studies, participants first memorized 
multiple pieces of information about various job candidates (exemplars). In subsequent test 
trials they judged the suitability of new candidates that varied in their similarity to the 
previously learned exemplars. Results show that when using similarity, but not when using a 
rule, participants fixated longer on the previous location of exemplars that resembled the new 
candidates than on the location of dissimilar exemplars. This suggests that people using 
similarity retrieve previously learned exemplars, whereas people using a rule do not. The 
experiment illustrates that eye movements can provide new insights into the memory 
processes underlying decision-making. 
 
Keywords: similarity, eye movements, process tracing, looking-at-nothing, multi-cue decision-
making, episodic memory 
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4.2 Introduction 
A fundamental distinction in cognitive psychology refers to the contrast between similarity- 
and rule-based cognitive processes. Although this distinction is intuitively appealing and has 
stimulated much empirical research, it has proved difficult to pin down on the process level 
(e.g., Barsalou, 1990; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Milton, Wills, & Hodgson, 2009; Pothos, 2005). One 
reason could be the core difference between rule-based and similarity-based processes in how 
information is processed in memory (Hahn & Chater, 1998). This makes the differences 
between similarity- and rule-based processes difficult to experiment, because memory 
processes are invisible. For instance, when studying decision processes it is easy to observe 
what people chose, but not whether people made a choice by focusing on the information 
provided or by retrieving similar decisions from memory. Recent research has suggested that 
eye movements can be used to trace information search in memory (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; 
Renkewitz & Jahn, 2010, 2012; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000); we 
show in the present work that recording eye movements can be used to make differences in 
memory retrieval between people using similarity- and rule-based strategies visible, providing a 
possible method for disentangling the two strategies on the process level. 
4.2.1 Using Eye Movements to Make Information Search in Memory Visible 
Studying cognitive processes that rely on memory, such as categorization, reasoning, problem 
solving, and decision-making, can be challenging because the processes of interest are not 
directly observable. Researchers have tackled this problem by developing indirect methods, 
using self-reports, computational modeling, and reaction times to gain a window into the mind 
(Anderson, 1987; Bröder, 2000; Johnson & Krems, 2001; Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2011; 
Mehlhorn et al., 2011; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Although these methods provide 
valuable data, they also have important drawbacks. For instance, self-reports about memory 
processes are often inaccurate and incomplete, and asking about them can affect the process 
itself (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2010; Russo, Johnson, & Stephens, 1989).  
Alternatively, eye movements can be used to trace information search (Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2011; Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013; Peterson & Beck, 2011). Eye movements are 
quick, frequent, and highly automatic actions (Irwin, 2004; Rayner, 2009; Spivey & Dale, 2011; 
van Gompel et al., 2007) that have been shown to reflect attention and information search in a 
variety of tasks, such as concept learning (Nelson & Cottrell, 2007; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005), 
text comprehension (Allopenna et al., 1998; Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Altmann, 2004; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1995), and decision-making (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Orquin & Mueller 
Loose, 2013). Lately, evidence has been accumulating that eye movements can also be used 
to trace memory processes. When people retrieve information from memory they look at 
spatial locations where the information was originally presented — even if the information is 
no longer visible (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; Johansson et al., 2012, 2006; Laeng et al., 2014; 
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Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Martarelli & Mast, 2013; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; Richardson 
& Spivey, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2001). In the classic paradigm, Richardson and Spivey (2000) 
presented participants with a spinning cross in one of four equal-sized areas on a computer 
screen together with spoken factual information. In a later test phase, participants heard a 
statement regarding the presented facts and had to judge the truth of the statement. Even 
though during this retrieval phase the computer screen was blank, participants fixated more 
often on the spatial area where the sought-after information had been presented than on the 
other three areas on the screen.  
Most likely, people show this “looking-at-nothing” effect because during encoding, 
information from multiple sources of input, including the locations of perceived objects, is 
integrated into an episodic memory representation. Once the episodic memory representation 
is reactivated during retrieval it spreads activation to the motor system, which in turn leads to 
the execution of eye movements back to the locations linked with the memory representation 
(Huettig et al., 2012, 2011; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004). The exact role eye movements play 
in the retrieval process is still debated (e.g., Ferreira et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2009), but 
early evidence suggests that eye movements can also facilitate memory retrieval (Johansson 
& Johansson, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Scholz, Mehlhorn, & Krems, 2014). 
Recent research suggests that the looking-at-nothing effect can also be used to trace 
retrieval processes in higher order cognitive processes such as decision-making and 
diagnostic reasoning. For instance, Renkewitz and Jahn (2010, 2012) found that when 
participants had to retrieve information about two alternatives to make a decision, they looked 
at the location where the information about the alternatives had previously appeared. 
Furthermore, gaze patterns during retrieval were consistent with the information search 
predicted by the decision strategies participants used. Similarly, Jahn and Braatz (2014) 
showed that during a diagnostic reasoning task, people tended to look at locations associated 
with symptoms they had to retrieve from memory to test hypotheses about what caused the 
symptom. More importantly, the eye movements reflected the diagnostic value of the 
symptoms and how participants updated their hypotheses about the causes over time. These 
findings suggest that eye movements are not automatically launched to all associated spatial 
locations but reflect target-oriented information search in memory during the reasoning 
process. 
In sum, spatial information about the location of information is stored along with the 
memory of it. Retrieving the respective memory triggers eye movements to the associated 
locations. These eye movements reflect the currently active memory representation and 
provide researchers with a new method for monitoring information search in memory. We 
used this method to differentiate memory processes involved in similarity- and rule-based 
judgments and decisions.  
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4.2.2 Memory Retrieval in Similarity- and Rule-based Processes 
The distinction between rule- and similarity-based processes is fundamental to understanding 
human cognition and has stimulated research in a broad range of fields, from categorization 
and decision-making (e.g., Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Erickson, Kruschke, 
Blair, Fragassi, Johansen, & Nosofsky, 1998; Persson & Rieskamp, 2009; Pothos & Hahn, 2000) 
to reasoning (Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992) and language acquisition (Pinker & Prince, 
1988). In general, it is assumed that rule-based processes involve the application of previously 
abstracted knowledge to specific instances (Hahn & Chater, 1998). That is, people form a rule 
defining the relationship between a specific piece of information and the decision outcome 
and apply it when confronted with a new decision problem (Bröder et al., 2010; Juslin, 
Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Küpper, 2012; Persson & Rieskamp, 
2009; von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 2010; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008, 2009). For 
instance, when deciding to take one’s bike or car in the morning, one could have learned the 
rule that it is better to take the car when it is raining. In contrast, similarity processes are 
generally characterized by the retrieval of similar instances or exemplars from memory (Bröder 
et al., 2010; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Hahn et al., 2010; Juslin & Persson, 2002). That is, when 
deciding to take the car or the bike in the morning, one might think back to similar occasions 
and compare how well one fared when taking the bike. 
A core theoretical distinction that has been proposed is that the two processes differ 
in the way mental representations of stored information are accessed (Bailey, 2005; Hahn & 
Chater, 1998). Similarity-based processes involve comparing the object under consideration to 
exemplars stored in memory. In contrast, rule-based processes involve processing the 
information an object under consideration provides according to the processing steps 
specified by the rule. Accordingly, in a decision task the object’s attributes are matched 
against the conditions for choosing the respective options as specified in the rule. This 
suggests that similarity-based but not rule-based processes require the retrieval of previously 
encountered instances from memory. Consistently, similarity-based judgments rely more on 
episodic memory than rule-based judgments (Hoffmann et al., 2014). However, direct evidence 
that similarity- and rule-based processes rely on different retrieval processes is scarce (Ashby 
& O’Brien, 2005). One problem is that differentiating the two processes is far from trivial on a 
conceptual and empirical level (Barsalou, 1990; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Markman et al., 2005; 
Pothos, 2005). Research trying to tease apart rule- and similarity-based processes has 
frequently relied on computational modeling approaches (e.g., Bröder et al., 2010; Juslin et al., 
2008; Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2007; Nosofsky & Bergert, 
2007; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Persson & Rieskamp, 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von 
Helversen, Karlsson, Mata, & Wilke, 2013; von Helversen et al., 2010). Although computational 
modeling approaches can provide relevant insights into the cognitive processes underlying 
behaviour, there are important limitations. First, the decision of which model best describes 
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the data is usually based on some measure of goodness of fit. However, depending on the 
selected measure the results may diverge considerably (Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, & 
Wagenmakers, 2013). Furthermore, just because a model can predict the outcome of a 
decision process does not necessarily mean it also reflects the underlying cognitive 
processes. Indeed, looking at process data may reveal that a model misses important aspects 
of the cognitive processes leading to the decision (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008). Accordingly, it 
seems necessary to complement cognitive modeling approaches with process data to reach a 
full understanding of the cognitive processes underlying a decision (see also Schulte-
Mecklenbeck et al., 2011). 
We used the looking-at-nothing effect to clarify how memory processes involved in 
similarity- and rule-based decisions differ. Specifically, if rule and similarity processes differ in 
the information that is retrieved from memory when making a decision, it should be possible to 
make these search processes visible by associating exemplars with specific spatial locations 
and then tracking the eye movements during the retrieval process to capture information 
search in memory. If people retrieve exemplars from memory when relying on a similarity-
based process, the looking-at-nothing effect would predict that people gaze back at associated 
exemplar locations. In contrast, if people do not retrieve similar exemplars from memory when 
using a rule, fixation on the locations associated with exemplars should be rare. Furthermore, 
when using an exemplar-based strategy the eye movements to exemplar locations should be a 
function of the exemplars’ similarity, because the probability with which an exemplar is 
retrieved from memory depends on the exemplar’s similarity to the object under evaluation 
(Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Hintzman, 1988; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997).  
To test these hypotheses, we conducted two experiments using a multi-cue decision 
paradigm. We chose this type of problem because the assumption that people rely on rule- and 
similarity-based strategies to make decisions is widespread (Bröder et al., 2010; Hahn et al., 
2010; Juslin et al., 2003, 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Persson & 
Rieskamp, 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von Helversen et al., 2010, 2013).  
4.3 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 examined if relying on a rule versus relying on similarity leads to different 
information retrieval from memory. Participants had to decide if job candidates applying for a 
position were suitable, that is, whether they should be invited for an interview or rejected. In a 
training phase participants learned information about two suitable and two unsuitable job 
candidates. In a subsequent test phase they were instructed to decide if new job candidates 
should be invited, either by using a rule that was provided to them or by using similarity to the 
previously learned job candidates (exemplars). To study eye movements, the information 
about the four exemplars was presented in four different locations on the screen during the 
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training phase. During the test phase we used the eye movements to the exemplar locations to 
measure memory retrieval. 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants 
We included participants in the experiment only if the tracking validity reached a visual angle 
smaller than 2°. This was the case for 63 participants. From the 63, we excluded 10 
participants from the analyses, 5 because they did not decide according to the instructed 
strategy and 5 because in the majority of trials less than 60 % of eye movement data was 
recorded (see Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012, for a similar procedure). The final 53 participants were 
all students from Technische Universität Chemnitz (34 female; Mage = 22.4 years, range 18 – 
31 years). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision with glasses or contact lenses. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the different strategy conditions, 27 to the rule 
condition and 26 to the similarity condition. For their participation they received course credit 
and a performance-dependent bonus (M = 4.80 euros). On average, the experiment lasted 60 
min.  
Apparatus  
Participants were seated in front of a 22-inch computer screen (resolution: 1680 × 1050 pixels) 
at a distance of 630 mm and instructed to position their head in a chin rest. Stimuli were 
presented using E-Prime 2.0 running on a separate computer. The eye tracker system SMI 
iView RED120 sampled data of the right eye at 120 Hz and recorded with iView X 2.5 following 
a 5-point calibration. Auditory material was presented via headphones. All auditory recordings 
were spoken by a female voice using a shell script in Mac OS X. Participants responded by 
pressing one of two keys on a standard keyboard or with mouse clicks on cue values. Data 
were analyzed with BeGaze 2.3. Fixation detection followed a dispersion threshold of 2° of 
visual angle and a duration threshold of 100 msec. 
Decision Task 
In the decision task, participants decided to invite job candidates for an interview or reject 
them based on information on three attribute dimensions (i.e., cues). The decision task 
consisted of three phases: a memorization phase, a strategy-learning phase, and a test phase 
(see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 Schematic illustration of the three phases in Experiment 1. Participants started with the 
memorization phase in which they had to learn the information about the four learning candidates. The 
candidates appeared in four rectangles in the upper two-thirds of the screen. Note for the figure we 
increased the size of the boxes in the memorization phase to enhance readability. The actual 
distribution of the learning candidates’ locations on the screen is reflected in the illustrations of the 
strategy learning and the test phase. In the study all cue information was written in the same font size. 
During the strategy-learning phase participants decided whether to invite the learning candidates for an 
interview following either a rule-based or a similarity-based strategy. Participants were told which 
training candidate they were evaluating in each trial via headphones. During the decision, the 
rectangles within which the information on the four candidates had appeared were visible but empty. In 
addition, a bottom rectangle appeared that contained information about the strategy participants 
should use. During the test phase, all rectangles remained visible but did not contain any information. 
The information about the test candidates participants evaluated was provided via headphones. 
Original materials were in German. 
 
 
Memorization phase. During the memorization phase participants memorized information 
about four male “learning” candidates (candidates used in the memorization and strategy-
learning phases). For each learning candidate participants learned the candidate’s name, his 
values on the three cues, and whether he had been invited to an interview. The three cues were 
knowledge of a foreign language (with cue values French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish), 
possession of computer skills (with cue values HTML, Photoshop, SPSS, and SQL), and 
previous work experience (with cue values automobile industry, financial sector, mobile phone 
industry, and pharmaceutical industry). Names of the learning (and test) candidates were 
taken from an online resource for popular first names (http://www.beliebte-vornamen.de). 
Each learning candidate had a unique combination of cue values (see Table A.4.1 in the 
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Appendix). Two of the learning candidates were suitable (i.e., had been invited) and two were 
unsuitable (i.e., had been rejected). Each of the four learning candidates was associated with a 
different spatial area located in the upper two-thirds of the screen and at an equal distance 
from the center of the screen (see Figure 4.1). The candidate’s name always appeared on top 
followed by the cue values and the suitability information (whether the candidate had been 
invited or rejected). Cue values and suitability information appeared as single words in four 
rectangles. Positions of learning candidates and the order of the cue values were randomized 
across participants with the constraint that the two invited learning candidates were always 
located at the same side of the screen, that is, both were on either the right or the left half of 
the screen. For a given participant, the order of the cues was the same for all learning 
candidates (e.g., for the same participant the cue “language” appeared in the second rectangle 
for all learning candidates). 
To learn the names, cue values, and suitability of the four learning candidates, 
participants first saw all the information about the four learning candidates in the rectangles 
on the screen and could study it. Once they had studied the information they could click on 
“continue” and all the information disappeared. Then the name of one of the learning 
candidates appeared on the screen and participants had to fill in the correct information for 
this candidate. They could do so by selecting the correct cue value from a table presented at 
the bottom of the screen. If they selected the correct information it was highlighted in green 
and appeared in the corresponding rectangle of the learning candidate where it remained 
visible for the rest of the trial. If they selected incorrect information, it was highlighted in red. 
In addition, the correct information was highlighted in green and appeared in the rectangle. 
Participants always filled in cue information for the learning candidates from top to bottom. 
After reproducing all the information for a learning candidate, the complete information was 
visible on the screen and was auditorily presented to the participant over the headphones. 
Then the name of the next learning candidate appeared and the candidate’s cue information 
had to be filled in. After participants filled in the information for all four learning candidates 
they received feedback about the percentage of correct decisions that had been made and a 
new cycle began. The sequence in which they had to reproduce the information for the four 
learning candidates was randomized within a cycle. This procedure was repeated until the 
participants correctly reproduced the information for all four learning candidates twice. 
Participant got a bonus of 1 euro if they finished learning within 40 cycles (e.g., each learning 
applicant would be presented 40 times). 
Strategy-learning phase. In the strategy-learning phase, half of the participants were 
instructed to use a rule to decide if a candidate should be invited and the other half were 
instructed to decide according to similarity. In the rule condition participants were instructed 
to invite a job candidate if at least two of the three cues had a positive value. Positive values 
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for each cue were (1) knowledge of French or Italian, (2) knowledge of HTML or SQL, and (3) 
experience in the financial sector or the mobile phone industry. For instance, according to this 
rule a candidate should be invited if he speaks French, has knowledge of HTML, and has 
experience in the automobile industry. However, a candidate should be rejected if he speaks 
French, has knowledge of SPSS, and is experienced in the automobile industry. Participants in 
the similarity condition were instructed to invite a candidate if he had more cue values in 
common with the learning candidates who had been invited than with the learning candidates 
who had not been invited. Participants were informed that they would need to use the strategy 
to evaluate the candidates in the test phase and that they could practice using the strategy by 
relating the strategy’s predictions to the cue information for the learning candidates. During 
the strategy-learning phase a shortened version of the strategy instructions was presented in a 
fifth spatial area at the bottom of the screen located at the same distance from the center as 
the areas of the learning candidates (see Figure 4.1). The visual layout of the rectangles in 
which the strategy instructions were presented was the same as for the information about the 
learning candidates. With the exception of these different instructions, the strategy-learning 
phase followed the same procedure in both conditions: The name of one of the learning 
candidates was presented via headphones and the participants had to decide if he should be 
invited according to the instructed strategy by retrieving the information about the learning 
candidate from memory. To make the decision, participants had to press one of two keys on 
the keyboard. After pressing the key they got visual feedback in the center of the screen about 
whether their decision was correct or wrong. If the decision was correct a green rectangle 
appeared in the middle of the screen stating: “This decision is correct. The candidate is 
invited/rejected.” In case of a wrong decision a red rectangle appeared stating “This decision is 
wrong. The candidate is invited/rejected.” In addition, the cue information of the judged 
learning exemplar became visible in the corresponding spatial area and was auditorily 
repeated to the participants. Then the next trial started. Strategy learning ended when 
participants had correctly judged the suitability of all four learning candidates within one 
cycle.  
To check if participants had learned the strategies, we asked them at the end of the 
strategy-learning phase to reproduce the cue values that would allow them to invite a 
candidate for an interview. For this all possible cue values were presented onscreen in a table, 
with the cue values of each cue in one row. Participants had to click on the respective cue 
values. In the rule condition they had to reproduce the cue values that would allow invitation. 
In the similarity condition they had to reproduce the cue values of the similar invited learning 
candidates. 
Test phase. To check if participants had understood how to apply the learned strategy to new 
candidates, they solved one practice trial at the beginning of the test phase, where they had to 
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judge a new candidate, and received feedback about the correctness of their choice. During 
subsequent trials no feedback was given.  
During the test phase, participants judged the suitability of 20 test candidates. Four of 
them had cue values identical to those of the learning candidates but had different names. The 
remaining 16 candidates were new candidates who differed in their similarity to the invited 
and rejected learning candidates. We constructed the test candidates so that they shared n = 
0, 1, 2, or 3 cue values with the two invited learning candidates and shared 3−n cue values with 
the rejected candidates. Thus, a candidate who shared no cue values with the invited learning 
candidates automatically shared three cue values with the rejected learning candidates, and 
so on. Details on the task structure can be found in the Appendix, Table A.4.1.  
At the beginning of each trial, participants had to fixate on the center of the screen (2 
s). Subsequently, the name and cue values of one candidate were presented auditorily over the 
headphones (6 s) and participants had to decide whether to invite them for an interview by 
pressing one of two keys on the keyboard (self-paced). While the information was presented 
participants saw only the empty rectangles in the spatial areas where cue and strategy 
information had been presented during the memorization and strategy-learning phases. For 
each correct judgment, participants were paid a bonus of 20 cents.  
4.3.2 Results 
Performance 
Participants memorized the information about the learning candidates rather quickly. On 
average they reached the learning criterion in 3.2 cycles (SD = 1.3). They also performed well 
during strategy training: On average, they correctly classified all learning candidates according 
to the strategy in 1.3 cycles (SD = 0.6). Participants in the two strategy conditions (rule, 
similarity) were equally fast in memorizing the information, Mrule = 3.3, SD = 1.5, Msim = 2.9, SD = 
1, t(45.2) = 1.15, p = .26, d = .34, and learning the strategy, Mrule = 1.2, SD = 0.5, Msim = 1.4, SD = 
0.8, t(42.4) = 1.14, p = .26, d = .36. 
In the test phase, we measured accuracy as the percentage of decisions that were in 
line with the instructed strategy. Accuracy was high and did not differ between the conditions, 
Mrule = 94.3, SD = 8.7 and Msim = 96.5, SD = 5.8, t(51) = 1.12, p = .27, d = .32.  
Response times were measured from the beginning of the auditory information 
presentation during a test trial until participants’ response. On average participants in the rule 
condition, Mrule = 9.6 s, SD = 0.6, took as long as participants in the similarity condition, Msim = 
9.2 s, SD = 1, t(51) = 1.54, p = .13, d = .43.  
Analyses of Fixations 
To assess differences in gaze behaviour between the strategy conditions we excluded all trials 
in which the dwell criterion (at least 60 % of the eye movements were recorded) was not met 
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on the trial level, which led to the exclusion of 70 trials (6.6 % of all trials). We then defined 
rectangular areas of interest (AOIs) around the location of each learning candidate (exemplar 
locations) and the instruction location. All AOIs were of the same size (8° by 8° of visual angle). 
These nonoverlapping AOIs exceeded the exemplar locations by 2.7° of visual angle in the 
horizontal direction and 1.8° of visual angle in the vertical direction. For each trial, we 
determined the sum of fixation durations at each of the five AOIs. Fixations on other areas 
were ignored. F values in statistical analyses were Greenhouse–Geisser corrected when 
necessary. We report the analyses separately for the test candidates who were only similar to 
the learning candidates and the test candidates who had cue profiles that were identical to the 
learning candidates’ because different memory processes could be involved. 
Mean fixation durations for identical test items. In a first step we analyzed only those test 
items that had an identical cue profile to that of the learning candidates. Following the looking-
at-nothing literature, we assumed that if people retrieve exemplars from memory, they should 
gaze back at the location associated with the learned exemplar when listening to a test item 
with an identical cue profile. To test this assumption, we calculated the fixation durations for 
the five AOIs in the trials in which the four identical test candidates were presented. We then 
tested how long participants gazed on average at the AOI that contained the identical learning 
exemplars relative to the other four AOIs. For this we coded the exemplar location that had 
contained the learning candidate with an identical cue profile to that of the test candidate as 
“match location”. The exemplar location that had contained the second invited or rejected 
learning candidate was coded as “mismatch 1 location”. The remaining exemplar locations 
were coded as mismatch 2 and mismatch 3 from left to right. The location containing the 
instruction during strategy learning was coded as “instruction location”. A mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with the within-subject factor exemplar location (match, mismatch 1, 
mismatch 2, mismatch 3, instruction) and the between-subjects factor strategy condition (rule 
or similarity) revealed main effects of exemplar location, F(2.5, 127.1) = 5.36, p = .003, ηp2 = 
.10, and strategy condition, F(1, 51) = 13.77, p = .001, ηp2 = .21, and a significant interaction, 
indicating that the pattern of eye movements differed between the conditions, F(2.5, 127.1) = 
4.02, p = .01, ηp2 = .08. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, participants fixated on the four exemplar 
locations and the instruction location equally long in the rule condition, F(2.4, 63.3) = 1.40, p = 
.25, ηp2 = .05. In contrast, in the similarity condition the gaze duration depended on the 
location, F(2.4, 60.6) = 5.19, p = .005, ηp2 = .17. Participants fixated longer on the match 
location than on the other exemplar locations (Bonferroni-corrected post hoc contrasts, all ps 
< .03). Participants also fixated longer on the match location than on the instruction location. 
However, this post-hoc contrast did not reach significance (p = .22). Additionally, participants 
in the similarity condition fixated on the match location longer than participants in the rule 
condition, t(32.1) = 4.12, p < .001, d = 1.45. 
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Figure 4.2 Mean duration of fixation on the five areas of interest (AOIs) in the rule as compared to the 
similarity condition. The first location marks the exemplar location that contained the learning 
candidate whose cue profile was identical to the respective test candidate’s (match). The second, third, 
and fourth locations refer to the other three exemplar locations (mismatch 1, mismatch 2, mismatch 3). 
The fifth location refers to the location of the instructions (instruction). Error bars represent one 
standard error. 
 
Mean fixation durations as a function of item similarity. In a second step we analyzed if the 
duration of fixation on the exemplar locations differed as a function of the similarity to the 
learning candidates when evaluating new test candidates who did not have identical cue 
profiles to those of the learning candidates (see Appendix, Table A.4.1). We first calculated for 
each participant the mean duration of fixation on the locations of the invited learning 
candidates, the rejected learning candidates, and the instructions in each trial. Then we 
calculated for each participant the mean fixation durations for the test candidates who had 0, 
1, 2, or 3 cue values in common with the invited learning candidates (and 3, 2, 1, and 0 values 
in common with the rejected learning candidates, respectively). We then tested if the mean 
duration of fixation on the locations of the invited and rejected learning candidates varied as a 
function of similarity (i.e., the number of shared cue values) in the two strategy conditions. For 
this we ran a mixed ANOVA on the fixation durations with the two within-subject factors 
similarity (0, 1, 2, 3) and exemplar type (invited vs. rejected) and the between-subjects factor 
strategy condition (rule vs. similarity). Overall, participants in the similarity condition fixated on 
the exemplar locations longer than participants in the rule condition, as shown by a main 
effect of strategy condition, F(1, 51) = 16.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. Furthermore, significant 
interactions between similarity and exemplar type, F(4.3, 216.7) = 8.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, and 
similarity, strategy condition, and exemplar type, F(4.3, 216.7) = 8.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, 
suggested that the effect of similarity differed by strategy condition and exemplar type. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.3, when we analyzed the two strategy conditions separately we found 
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that in the rule condition, fixation durations did not differ by similarity. Neither the main effect 
of similarity, F(3, 78) = 0.92, p = .44, ηp2 = .03, nor the interaction between similarity and 
exemplar type, F(3.4, 87.4) = 1.14, p = .34, ηp2 = .04, was significant. In contrast, in the 
similarity condition, participants’ gaze varied according to similarity, as shown by a significant 
interaction of similarity and exemplar type, F(3.3, 82.3) = 10.1, p < .001, ηp2 = .29. Indeed, the 
more cue values a test candidate shared with the invited learning candidates the more 
participants gazed at invited candidates and the less they gazed at rejected candidates [linear 
contrast for the invited candidates: F(1, 25) = 17.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .42]. In turn, the more 
similar the test candidates were to rejected learning candidates, the more participants gazed 
at rejected candidates and the less they gazed at invited candidates [linear contrast rejected 
candidates: F(1, 25) = 19.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .44]. 
 
Figure 4.3 Mean duration of fixation for exemplar locations of invited and rejected candidates and the 
instruction location in the rule condition (left) and the similarity condition (right). Exemplar location 
refers to the number of shared cue values with invited learning candidates ranging from 0 to 3. The 
similarity to the rejected candidates is the opposite of the similarity to the invited ones. Thus a 
similarity to the invited candidates of 0 corresponds to a similarity of 3 to the rejected ones, and so on. 
Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
4.3.3 Discussion Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 we investigated whether the gaze patterns of participants differ when using a 
rule-based or a similarity-based decision strategy. Taking into account the finding that when 
retrieving information from memory people look back at the location where the information 
previously appeared (e.g., Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000), we 
hypothesized that participants’ gaze patterns should reflect whether they retrieved the learned 
exemplars from memory. In line with this hypothesis, we found that when instructed to use a 
and spontaneous st ategy use we investigated the ye
movements related to memory processes when strategies
are spontaneously employed and when explicit instruc-
tions are given to use a specific strategy.
Research in categorization, judgment, and decision
making based on cognitive modeling suggests that the
accuracy of strategies and the ease with which a strategy
can be employed exert a strong influence on strategy selec-
tion (Bröder et al., 2010; Hoffmann et al., 2013, 2014;
Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; Rie kamp
& Otto, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2013). Specifically, peo-
ple have been found to rely on rules as long as rules allow
the task to be sol ed and can be easily applied—which is
usually the case with one-dimensional rules. However,
when the task cannot be solved by (simple) rules, people
frequently switch to a similarity-based strategy (Ashby
et al., 1998; Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Erickson et al.,
1998; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Juslin et al., 2008; Nosofsky
& Palmeri, 1998; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994;
von Helversen et al., 2013). Accordingly, we created two
conditions, one in which the decision task could be solved
by a simple, one-dimensional rule and the other in which
the decision task could only be solved by memorizing the
exemplars. In the first condition participants should recog-
nize the rule and rely on a rule-based decision process,
whereas in the second condition people should realize that
the task cannot be solved by a rule and switch to a similar-
ity-based strategy. We included two test phases. In the first
participants could spontaneously choose how to solve the
task; in the second phase we instructed them to follow a
rule- or similarity-based strategy.
3.1. Method
Overall, we used a very similar decision task to that in
Study 1. Again, participants had to decide whether to invite
job candidates for an interview based on three cues. How-
ever, to be better able to induce strategy selection through
task structure, we increased the number of learning exem-
plars to eight and adapted he strategy-learning phase to
encourage a spontaneous use of the strategies. We
recorded participants’ eye movements during the two test
phases (spontaneous, instructed).
3.1.1. Participants
Fifty-seven people met the validity criterion. We
excluded three of them from the analysis, one for not finish-
ing the memorization phase within 1.5 h and two because
in themajority of trials less tha 60% of eyemovement data
was recorded, resulting in a final sample of 54 participants.
The majority of the participants were students from the
University of Basel (32 female; Mage = 27.7 years, range
18–51 years). Participants took part for course credit or
financial compensation [16 Swiss francs (CHF) per hour].
In addition, they could earn a bonus depending on their
performance in the learning and test phases (M = 5.1
CHF). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision with
glasses or contact lenses. Participants were randomly
assigned, 26 to the rule condition and 28 to the similarity
condition. On average, the experiment lasted 90 min.
3.1.2. Apparatus
The same setup as in Study 1 was implemented at the
University of Basel. Participants were seated in front of a
22-in. computer screen and the eye tracker system SMI
iView RED120 sampled data of the right eye at 120 Hz.
Auditory materials were presented via loudspeakers. Fixa-
tion detection followed a dispersion threshold of 2! of
visual angle and a duration threshold of 100 ms.
3.1.3. Decision task
We used the same procedure and materials as in Study
1 with some adaptations to induce participants to use
either a rule or similarity without instructing them to do
so. This time the study consisted of four phases: a memo-
rization phase, a strategy-learning phase, and two test
phases. In addition, we probed participants’ memory of
learning candidates’ cue values at the end.
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Fig. 3. Mean duration of fixation for exemplar locations of invited and rejected candidates and the instruction location in the rule condition (left) and the
similarity condition (right). Exemplar location refers to the number of shared cue values with invited learning candidates ranging from 0 to 3. The similarity
to the rejected candidates is the opposite of the similarity to the invited ones. Thus a si ilarity to the invited candidates of 0 corresponds to a similarity of 3
to the rejected ones, and so on. Error bars represent one standard error.
A. Scholz et al. / Cognition 136 (2015) 228–246 235
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rule, participants did not look back at the locations associated with learning candidates. In 
contrast, when participants were instructed to make decisions based on the similarity to the 
learned candidates they looked back at the locations of similar exemplars. These results 
provide empirical evidence that people retrieve different information from memory when 
instructed to use a rule- or similarity-based strategy and resonate with the idea that similarity- 
and rule-based processes differ in how memory representations are accessed (e.g., Bailey, 
2005; Hahn & Chater, 1998).  
The results are in line with research suggesting that eye movements to locations 
where information had previously appeared reflect memory retrieval processes (Jahn & Braatz, 
2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012) and show that the looking-at-nothing effect not only appears 
when previously seen exemplars are evaluated but also reflects memory retrieval in response 
to new information. However, although we found that people looked back at the locations of 
the previously learned exemplars, we did not find a looking-at-nothing effect for the instruction 
location in either the rule or the similarity condition. Possibly, the strategy-learning phase was 
too short to build up a reliable association between the instruction location and episodic 
memory traces of the strategy. Alternatively, it is possible that the strategy instruction was 
kept activated during the complete test phase, making retrieval unnecessary.  
The goal of the first study was to show that differences in information search in 
memory can be observed by tracking eye movements during the decision process. We 
instructed participants to use a rule- or similarity-based strategy — thus ensuring that 
participants indeed relied on the cognitive process of interest. Based on the first study, 
however, we cannot tell if the same memory retrieval processes would occur when people 
spontaneously use a similarity- or rule-based strategy. An explicit instruction to use a strategy 
induces a deliberate and controlled strategy execution, which could result in different cognitive 
processes from those that would occur for spontaneous strategy application. In particular, the 
cognitive processes involved when spontaneously using a similarity-based strategy could 
differ from a controlled application of similarity, because similarity-based strategies are often 
thought to be of an implicit and automatic nature (Ashby et al., 1998; Hoffmann et al., 2013; 
but see Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2008). In addition, the explicit rule instruction could have 
impeded retrieval processes that can appear when participants spontaneously rely on a 
decision rule but not if they deliberately use the rule. Thus, to go one step further and to 
investigate if the same gaze patterns can be observed when participants spontaneously rely 
on a rule- or a similarity-based strategy, we conducted a second study in which we did not 
instruct participants to rely on a specific strategy but aimed to manipulate strategy use 
implicitly through the task structure.  
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4.4 Experiment 2 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to test if information retrieval from memory also differs 
between rule-based and similarity-based decision strategies when the strategy is employed 
spontaneously. To be able to compare explicit and spontaneous strategy use we investigated 
the eye movements related to memory processes when strategies are spontaneously 
employed and when explicit instructions are given to use a specific strategy.  
Research in categorization, judgment, and decision-making based on cognitive 
modeling suggests that the accuracy of strategies and the ease with which a strategy can be 
employed exert a strong influence on strategy selection (Bröder et al., 2010; Hoffmann et al., 
2013; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; Rieskamp & Otto, 
2006; von Helversen et al., 2013). Specifically, people have been found to rely on rules as long 
as rules allow the task to be solved and can be easily applied — which is usually the case with 
one-dimensional rules. However, when the task cannot be solved by (simple) rules, people 
frequently switch to a similarity-based strategy (Ashby et al., 1998; Ashby & Maddox, 2005; 
Erickson et al., 1998; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Juslin et al., 2008; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1998; 
Nosofsky, Plameri, & McKinley, 1994). Accordingly, we created two conditions, one in which 
the decision task could be solved by a simple, one-dimensional rule and the other in which the 
decision task could only be solved by memorizing the exemplars. In the first condition 
participants should recognize the rule and rely on a rule-based decision process, whereas in 
the second condition people should realize that the task cannot be solved by a rule and switch 
to a similarity-based strategy. We included two test phases. In the first participants could 
spontaneously choose how to solve the task; in the second phase we instructed them to follow 
a rule- or similarity-based strategy. 
4.4.1 Method 
Overall, we used a very similar decision task to that in Experiment 1. Again, participants had to 
decide whether to invite job candidates for an interview based on three cues. However, to be 
better able to induce strategy selection through task structure, we increased the number of 
learning exemplars to eight and adapted the strategy-learning phase to encourage a 
spontaneous use of the strategies. We recorded participants’ eye movements during the two 
test phases (spontaneous, instructed). 
Participants 
Fifty-seven people met the validity criterion. We excluded three of them from the analysis, one 
for not finishing the memorization phase within 1.5 h and two because in the majority of trials 
less than 60 % of eye movement data was recorded, resulting in a final sample of 54 
participants. The majority of the participants were students from the University of Basel (32 
female; Mage = 27.7 years, range 18–51 years). Participants took part for course credit or 
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financial compensation [16 Swiss francs (CHF) per hour]. In addition, they could earn a bonus 
depending on their performance in the learning and test phases (M = 5.1 CHF). All had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision with glasses or contact lenses. Participants were randomly 
assigned, 26 to the rule condition and 28 to the similarity condition. On average, the 
experiment lasted 90 min.  
Apparatus 
The same setup as in Experiment 1 was implemented at the University of Basel. Participants 
were seated in front of a 22-inch computer screen and the eye tracker system SMI iView 
RED120 sampled data of the right eye at 120 Hz. Auditory materials were presented via 
loudspeakers. Fixation detection followed a dispersion threshold of 2° of visual angle and a 
duration threshold of 100 msec. 
Decision Task 
We used the same procedure and materials as in Experiment 1 with some adaptations to 
induce participants to use either a rule or similarity without instructing them to do so. This 
time the study consisted of four phases: a memorization phase, a strategy-learning phase, and 
two test phases. In addition, we probed participants’ memory of learning candidates’ cue 
values at the end. 
Memorization phase. During the memorization phase, participants had to learn the cue values 
and names of eight learning candidates by heart. We increased the number of learning 
candidates to be better able to induce using a rule or similarity via the task structure and 
outcome feedback. In contrast to Experiment 1, where each cue value was unique to a learning 
candidate, in Experiment 2 each cue value was associated with two learning candidates. The 
complete task structure can be found in the Appendix, Table A.4.2. As in Experiment 1, each of 
the eight learning candidates was presented at a different spatial location on the screen that 
was equidistant from the center and from the neighboring learning candidates (see Figure 
4.4). In contrast to Experiment 1, we kept the order of the cues constant for all participants, 
starting with work experience and following with possession of computer skills and knowledge 
of a foreign language. In addition, participants did not learn about the suitability of the learning 
candidate (i.e., whether the candidate was invited to an interview) during the memorization 
phase. Presentation and test of cue values followed the same procedure as in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 4.4 Visual layout during both test phases of Experiment 2. During the tests only the empty 
rectangles were visible.  
 
 
Strategy-learning phase. During the strategy-learning phase, participants were informed that 
they had to learn how to decide which candidates should be invited to an interview and that 
the knowledge they gained during the strategy-learning phase would be necessary to perform 
the task accurately in the subsequent test phases. Participants could learn to make the 
decisions based on trial-by-trial outcome feedback. In each trial, participants first fixated on a 
fixation cross at the center of the screen for 2 s. They then saw a screen containing only the 
empty rectangles where the learning exemplars had appeared during the memorization phase 
and heard the name of one of the learning candidates. Then, they had to decide whether they 
would invite him by pressing one of two keys. After their response, participants got visual 
feedback on whether they had given the correct response, and the cue information for the 
judged learning candidate was presented visually and auditorily. The eight learning candidates 
were presented repeatedly in randomized order with all candidates shown before a new cycle 
started. Within one cycle the order of the learning candidates was randomized. Strategy 
learning continued until the participants had correctly judged all learning exemplars in one 
cycle once or had completed 160 trials (i.e., 20 cycles). 
In each condition, four of the learning candidates were invited for an interview and four 
were rejected. In the rule condition, the task could be solved with a simple rule based on the 
foreign language cue: A candidate was invited if he spoke French or Italian but not if he spoke 
Spanish or Portuguese3. In the similarity condition, the task could not be solved by a rule but 
                                                        
3 This rule was rather simple for two reasons: First, it was based on dichotomous cue values of a single cue. 
Second, the cue values matched with Swiss participants’ prior knowledge about languages that are particularly 
applicable in Switzerland. 
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only by memorizing the unique cue profile of each learning candidate. Specifically, we selected 
which of the eight candidates were invited and which were rejected so that every cue value 
appeared once with an invited and once with a rejected learning candidate (see Appendix, 
Table A.4.2).  
Positions of learning candidates were balanced in two spatial layouts. In both layouts 
no more than two learning candidates who belonged to the same category (invited or rejected) 
appeared in adjacent spatial locations. In each strategy condition, half the participants were 
presented with one spatial layout and the other half with the second layout. 
Test Phases 1 and 2. In the test phases, participants had to judge 28 test candidates twice, 
once in Test Phase 1 and once in Test Phase 2. Eight of them were the learning candidates. 
Additionally, 20 new candidates were presented who shared 0 to 2 cue values with the learning 
candidates. As in Experiment 1, participants first saw the fixation cross in the center of the 
screen (2 s). Then they saw the blank screen (except for the empty rectangles) and listened to 
the name and cue information of a test candidate. After that, they decided if the candidate 
should be invited by pressing one of two keys. No feedback was given to the participants.  
In Test Phase 1, participants were told to judge the test candidates according to their 
experience gained in the strategy-learning phase. After Test Phase 1, we asked participants to 
write down how they solved the judgment task, so we could check if they had indeed used 
different strategies in the two strategy conditions. In Test Phase 2, participants in the rule 
condition were instructed to invite participants who knew French or Italian (the same rule that 
was used to determine feedback in the strategy-learning phase) and participants in the 
similarity condition were instructed to invite test candidates if they shared more cue values 
with the invited than with the rejected learning candidates. 
Memory test.  After completing both test phases, participants were asked to retrieve the cue 
values of the learning candidates. Participants saw a blank screen containing empty 
rectangles and filled in cue values of the learning candidates one by one by choosing the 
appropriate value from a selection that was presented in the center of the screen. For each 
correct judgment, participants were paid a bonus of 10 cents. 
4.4.2 Results 
Performance and Strategy Classification 
Participants were able to memorize the information on the eight learning candidates rather 
quickly and did not differ between conditions in the learning cycles they required, Mrule = 4.9, SD 
= 2.4, Msim = 4.8, SD = 1.9, t(52) = 0.10, p = .92, d = .03. There were only small differences in the 
amount of practice it took to complete the strategy-learning phase with participants in the rule 
condition needing somewhat fewer cycles than participants in the similarity condition, Mrule = 
3.7, SD = 1.3, Msim = 5, SD = 3.8, t(52) = 1.82, p = .08, d = .50.  
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In the test phases, we measured accuracy as the percentage of responses that were in 
line with the strategy that they learned during the strategy-learning phase. Overall, the 
accuracy was rather high in both conditions, Mrule = 91.5, SD = 11.5, Msim = 80.4, SD = 11. 
We then checked if participants had used the intended strategy by classifying them as 
selecting a similarity- or a rule-based strategy based on their verbal reports after Test Phase 
1.4 Participants were classified into three categories by three independent raters: (1) Simple 
rule users: Participants mentioned one cue that they used to make a decision, for example, “I 
concentrated on the cue foreign language. I invited candidates speaking French or Italian. I did 
not invite candidates speaking Spanish or Portuguese.” (2) Complex rule users: Participants 
mentioned two or more cues, for example, “First I looked up language knowledge. If the 
candidate spoke French or Italian, I looked up other cues.” (3) Similarity users: Participants 
referred explicitly to using similarity to the learning candidates, for example, “I tried to find the 
most similar learning candidate and decided [to invite or reject a test candidate] according to 
this learning candidate.” Overall, rater agreement was high. In the cases where the raters 
disagreed, the case was discussed until agreement was reached. In the rule feedback 
condition, 10 participants were classified as using a simple rule, 4 as using a complex rule, and 
8 as using similarity. In the similarity feedback condition, no participant used a simple rule, 3 
participants used a complex rule, and 18 participants used similarity. In four cases in the rule 
feedback condition and in three cases in the similarity feedback condition participants did not 
report a strategy or reported problems verbalizing the strategy they used. Similarity is often 
considered an implicit strategy, which can impair the ability to verbalize it (Ashby et al., 1998). 
For this reason we included these participants in the similarity user category. To ensure that 
this did not influence the pattern of results, we additionally ran the analyses without these 
participants, which yielded the same pattern of results. We excluded four participants in the 
similarity condition because they reported using different strategies, such as responding by 
chance. Because participants differed in the strategies they selected in the two conditions, we 
used strategy classification as an additional factor in the following analyses. We excluded the 
three participants who were classified as rule users in the similarity condition from the 
analysis because the low number of rule users in this condition did not allow a statistical 
comparison. Descriptive statistics for the three rule users in the similarity condition and the 
four participants who reported using different strategies are included in the Appendix, Table 
A.4.3. 
                                                        
4 The adaptive learning criterion in the strategy-learning phase ensured that participants judged all eight learning 
candidates in line with the strategy feedback. However, in our task it was not possible to unambiguously 
determine the strategy a participant used purely based on the participants’ decisions. In particular, in the rule 
condition we cannot rule out based on the decisions that a participant solved the task by using the similarity of 
the test candidates to the learning candidates on the foreign language cue to make the decision. Thus, we used 
the verbal reports to determine strategy choices. 
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We then compared accuracy in the two test phases depending on the strategy 
condition (rule or similarity) and strategy classification (see Table 4.1). In the rule condition in 
Test Phase 1, participants using similarity performed worse than participants using a rule, 
t(24) = 2.90, p = .008, d = 1.16. Participants using similarity in the rule condition improved from 
Test Phase 1 to 2, t(11) = 4.85, p = .001, d = 1.46, and in Test Phase 2 rule and similarity users 
were equally accurate, t(11.83) = 1.22, p = .245, d = .07.  
Similarity users in the similarity condition were as accurate as similarity users in the 
rule condition in Test Phase 1, t(31) = 0.04, p = .97, d = 0, but less accurate in Test Phase 2, 
t(31) = 3.23, p = .003, d = .16. Similarity users in the similarity condition did not differ in terms 
of accuracy between Test Phase 1 and Test Phase 2, t(20) = 1.69, p = .11, d = .38.  
 
Table 4.1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Sample Size for Response Accuracy (%) in the Two Test 
Phases. 
Test phase Strategy condition 
Rule Similarity 
M SD n M SD n 
1       
   Rule users  93 12.4 14 87.7 9 3 
   Similarity users 77.5 14.9 12 77.7 12 21 
2       
   Rule users 99 2.2 14 89.9 5.1 3 
   Similarity users 95.1 10.6 12 82.5 11 21 
 
As in Experiment 1, response times were measured from the beginning of the auditory 
information presentation until participants’ response in a test trial. In Test Phase 1 there were 
no differences in response times between the rule condition and the similarity condition, Mrule = 
10.6 s, SD = 4.3, Msim = 11.2 s, SD = 3.6, t(28) = 0.53, p = .60, d = .10, nor between rule and 
similarity users, Mrule = 10.5 s, SD = 4.1, Msim = 11.2 s, SD = 3.9, t(48) = 0.60, p = .55, d = .17. In 
Test Phase 2 participants in the rule condition were faster than participants in the similarity 
condition, Mrule = 8.8 s, SD = 0.4, Msim = 10.8 s, SD = 2.3, t(28.8) = 4.52, p < .001, d = 1.68. 
Performance in the memory test at the end of the experiment was very high, with participants 
remembering almost all information about the learning candidates in both conditions, Mrule = 
99.2, SD = 2.1, Msim = 99.1, SD = 1.7, t(48) = 0.12, p = .90, d = .03, independent of the strategy 
they used. 
Analyses of Fixations 
To analyze if similarity influenced eye movements we first defined rectangular AOIs around the 
eight exemplar locations in the same way as in Experiment 1. All AOIs were of the same size 
(5.5° by 6° of visual angle). These nonoverlapping AOIs exceeded the exemplar locations by 
approximately 1.5° of visual angle in each direction.  As in Experiment 1, we excluded all trials 
where the dwell criterion was not met (6.5 % of all trials). Then we aggregated durations of 
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fixation on the exemplar locations depending on their similarity to the test candidate in a given 
trial for each participant. Unlike in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 more than one exemplar 
location contained cue values identical to cue values of learning or test candidates. More 
precisely, for the eight test candidates who were identical to the learning candidates (old test 
items), one exemplar location contained an identical cue profile, three exemplar locations 
contained one identical cue, and four exemplar locations contained no identical cues. For the 
20 new test candidates (new test items), one or two exemplar locations contained two 
identical cue values, two to four exemplar locations contained one identical cue, and three or 
four locations contained no identical cue values. Thus for the old test items, the exemplar 
locations shared 0, 1, or 3 cue values with the test candidates and for the new items the 
exemplar locations shared 0, 1, or 2 cue values with the new test items. As in Experiment 1, we 
analyzed mean duration of fixation on the exemplar locations separately for the old and new 
items and for Test Phases 1 and 2 (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6). F values in statistical analyses 
were Greenhouse–Geisser corrected when necessary. 
Mean fixation durations for old items. 
Test Phase 1. In a first step, we analyzed effects of strategy condition and strategy 
classification on duration of fixation on exemplar locations when judging the old items for Test 
Phase 1. We assumed that if exemplar retrieval takes place, participants should have fixated 
on AOIs that contained identical cue values during learning. First, we tested whether mean 
duration of fixation on exemplar locations differed between participants classified as rule or 
similarity users in the rule condition of Test Phase 1 (Figure 4.5a). A mixed ANOVA with the 
within-subject factor exemplar similarity (0, 1, 3) and the between-subjects factor strategy 
classification (rule or similarity user) revealed that overall, similarity users looked longer at the 
exemplar locations than rule users, as shown by a main effect of strategy classification, F(1, 
24) = 4.87, p = .04, ηp2 = .17. Furthermore, a main effect of exemplar similarity suggests that 
participants looked longer at the exemplar location associated with the identical learning 
candidate than at the other exemplar locations, F(1, 24.8) = 21.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. Finally, 
similarity and rule users differed in the degree to which they looked back at the locations of 
similar learning candidates, as shown by a significant interaction between exemplar similarity 
and strategy classification, F(1, 24.8) = 5.05, p = .03, ηp2 = .17. In particular, similarity users 
clearly gazed more often at exemplar locations that were associated with the identical learning 
candidate than rule users did, t(24) = 2.29, p = .02, d = .93. 
Second, we tested whether similarity users in the similarity condition also looked 
longer at the identical learning candidates (Figure 4.5b). Indeed, an ANOVA for repeated 
measures testing the factor exemplar similarity revealed a significant effect for exemplar 
similarity, F(1, 20.9) = 23.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .54, suggesting that participants in the similarity 
condition looked much more frequently at the location of the identical learning candidate than 
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at the other exemplar locations. Last, a test to determine if similarity users in the rule 
condition differed from similarity users in the similarity condition showed no difference, as 
indicated by no main effect for condition, F(1, 31) = 1.14, p = .30, ηp2 = .04, and no interaction 
between condition and exemplar similarity, F(1, 32.2) = 0.85, p = .43, ηp2 = .03.  
Test Phase 2. We repeated the same set of analyses for Test Phase 2. As illustrated in Figure 
4.5c, we still found a main effect for exemplar similarity, indicating that participants in the rule 
condition looked longer at the location of the identical learning candidate than at the other 
exemplar locations, F(1, 24.7) = 10.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. However, in Test Phase 2, 
participants classified as rule users no longer differed from participants classified as similarity 
users, as indicated by the lack of a main effect for strategy classification, F(1, 24) = 0.01, p = 
.91, ηp2 = 0, and no interaction between exemplar similarity and strategy classification, F(1, 
24.7) = 0.76, p = .93, ηp2 = 0. This suggests that after being instructed to use a rule, 
participants changed their strategy according to the instructions. In the similarity condition, 
the effect of exemplar similarity on fixation durations persisted in Test Phase 2, F(1, 20.2) = 
40.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .67 (Figure 4.5d). Last, in Test Phase 2 we found that participants 
originally classified as similarity users in the rule condition showed a smaller exemplar 
similarity effect than similarity users in the similarity condition, as shown by a significant main 
effect for the strategy condition, F(1, 31) = 11.04, p = .002, ηp2 = .26, and an interaction 
between strategy condition and exemplar similarity, F(1, 31.5) = 10.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .26. 
 
Mean fixation durations for new items. 
Test Phase 1. Next, we tested if the effect of exemplar similarity also existed for the new test 
items that shared 0, 1, or 2 cue values with the learning candidates. As with the old items, we 
first tested whether similarity users differed from rule users in the rule condition (Figure 4.6a). 
Similar to what we found for the old items, similarity users looked more at the exemplar 
locations than did rule users, F(1, 24) = 5.33, p = .03, ηp2 = .18, and overall fixation durations 
increased with exemplar similarity, F(1.1, 26.7) = 11.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .33. Furthermore, a 
significant interaction between exemplar similarity and strategy classification indicates that 
similarity users differed from rule users in the degree to which they looked back at the 
locations of similar learning candidates, F(1.1, 26.7) = 6.16, p = .02, ηp2 = .20. Whereas 
exemplar similarity did not play a role for the rule users, F(1, 13) = 2.34, p = .15, ηp2 = .15, 
similarity users gazed more at the locations of the learning candidates the more cue values 
these shared with the test candidates, F(1, 11) = 9.19, p = .01, ηp2 = .45. 
 In the same vein, we found that similarity users in the similarity condition also looked 
more at the exemplar locations of similar learning candidates than at the locations of learning 
candidates that had different cue values, F(1.3, 26.6) = 13.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .39 (Figure 4.6b).  
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Figure 4.5 Mean duration of fixation on exemplar locations sharing 0 to 3 cue values with old test 
items for the rule condition (a, c) and the similarity condition (b, d) by strategy classification (rule user, 
similarity user) and test phase (Test Phase 1 spontaneous use: a, b; Test Phase 2 strategy instruction: 
c, d). Error bars show standard errors. 
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Figure 4.6 Mean duration of fixation on exemplar locations sharing 0 to 2 cue values with new test 
items for the rule condition (a, c) and the similarity condition (b, d) by strategy classification (rule user, 
similarity user) and test phase (Test Phase 1 spontaneous use: a, b; Test Phase 2 strategy instruction: 
c, d). Error bars show standard errors. 
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Similarity users in the similarity condition and similarity users in the rule condition did not 
differ significantly from each other, as indicated by the lack of a main effect for condition, F(1, 
31) = 2.10, p = .16, ηp2 = .06, and a nonsignificant interaction between condition and exemplar 
similarity, F(1.2, 37.4) = 1.63, p = .21, ηp2 = .05. 
Test Phase 2. We repeated the same analyses for Test Phase 2. As shown in Figure 4.6c, we 
did not find an effect for exemplar similarity, F(2, 48) = 0.81, p = .45, ηp2 = .03, or strategy 
classification, F(1, 24) = 0.24, p = .88, ηp2 = .0, nor an interaction between these two factors in 
the rule condition, F(2, 48) = 0.51, p = .60, ηp2 = .02. Participants almost did not look at 
exemplar locations, regardless of their classification as rule or similarity user. In contrast, we 
still found an effect of exemplar similarity in the similarity condition, F(1.2, 23.0) = 26.10, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .57 (Figure 4.6d). 
Last, we compared participants classified as similarity users in the rule and similarity 
conditions. Whereas similarity users in the similarity condition looked more at the exemplar 
locations of similar learning candidates than the locations of learning exemplars with different 
cue values, similarity users in the rule condition did not look back at the exemplar locations of 
similar learning candidates. This gaze pattern is confirmed by the results of a mixed ANOVA 
that showed a main effect for the factor strategy condition, F(1, 31) = 12.48, p = .001, ηp2 = .29, 
and a significant interaction between the factors exemplar similarity and strategy condition, 
F(1.3, 38.0) = 13.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. 
4.4.3 Discussion Experiment 2 
Overall, we found a similar pattern of results to that in Experiment 1. Participants using a 
similarity-based strategy showed a strong effect of similarity on eye movements. They looked 
more frequently at locations where identical but also where similar exemplars to the candidate 
under consideration had been presented. This was the case when participants were not 
instructed to use a specific strategy as well as when instructed to rely on similarity. 
Furthermore, the same effect appeared for all participants classified as using similarity, 
independent of whether they had received feedback inducing a similarity-based strategy. 
As in Experiment 1 participants classified as using a rule or instructed to use a rule did 
not look back at the locations of similar exemplars. However, in contrast to Experiment 1, we 
found a memory effect when the same candidates appeared during test that had been studied 
previously. Here we found that even participants instructed to use a rule looked more 
frequently at the location where the specific candidate had appeared before. This indicates 
that when it was not necessary to use a rule because a specific candidate was recognized, 
participants relied on memory retrieval, but not when new candidates were evaluated. Possibly 
this effect did not appear in Experiment 1 because there the “identical” candidates appeared 
with new names during test, whereas they had the same names in Experiment 2, which could 
have induced recognition regardless of the strategy they used.  
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We were only partly able to induce participants to use a rule- or similarity-based 
strategy. Participants’ self-reports showed that also in the rule feedback condition a 
considerable number of participants used similarity. These results are in contrast to studies 
showing that usually people prefer simple rules to similarity (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Erickson 
et al., 1998; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Nosofsky et al., 1994). However, our studies differed from 
these experiments, because usually the information about the candidate does not need to be 
retrieved from memory. In contrast, in our task participants had to learn the rule while 
retrieving the cue values from memory. Indeed, Platzer and Bröder (2013) showed that in 
memory-based decisions people more frequently rely on similarity — in particular if the cue 
polarity (i.e., which cue value is associated with a positive outcome) is not known. In our task, 
learning about the direction of a cue was even more complex because every cue could take on 
four values compared to two cue values in the experiment by Platzer and Bröder (2013).  
In the analysis, we classified participants based on verbal descriptions of the 
strategies they used. The ability to verbalize is frequently considered a feature of rule 
application, whereas similarity-based strategies are often considered implicit and thus less 
accessible to deliberate reporting. Thus, similarity users might be less able to accurately report 
the strategy they used (Ashby et al., 1998; Ashby & Maddox, 2005). Indeed, participants who 
reported using a rule were easily classified and rater agreement was very high, reaching 100 % 
for participants classified as using a simple rule. The majority of similarity users could be 
clearly classified as using similarity based on their description, but because similarity might be 
difficult to verbalize we included participants who were unable to verbalize the strategy they 
used in the similarity user category. However, we cannot rule out that these participants 
actually followed a different strategy, combined a rule-based and a similarity-based strategy, 
or switched strategies between trials. Overall, our results suggest that the gaze pattern of 
these participants reflects retrieval processes caused by similarity. Future research, however, 
should investigate if there are differences between people who rely on a single strategy and 
those who use multiple strategies as well as possible differences between participants who 
have insight into the strategies they used and participants who do not. Furthermore, 
researchers disagree on the degree to which self-reports reflect people’s actual cognitive 
processes versus only general beliefs about how they made a decision (e.g., Harries, Evans, & 
Dennis, 2000; Lagnado, Newll, Kahan, & Shanks, 2006). This suggests that future research 
should use additional methods such as cognitive modeling to corroborate our findings. 
4.5 General Discussion  
When making everyday decisions from memory people can apply abstract rules that process 
the available information for a decision or they can make a decision according to similar 
decision situations encountered in the past (Ashby et al., 1998; Erickson et al., 1998; Juslin & 
Persson, 2002; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Platzer & Bröder, 2013). Although this distinction is 
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intuitively appealing it proves hard to separate on a process level. One reason is that the two 
processes are conceptually difficult to distinguish (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Markman et al., 2005; 
Pothos, 2005). Another problem is that hardly any tools exist that can trace memory processes 
during higher-level mental processes that are not intrusive and can measure the ongoing 
memory processes online (e.g., Bröder, 2000; Peterson & Beck, 2011).  
In two studies we explored memory processes during similarity- versus rule-based 
retrieval processes using a recently developed method based on the measurement of eye 
movements (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012). We found that participants using 
a similarity-based strategy differed in their eye movements from participants using a rule-
based strategy: Whereas participants using similarity fixated on spatial locations that were 
associated with exemplars during learning, participants using a rule did not look back at the 
locations of the previously learned exemplars. This was the case when applying a complex rule 
based on multiple cues (Experiment 1) as well as a simple one-dimensional rule (Experiment 
2), when applying similarity based on matches to four exemplars with unique cue values 
(Experiment 1) as well as when applying similarity to eight exemplars with each cue value 
associated with two exemplars (Experiment 2), and when instructed to use a strategy 
(Experiment 1) as well as when selecting a strategy spontaneously (Experiment 2). In sum, 
these results provide robust evidence that participants using a similarity-based strategy 
retrieved exemplar information from memory, whereas participants who used a rule to arrive 
at a decision did not retrieve exemplar information from memory.  
4.5.1 Using Eye Movements to Study Memory Retrieval in Decision-making 
In both studies we found that people showed differences in eye movements depending on the 
retrieval demands of the decision strategy they employed. These results are in line with the 
idea that eye movements to associated spatial locations can be seen as direct evidence for 
memory retrieval, and the results dovetail with an ever-growing number of papers showing 
that when retrieving information from memory, people gaze back at spatial locations that have 
been associated with the to-be-retrieved information during encoding (e.g., Hoover & 
Richardson, 2008; Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; 
Richardson & Spivey, 2000).  
In addition, our findings support the idea that eye movements do not reflect an 
automatic response that is executed upon listening to a statement probing associated spatial 
information, but rather a strategy-based retrieval process (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & 
Jahn, 2012). If eye movements are the result of an automatic link between perception and 
retrieval, rule users should have shown the same pattern of eye movements as similarity users, 
because listening to cue information should have automatically activated the episodic 
memory trace and triggered eye movements back to the associated spatial locations. Instead, 
rule user did not look back at these locations. This view is in line with findings in diagnostic 
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reasoning where gaze behaviour has been shown to reflect the activation status of a 
hypothesis in memory (Jahn & Braatz, 2014). Here, we demonstrated that this research can be 
extended to study how eye movements reflect the memory processes involved in similarity- 
and rule-based decision and judgment processes.  
In our study people’s eye movements were free and unrestricted. Recent research, 
however, suggests that triggering the eyes to move to a specific location during retrieval can 
enhance the retrieval of the information associated with that location (Johansson et al., 2012; 
Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Scholz et al., 2014). Similarly, manipulating 
the salience of cues (Platzer & Bröder, 2012) and guiding the eyes toward valid and invalid cue 
information (Platzer et al., 2014) have been shown to influence the probability with which the 
cues are retrieved from memory and the resulting decision strategy. This suggests that 
guiding eye movements to locations could be a subtle way to alter the decision-making 
process, even if these locations no longer contain any information. However, with unrestricted 
eye movements, enhanced retrieval accuracy due to eye movements to associated but 
emptied spatial locations is unlikely (cf. Richardson et al., 2009; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004). 
4.5.2 Memory Retrieval in Rule-based and Similarity-based Decisions 
We found in both studies that people using a rule did not look back at the locations of 
previously learned exemplars, but people using a similarity-based strategy did, independent of 
the complexity of the task structure and if the strategy was instructed or spontaneously used. 
This suggests that similarity-based and rule-based decisions rely on different memory 
processes. These results are in line with the assumptions of Hahn and Chater (1998; see also 
Bailey, 2005), who proposed that the core difference between rule and similarity lies not in the 
nature of the mental representations that are built, but in the way memory representations of 
stored information are matched with a novel object. Whereas similarity users make a decision 
by matching the object under consideration against the stored exemplars, rule users compare 
the object against the conditions for choosing a specific option specified by the rule. 
Correspondingly, we found that only participants using similarity returned their gaze to the 
locations associated with exemplars, even though we made sure that rule and similarity users 
had the same information available in memory: Similarity and rule users received the same 
cue information about job candidates and we ensured that they were equally able to retrieve 
this information throughout the decision-making phase. Furthermore, a memory check at the 
end of Experiment 2 showed that participants remembered almost all the cue information and 
that there was no difference in recall accuracy between users of similarity- and rule-based 
strategies.  
Eye movements suggest that for participants using a similarity-based strategy, 
memory retrieval was a direct function of similarity with similar exemplars being fixated on 
more than nonsimilar exemplars. This idea is in line with multiple-trace models of memory 
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such as the MINERVA model, which assumes that recall is a function of similarity to the object 
under consideration and the frequency and recency with which it was encountered during 
learning (Hintzman, 1988; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). In our study, frequency and recency 
were the same for all exemplars, leaving the effect of similarity. However, our results suggest 
that using eye movements to trace memory retrieval could be a promising avenue to 
investigate how frequency and recency interact with similarity when retrieving information. 
Overall, the differences between rule and similarity users were somewhat more 
pronounced when they followed instruction than when we compared participants who were 
classified based on their verbal reports. This suggests that the memory processes involved in 
an explicit and deliberate application of a strategy are comparable to the processes triggered 
by spontaneous use. However, a considerable number of participants were unable to verbalize 
the strategy they used, and it is possible that this is the result of using a combination of 
similarity and rule-based processes (e.g., Brooks & Hannah, 2006; Hahn et al., 2010; von 
Helversen, Herzog, & Rieskamp, 2014). Here, making retrieval processes visible by tracing eye 
movements during the decision phase could be a valuable tool to analyze the memory 
processes involved in spontaneous decisions. 
4.6 Conclusion 
By observing eye movements while people performed memory-based decisions using a 
similarity-based or a rule-based strategy, we showed that the two strategies involve different 
memory processes. Although similarity and rule users had built the same memory 
representations, they differed in how these representations were accessed when making a 
decision. Whereas similarity users retrieved information about similar exemplars, rule users 
did not—providing empirical evidence that the two processes can be disentangled on the 
process level. Our results show that observing peoples’ eye movements to “nothing” can make 
cognitive processes visible that otherwise would be hidden from sight.  
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4.7 Appendix 
Table A.4.1 Item Structure in Experiment 1  
Test 
candidate 
no. 
Cue 1:  
Language  
skills 
Cue 2: 
Computer  
skills 
Cue 3:  
Work 
experience 
Exemplar 
location (no. 
cues shared) 
Strategy prediction 
Rule Similarity 
1 Italian SQL Automobile 3 Invited Invited 
2 French SPSS Finance 3 Invited Invited 
3 French SQL Finance 3 Invited Invited 
4 Italian SPSS Finance 3 Invited Invited 
5 French SPSS Mobile phone 2 Invited Invited 
6 Italian HTML Automobile 2 Invited Invited 
7 Portuguese HTML Finance 1 Invited Rejected 
8 French Photoshop Mobile phone 1 Invited Rejected 
9 Spanish HTML Mobile phone 0 Invited Rejected 
10 Portuguese HTML Mobile phone 0 Invited Rejected 
11 Portuguese HTML Pharmaceutical 0 Rejected Rejected 
12 Spanish Photoshop Mobile phone 0 Rejected Rejected 
13 Spanish Photoshop Pharmaceutical 0 Rejected Rejected 
14 Portuguese Photoshop Mobile phone 0 Rejected Rejected 
15 Portuguese HTML Automobile 1 Rejected Rejected 
16 Spanish SPSS Mobile phone 1 Rejected Rejected 
17 Spanish SQL Automobile 2 Rejected Invited 
18 Italian Photoshop Automobile 2 Rejected Invited 
19 French SPSS Automobile 3 Rejected Invited 
20 Italian SPSS Automobile 3 Rejected Invited 
Note. Exemplar location indicates number of corresponding cue values with the invited learning candidates. 
Strategy prediction indicates if a test candidate was invited or rejected according to the rule or similarity 
instruction. Italic type denotes test candidates who had cue patterns identical to those of the learning candidates 
(identical test items). Test candidates 1 and 2 correspond with invited learning candidates and candidates 11 and 
12 with rejected learning candidates. All remaining test candidates varied in their similarity to the invited learning 
candidates (new test items).  
  
Chapter 4 
74 
Table A.4.2 Item Structure in Experiment 2 
Test 
candidate 
no. 
Cue 1: 
Language  
skills 
Cue 2:  
Computer  
skills 
Cue 3:  
Work  
experience 
Strategy prediction 
Rule Similarity 
1 French SPSS Automobile Invited Rejected 
2 French SQL Mobile phone Invited Rejected 
3 French SPSS Mobile phone Invited Rejected 
4 French Photoshop Mobile phone Invited Invited 
5 French SPSS Financial Invited Invited 
6 French HTML Financial Invited Ambiguous 
7 French Photoshop Financial Invited Invited 
8 Italian SQL Automobile Invited Invited 
9 Italian SPSS Automobile Invited Ambiguous 
10 Italian HTML Automobile Invited Invited 
11 Italian SQL Pharmaceutical Invited Invited 
12 Italian HTML Pharmaceutical Invited Rejected 
13 Italian Photoshop Pharmaceutical Invited Rejected 
14 Italian HTML Financial Invited Rejected 
15 Spanish SPSS Automobile Rejected Ambiguous 
16 Spanish SQL Pharmaceutical Rejected Invited 
17 Spanish SPSS Pharmaceutical Rejected Invited 
18 Spanish Photoshop Pharmaceutical Rejected Ambiguous 
19 Spanish SQL Mobile phone Rejected Rejected 
20 Spanish SQL Financial Rejected Rejected 
21 Spanish SPSS Financial Rejected Invited 
22 Portuguese HTML Automobile Rejected Invited 
23 Portuguese Photoshop Automobile Rejected Rejected 
24 Portuguese Photoshop Pharmaceutical Rejected Rejected 
25 Portuguese SQL Mobile phone Rejected Ambiguous 
26 Portuguese HTML Mobile phone Rejected Invited 
27 Portuguese Photoshop Mobile phone Rejected Invited 
28 Portuguese HTML Financial Rejected Ambiguous 
Note. Strategy prediction indicates if a test candidate was invited according to the received strategy feedback 
(rule or similarity). According to the similarity feedback, six test candidates were equally similar to an invited and 
a rejected learning candidate and were classified as ambiguous. Italics denote test candidates who corresponded 
in their cue patterns with the eight learning candidates (old items). According to the rule feedback, candidates 
with the numbers 3, 7, 8, and 12 were invited and candidates number 17, 20, 23, and 26 were rejected. According 
to the similarity feedback, candidates number 7, 8, 17, and 26 were invited and candidates number 3, 12, 20, and 
23 were rejected. All other test candidates varied in their similarity with the learning candidates (new items). 
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Table A.4.3 Means and Standard Deviations for Response Accuracy (%), Response Times (seconds) 
and Fixation Durations (seconds) on Exemplar Locations for Old and New Test Items and Test Phases 
1 and 2 for the Seven Participants in the Similarity Condition in Experiment 2 Who Either Used a Rule 
(Participants 1–3) or Reported Using a Different Strategy (Participants 4–7) 
Participant 
no. 
Response 
accuracy 
Response 
time 
Exemplar location (no. cues shared) 
0 1 2/3 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Old items 
Test Phase 1           
1 100 0 9.2 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.3 2.4 
2 86 38 22.4 14.9 0.2 0.2 1.1 1 3.4 3.8 
3 100 0 9 0.6 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
4 75 46 9.3 1.7 0 0 0 0.1 3.3 1.8 
5 100 0 9.2 1.3 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 
6 88 35 10.2 3.7 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.1 2.3 1.8 
7 100 0 9 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 
Test Phase 2           
1 100 0 9.1 1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.9 1.6 
2 67 52 12.5 8.8 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 2.6 4.7 
3 100 0 8.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0 0 
4 63 52 8.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 3.9 0.7 
5 100 0 9.1 1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.6 3.7 
6 100 0 10.1 2.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 5 1.8 
7 88 35 8.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.7 
New items 
Test Phase 1           
1 90 31 10.6 2.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.1 
2 73 46 27.8 16.4 0.7 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.6 
3 90 31 11.9 2.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 
4 75 44 8.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.8 
5 80 41 15.9 6 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.2 0.8 
6 75 44 11.6 3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0.7 1.1 
7 70 47 9.1 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 
Test Phase 2           
1 90 31 12.7 6.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.2 0.9 
2 89 32 13 8.4 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.4 
3 90 31 10.6 2.5 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
4 75 44 10.5 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.9 1 
5 90 31 22.7 17.5 0.1 0.1 1.2 2.9 1.4 4.8 
6 65 49 13 5 0.4 0.6 1.5 0.9 1.8 1.6 
7 70 47 11.1 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 
Note. Old items shared 0, 1, and 3 cue vales with exemplars and new items shared 0, 1, and 2 cue values with 
exemplars. 
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5.1 Abstract 
Memory indexing is an eye tracking method that affords rich time course information about 
memory-based cognitive processing during complex tasks such as reasoning, thinking, and 
decision-making. We apply memory indexing to reveal symptom processing in sequential 
diagnostic reasoning, in which multiple pieces of information are evaluated to find a probable 
explanation for observed symptoms. Participants first learned information about causes and 
symptoms presented in spatial frames. Gaze allocation on emptied spatial frames during 
symptom processing and during the diagnostic response reflected the subjective status of 
hypotheses held in memory and the preferred interpretation of ambiguous symptoms. All 
symptom sequences supported multiple diagnoses and thus, each diagnosis was chosen 
under uncertainty. Memory indexing traced how the diagnostic decision developed and it 
revealed instances of hypothesis change and biases in symptom processing that explain the 
observed order effects. Memory indexing thus provided direct online evidence for coherence 
maximization in processing ambiguous information. 
 
Keywords: eye movements, process tracing, memory indexing, diagnostic reasoning, belief 
updating 
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5.2 Introduction 
In diagnostic reasoning the task is to find a probable explanation for a set of observations 
(Johnson & Krems, 2001; Patel, Arocha, & Zhang, 2005). For example, a physician has to find 
the most likely cause for a patient’s symptoms. Usually, symptoms are reported sequentially 
and have to be evaluated based on knowledge stored in long-term memory (Thomas, 
Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008). Symptom information can be sufficient to determine 
a single explanation. But often, the available information supports more than one hypothesis 
(McKenzie, 1998) and thus is ambiguous. An ambiguous case elicits differing final diagnoses 
even though early observed symptoms may strongly suggest a certain hypothesis. A 
diagnostician may stay with an initial hypothesis or change to an alternative. In the present 
study, we apply eye tracking in a manner suitable for process tracing of memory-based 
reasoning and decision-making (memory indexing) to reveal coherence maximizing in 
symptom processing leading to one or the other diagnosis for ambiguous cases. 
If a symptom sequence supports multiple hypotheses (i.e. an ambiguous symptom 
sequence) and hypotheses are supported to differing degrees, the hypothesis receiving the 
strongest support is most likely chosen. However, an objectively less supported hypothesis 
may be chosen instead because a diagnosis reflects the subjective evaluation of symptoms 
(Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). For instance, the order in which symptoms are presented affects 
symptom evaluation in a systematic manner (Baumann et al., 2010; Bergus, Chapman, Levy, 
Ely, & Oppliger, 1998; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011). Recent 
research suggests that symptom processing in sequential diagnostic reasoning with 
ambiguous symptom sets is often biased towards the hypothesis that is supported by 
symptoms presented early in the symptom sequence (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Lange, 
Thomas, & Davelaar, 2012; Rebitschek et al., 2012; Weber, Böckenholt, Hilton, & Wallace, 
1993). This is especially true when participants are probed only after they have received all 
symptom information (end of sequence response mode, Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). These 
findings on diagnosis momentum (Croskerry, 2003), which constitute instances of the more 
general phenomenon of confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), can be interpreted as a 
reasoners’ tendency to strive for a coherent interpretation of presented information and to 
distort information to increase coherence (Kostopoulou, Russo, Keenan, Delaney, & Douiri, 
2012; Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996; Wang, Johnson, & Zhang, 2006). Maximizing coherence 
more often favors the initially leading hypothesis, but it can also strengthen an alternative 
after a hypothesis change. Such a change is likely if clearly stronger evidence for an 
alternative hypothesis has accumulated. 
Biased symptom processing influenced by the order of symptoms is most clearly 
exemplified with maximally ambiguous cases that contain equal support for two hypotheses. 
The probability that a patient suffers from a certain disease given equal support for this and 
another disease (and equal base rates) is .5 and constitutes maximal ambiguity. Deviations of 
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diagnosis proportions from .5 indicate biased symptom processing. The same set of 
symptoms presented in one order may favor one diagnosis and presented in a different order 
may favor the alternative.  
Another special case of ambiguity results if two alternatives are supported by the 
same number of symptoms, but for one hypothesis the supporting symptoms are more 
diagnostic whereas for the other hypothesis the supporting symptoms are more diverse. 
Symptoms are maximally diagnostic for a hypothesized cause if they are only linked to this 
cause. For example, if eyes symptoms support only one hypothesis then two symptoms that 
are derived from the eyes symptom class (e.g., “eyelid swelling” and “lacrimation”) are 
maximally diagnostic. However, these symptoms are not diverse. Two symptoms are diverse if 
they cover two different symptom classes that are linked to a hypothesis (e.g., “lacrimation” 
and “cough” covering the symptom classes “eyes” and “respiration”). Diverse symptoms can 
provide stronger support than non-diverse symptoms. This has been explained, for example, by 
similarity coverage (Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990) and causal diversity (Kim & 
Keil, 2003; Kim, Yopchick, & de Kwaadsteniet, 2008). Diversity and diagnosticity are 
independent because diverse symptoms may also be linked to other hypotheses and thus be 
less diagnostic. Ambiguous symptom sets consisting of equal numbers of maximally 
diagnostic but non-diverse symptoms supporting one hypothesis and less diagnostic but 
diverse symptoms supporting another hypothesis thus pit diagnosticity and diversity against 
each other.  
The three types of ambiguous symptom sets – superior support for one hypothesis, 
equal support, and diagnosticity vs. diversity – are all interesting to study with process tracing. 
For symptom sets with superior support process data clarify how coherence maximizing can 
result in choosing the less supported diagnosis. With equal support process data reveal how 
coherence maximizing pushes one of two competing hypotheses. And for diagnosticity vs. 
diversity process tracing reveals, for instance, how much a second symptom from a maximally 
diagnostic symptom class increases the status of the respective hypothesis. Diagnostic 
reasoning as a memory-based task poses challenges for process tracing. But recently, a 
method has been developed that allows tracing the status of multiple hypotheses in parallel 
and indicates coherence maximizing in symptom processing. 
Process measures were thought to be not applicable to study memory-based 
processes, because cognition was thought to proceed without accompanying actions towards 
the environment. However, recent research on the so-called “looking-at-nothing” phenomenon 
and the “visual-world” paradigm has proven that eye movements are applicable to study 
memory retrieval (e.g., Ferreira et al., 2008; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004) and language 
processing (Allopenna et al., 1998; Altmann & Kamide, 2009; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). Taking 
these results a step further, “memory indexing” has been developed as a process measure to 
study higher-level cognitive tasks (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2010, 2012). In a 
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memory indexing study, participants first learn information that is presented at different 
spatial locations on a computer screen. During a subsequent decision or reasoning phase, the 
spatial locations that contained information during learning are empty and eye movements are 
recorded. In decision-making, eye movements matched spontaneously applied decision 
heuristics (Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012). Inferring memory-based processing by observing eye 
movements is possible, because when processing information from the outside world, human 
cognition combines visual and auditory perceptual input with conceptual knowledge resulting 
in mental representations stored in episodic memory traces. Reactivation of parts of such a 
representation reestablishes a spatial index that leads the gaze back to spatial locations that 
were associated with the retrieved context (Huettig et al., 2011; Theeuwes et al., 2009). A 
spatial index can be linked to episodic memories (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; Richardson & 
Spivey, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2001) to remembered or imagined scenes (Johansson et al., 
2012; Johansson et al., 2006) and is triggered by linguistic input (Spivey & Dale, 2011).  
Jahn and Braatz (2014) applied memory indexing to study sequential diagnostic 
reasoning. Participants were told to imagine they were physicians diagnosing the chemical 
with which a worker in a chemical plant was affected during an accident (chemical-accident 
task, Mehlhorn et al., 2011). Information about symptoms and the chemicals that could cause 
them were learned during a preceding learning phase. Symptom classes and chemicals 
(possible diagnoses) were associated to spatial locations. During reasoning trials symptoms 
were presented auditorily in sequence. Memory indexing showed the activation status of 
hypotheses in memory over the course of a reasoning trial and indicated how symptoms were 
interpreted (Jahn & Braatz, 2014). In the study by Jahn and Braatz (2014), in most sequences 
a single final diagnosis was left after all symptom information had been presented.  
The aim of the current study is to show how the study of eye movements can reveal 
memory processes underlying sequential diagnostic reasoning from the first symptom 
presentation until a reasoners’ response for ambiguous symptom sequences. In order to do so, 
we applied memory indexing in the chemical accident task (see Jahn & Braatz, 2014). We 
created 16 item sequences that included a set of critical manipulations: First, to convey the 
value of process data, we studied symptom sequences that supported two or three contending 
hypotheses and were ambiguous throughout the symptom sequence such that the same 
symptom sequence could result in differing diagnoses. Second, we varied the degree of 
support (one, two or three symptoms supporting one hypothesis) creating symptom 
sequences with superior support for one hypothesis and sequences with equal support. Third, 
we manipulated the order of symptom presentation to vary when a hypothesis change 
becomes likely and to reveal coherence maximizing symptom processing that changes 
diagnosis proportions for the same symptoms presented in a different order. Fourth, to explore 
whether participants put more weight on diagnosticity or on diversity based on their implicit 
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assumptions about the scenario, we tested symptom sequences that pitted diagnosticity 
against diversity.  
We assessed diagnostic responses and confidence ratings to test effects of symptom 
order and diversity. We expect that a hypothesis that receives the most support throughout 
the symptom sequence is selected over a hypothesis that received less support. Given results 
on primacy effects, earlier presented symptoms should have a stronger impact on the final 
diagnosis than later symptoms because of diagnosis momentum. Order effects should be 
particularly perspicuous for equally supported hypotheses. Furthermore, hypotheses that are 
supported by symptoms from two symptom classes may be more likely chosen than 
hypotheses supported by symptoms from one class (diversity effect).  
Eye movements are recorded to reveal symptom processing throughout the reasoning 
process. Gaze data after the first symptom should reflect which hypotheses this symptom 
supports. Eye movements during subsequent symptom presentations (second till fourth 
symptom) should reveal diagnosis momentum resulting from symptom processing biased 
towards a coherent symptom interpretation as well as when in the sequence of symptom 
presentations a hypothesis change takes place. When giving the response, gaze behaviour 
should reveal which hypothesis was chosen at the end of the reasoning trial (gaze cascade 
effect, Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). 
5.3 Method 
The study consisted of a learning phase and a subsequent reasoning phase similar to Jahn 
and Braatz (2014). During the learning phase, participants acquired the knowledge needed for 
the reasoning phase. The reasoning task was to determine the most likely cause of a patient’s 
symptoms. The patients were workers in a chemical plant that produces four chemicals and 
each worker was affected by exactly one of those chemicals. 
In the learning phase, participants first learned how symptoms are assigned to symptom 
classes and second how symptom classes relate to chemicals. Associations between 
symptom classes and chemicals were established by presenting symptom classes in 
rectangular frames in four spatial areas that each represented one chemical (Figure 5.1). 
During reasoning, symptoms were presented auditorily while participants only saw the 
emptied rectangular frames. Eye movements were recorded throughout the reasoning phase. 
The diagnostic decision, response times, and confidence ratings were collected at the end of 
the reasoning trial. 
5.3.1 Participants 
Of 34 participants, for whom calibration succeeded to an accuracy of at least 2° of visual 
angle, we had to exclude two participants because the eye tracker lost participants’ gaze 
through the course of the experiment. The final 32 participants were all students from 
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Technische Universität Chemnitz (21 female, 11 male) with a mean age of 22.4 years (ranging 
from 19-39 years). All had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
5.3.2 Apparatus 
Participants were seated at a distance of 63 cm in front of a 22’’ computer screen (1680 x 
1050 pixels). Stimuli were presented via E-Prime 2.0. Auditory recordings were presented 
through headphones and responses were given on a standard keyboard. An SMI RED remote 
eye tracker sampled data of the right eye at 120 Hz. Gaze data were recorded with iView X 2.5 
following 5-point calibration and analyzed with BeGaze 2.3. Fixation detection used a 
dispersion threshold of 80 pixels and a duration threshold of 100 ms.  
5.3.3 Material 
The four chemicals were assigned to screen quadrants (see Figure 5.1). Each quadrant 
enclosed three rectangular frames, which contained the three symptom classes that the 
respective chemical could cause. For example, the chemical at the top left caused symptoms 
from the symptom classes circulation, pain, and skin. One symptom class was unique (pain for 
the top left chemical) and two symptom classes were shared with other chemicals. Table 5.1 
lists all eight symptom classes and symptoms. Original materials were in German. 
 
Table 5.1 Symptom classes and symptoms (originally in German) 
Symptom class Symptom Symptom 
Eyes (Augen) Eyelid swelling (Lidschwellung) Lacrimation (Tränenfluss) 
Respiration (Atemwege) Difficult breathing (Erstickungsgefühl) Cough (Husten) 
Neurological (Nervensystem) Speech disorder (Sprachstörung) Paralysis (Lähmung) 
Circulation (Kreislauf) Sweating (Schwitzen) Swoon (Ohnmacht) 
Pain (Schmerzen) Twinge (Stechen) Sting (Brennen) 
Skin (Haut) Rash (Ausschlag) Acid burn (Verätzung) 
Digestion (Verdauung) Vomiting (Erbrechen) Diarrhea (Durchfall) 
Psychoactive (Psychoaktiv) Aggressivity (Aggressivität) Anxiety (Angstzustände) 
 
Frames containing symptom classes were arranged in a circle. The distance between the 
center of the screen and the center of each rectangle was 12.2° of visual angle. The four 
symptom classes that were uniquely caused by one chemical were presented in the middle of 
a quadrant (e.g., symptom class pain in the middle of the top left quadrant is located between 
the symptom classes circulation and skin). The symptom classes that were caused by two 
chemicals occurred in two quadrants and were presented in two neighboring frames on the 
circle (e.g., circulation is located top right and top left). Symptoms from symptom classes that 
were associated with one chemical are denoted with a single small letter (a, b, c, or d). 
Symptoms from symptom classes that were associated with two chemicals are denoted with 
two small letters (e.g., symptom ab can be caused by chemical A and chemical B).  
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Figure 5.1 Left: Spatial arrangement of the four chemicals and the symptom classes that each 
chemical could cause as it was presented during learning. Right: Emptied spatial arrangement shown 
during the reasoning phase. 
 
A single trial in the reasoning phase consisted of four symptoms that were presented 
auditorily, for example, sting, rash, eyelid swelling, and lacrimation. In this example, sting 
(belonging to the pain class) was associated with the top left chemical, rash (skin) was 
associated with the top left and the bottom left chemicals, and eyelid swelling (eyes) and 
lacrimation (eyes) were associated with the top right chemical. We refer to the chemical that 
we assumed to have an advantage in participants’ diagnostic reasoning as the A-chemical. 
The advantage could be that it was supported by more symptoms than alternative chemicals, 
that it was equally supported but it had the advantage of being supported by the first 
symptom or that it was supported by an equal number of symptoms but by symptoms from 
different classes (diversity). We refer to the competing alternative chemical as the B-chemical, 
and to further competitors as C- and D-chemicals. In the example, the top left chemical is the 
A-chemical supported by sting (pain) and rash (skin), the top right chemical is the B-chemical 
supported by eyelid swelling (eyes) and lacrimation (eyes), the bottom left chemical is the C-
chemical supported only by rash (skin), and thus, the sequence sting, rash, eyelid swelling, and 
lacrimation is an example of an a-ac-b-b sequence. In this sequence, A is supported by a 
diverse symptom combination; B is supported by a more diagnostic but non-diverse symptom 
combination. 
Across 16 symptom sequences, we varied the degree of support for each chemical 
(superior support, equal support), the number of supported chemicals, the diversity of support, 
and the symptom order. The selected sequences by far do not exhaust all possibilities but test 
our research questions and highlight the value of memory indexing for tracing how diagnoses 
develop for ambiguous sequences. All tested symptom sequences are presented in the x-axis 
labels of Figure 5.2. For each symptom sequence, each of the four chemicals once appeared in 
the A-role. This was possible because the chemicals’ symptom class patterns were 
symmetrical. We constructed all possible assignments of symptoms to symptom sequences 
with the restriction that no single symptom occurred twice in the same symptom sequence. 
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Each sequence was tested four times per participant with each chemical in the A-role resulting 
in 64 (16 sequences * 4 chemicals) trials per participant. The B- and C-roles could be 
interchanged. For example, if A was located top left, B could be located top right or bottom 
left. We varied the B and C-roles for each sequence between participants. 
5.3.4 Procedure 
Learning symptoms and symptom classes. Participants first studied eight symptom classes 
and their symptoms presented in a similar layout as in Table 5.1 until they felt ready to be 
tested. Subsequently, they worked through learning trials. In each learning trial, a symptom 
was presented visually together with a list of symptom classes numbered from one to eight. 
Participants had to respond with the number denoting the correct symptom class and received 
visual and auditory feedback. Auditory feedback consisted of a single tone indicating a correct 
or wrong response. Visual feedback after a wrong response contained the correct answer. The 
16 symptoms were presented in random order and in each trial the list of symptom classes to 
choose from was reordered randomly. The first learning phase continued until all symptoms 
were once answered without errors. Learning symptoms and symptom classes lasted 11 min 
on average (SD = 10 min). 
Learning chemicals and their symptom classes. Next, participants learned about the four 
chemicals. Participants were presented with the spatial layout as shown left in Figure 5.1 and 
studied the layout until they felt ready to be tested. During subsequent test trials, participants 
only saw the emptied spatial frames as shown right in Figure 5.1 and a symptom was 
presented auditorily. Participants responded by indicating which chemical could have caused 
the presented symptom by pressing one of the number keys 1, 2, 4, and 5 on the number block 
of the keyboard. The keys matched the spatial positions of the chemicals (e.g., number 4 
indicated the chemical at the top left). Feedback was provided auditorily by a tone signaling a 
correct or a wrong response. After a wrong response, all symptom classes reappeared in the 
rectangular frames for two seconds. If a symptom could be caused by two chemicals, after 
receiving feedback about the first response, participants were prompted to indicate a second 
chemical and received feedback in exactly the same way as for the first response. Symptoms 
were presented in random order. There were 24 combinations of symptoms and chemicals. 
Learning lasted until participants assigned 95 % of all symptoms (23 out of 24 items) 
correctly. Learning which symptom classes could be caused by which chemicals lasted 10 min 
on average (SD = 9 min). 
Reasoning phase. Each reasoning trial was started self-paced by hitting the space bar. The 
next slide showed the emptied rectangular frames (Figure 5.1, right) and participants were 
auditorily presented with a sequence of four symptoms. Each symptom presentation lasted 
1000 ms followed by a delay of 2000 ms. After the fourth symptom had been presented, 
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participants indicated their diagnosis using the same keys as during learning. Response time 
was not restricted. Then, the screen containing the emptied spatial frames was replaced by 
the instruction “Please, indicate how sure you are about your diagnosis” from 1 “very unsure” 
to 7 “very sure”. Participants rated their confidence with a number on the keyboard and were 
prompted to start the next trial.  
After solving three practice trials at the beginning of the reasoning phase, the eye 
tracker was calibrated. Subsequently, participants worked through 64 reasoning trials. The 
reasoning phase was divided in four blocks. Each block consisted of 16 trials, in which all 16 
symptom sequences were tested once. The assignment of chemicals to sequences was 
balanced across blocks and the order of blocks was balanced across participants. For each 
trial, the assignment of symptoms was drawn randomly from four, six or eight possible 
assignments for this combination of sequence and chemical. After each block, participants 
were informed about how many blocks they had finished. Solving the 64 reasoning trials lasted 
21 min on average (SD = 3 min). 
5.4 Results 
We report response proportions for all 16 symptom sequences and mean fixation proportions 
for a subset of five sequences, in which the first symptom establishes a single leading 
hypothesis. Gaze data of another three sequences, response time data, and confidence ratings 
for all 16 sequences are provided as supplemental material.  
5.4.1 Diagnostic Response 
Diagnostic responses were recorded after the sequence of four symptoms had been presented 
(end of sequence response mode). Participants chose one of the four chemicals as the most 
likely cause of the presented symptoms. Figure 5.2.1 shows the proportions of A- and B-
responses for ten sequences with two contending hypotheses. Figure 5.2.2 shows response 
proportions for six sequences with three contending hypotheses.  
Participants almost always chose one of the two or three contending hypotheses. Only 
in 37 trials (1.8 % of all trials) participants chose a chemical that was not supported by the 
symptom sequence. In 38 trials (1.9 % of all trials) they chose the diagnosis that was only 
weakly supported by a single symptom that also pointed to a better supported chemical (e.g., 
C-response after a-ac-b-b). These cases were excluded from further analyses. 
If A was the only hypothesis supported by three symptoms (sequences 1 to 3 in Figure 
5.2.1 and sequences 1 to 5 in Figure 5.2.2), the A-response proportion was the highest. Thus, 
people chose the hypothesis that received the most support. For the sixth sequence in Figure 
5.2.1 (ab-a-b-ab), the B-response proportion was higher than the A-response proportion. This 
reflects a strong order effect because sequences 4 to 6 in Figure 5.2.1 provide equal support 
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Figure 5.2 1) Mean proportions of A- and B-diagnoses for each symptom sequence with two 
contending hypotheses. The first three sequences (from left to right) contain superior support for the 
A-diagnosis. The sequences four to six contain equal support for A and B and consist of the same set 
of symptoms (symptom order is varied), likewise the remaining four sequences that pit diagnosticity 
against diversity consist of the same set of symptoms. 2) Mean proportions of A- and B-diagnoses for 
each symptom sequence with A-, B- and C- or D-diagnoses for symptom sequences with three 
contending hypotheses. The first four sequences consist of the same set of symptoms and contain 
three symptoms supporting the A-diagnosis, all of which support another diagnosis as well (ab and ac). 
The two sequences on the right included inconsistent symptoms supporting the D-diagnosis (d or twice 
bd). Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
for A and B and differ only in symptom order. This order effect was confirmed by a significant 
linear downward trend of A-response proportions across these three sequences, F(2, 62) = 
15.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .34. 
If two hypotheses were supported by two symptoms each (e.g., A and B in sequences 
7 to 10 in Figure 5.2.1) and if three hypotheses were supported by two symptoms each 
(rightmost sequence in Figure 5.2.2), participants chose more often the hypothesis supported 
by two maximally diagnostic symptoms from the same symptom class than a competing 
hypothesis supported by diverse symptoms that (in part or both) were associated with two 
chemicals: In all four symptom sequences consisting of the symptoms ac, a, b, and b (7 to 10 
in Figure 5.2.1), there was a tendency for participants to choose B over A. In the sequence a-
bd-bd-a (rightmost in Figure 5.2.2) participants chose A more often than B or D. Thus, 
diagnosticity was more often evaluated as stronger than diversity. In order to trace the 
differences in symptom processing resulting in one or the other diagnosis for the same 
symptom sequence, we analyzed fixation proportions separately for the given responses. 
5.4.2 Fixation Proportions 
For each trial, we computed the proportion of trial duration for which no gaze data had been 
recorded. Trials were discarded if more than 40 % of gaze data were missing (4.9 % of all 
trials) due to blinks, eyes closed or looking off the screen. We analyzed fixation proportions on 
two levels. First, we report results on fixation proportions on former chemical locations. 
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Second, for more fine-grained analyses and to reveal symptom interpretation and rehearsal, 
we report fixation proportions on former locations of symptom classes.  
Fixation proportions on former chemical locations. Four areas of interest (AOIs) were 
defined corresponding to the four spatial areas representing the four chemicals. The AOIs 
were denoted A, B, C, and D according to the four chemical roles. The center of the screen was 
not included in the analyses (a circular area around the center of the screen with a diameter of 
5.1° of visual angle). Each trial was divided in five time intervals defined by the onsets of each 
of the four symptom presentations and the response interval. For each of the five intervals and 
each AOI, we computed the proportion of total fixation time in the four AOIs (screen quadrants 
excluding the center circle sector) separately for each symptom sequence and each 
participant and separated by diagnostic response. 
Figure 5.3 shows plots of mean fixation proportions across the five time intervals for 
five symptom sequences starting with an a- or a b-symptom. There are separate plots for trials 
with A-, B- and D-responses (left, middle, and right column, respectively). The symptom 
sequences in Figure 5.3 are ordered from top to bottom according to the number of 
consecutive symptoms that supported the A-hypothesis from the beginning of the sequence 
onward. The sequence in the first row started with three symptoms supporting A (a-ab-ab-b). 
The sequence in the second row started with two symptoms supporting A (a-ac-b-b). The 
sequences in the third and fourth row started with a single a-symptom (a-bd-bd-a and a-bd-a-
ab). And finally, the sequence in the fifth row started with a b-symptom (b-ab-ac-ac). Although, 
the proportions of B-responses for these sequences varied (Figure 5.2), the ordering in 
Figure 5.3 conveys in the B-response column that participants switched their leading 
hypothesis the earlier from A to B the earlier the series of A-supporting symptoms ended 
(hypothesis change). In the following, we focus on gaze data showing the generation of a 
leading hypothesis and subsequent biased symptom processing either favoring the leading 
hypothesis or resulting in a hypothesis change. 
First symptom interval. In the first symptom interval, fixation proportions should reflect how 
much the first symptom supported each individual hypothesis (momentary probability 
matching). As expected, this was the case for all symptom sequences displayed in Figure 5.3. 
The first four symptom sequences (first till fourth row of Figure 5.3) began with an a-
symptom. Accordingly, the A-quadrant in the first interval was fixated longer than the other 
three spatial areas B, C and D. Vice versa in the symptom sequence starting with a b-symptom 
at the bottom of Figure 5.3, B is fixated longer than A in trials finally responded to with B. 
Second till fourth symptom interval. Fixation proportions during subsequent symptom 
presentations reflected the subjective probabilities of the respective chemical as cause of a 
symptom. The memory indexing gaze data differed between trials of the same symptom 
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sequence with differing final responses and reflected both the support provided by symptoms 
and biased symptom processing (diagnosis momentum).  
 Fixation proportions reflected differences in support of alternative hypotheses in the 
symptom sequences: In trials with A-responses, the A-fixation proportion dropped the earlier 
symptoms supported an alternative hypothesis. Vice versa in trials with B-responses, fixation 
proportions for B increased the earlier a B-supporting symptom was presented. In the 
sequence a-bd-bd-a, a third hypothesis D was as supported as B. In trials with D-responses, the 
most fixated quadrant shifted from A to D (Figure 5.3, third row). 
The observed change in fixation proportions induced by a symptom differed depending 
on the final response (diagnosis momentum): For example, in the sequence a-ab-ab-b (Figure 
5.3, top row) with a final A-response, B received almost no fixations in the second and third 
interval in comparison to A, which was fixated more than 60 % of the time in each interval. In 
contrast, with a final B-response, the B-proportion increased after the ab-symptoms. Similarly, 
in the sequence a-bd-a-ab (Figure 5.3, fourth row) with a final A-response, the inconsistent bd-
symptom was ignored as can be seen in the low fixation proportions for the B- and D-
quadrants. However, with a final B-response, the bd-symptom led to a strong increase in 
fixation proportions for the B-quadrant. 
With regard to the sequences that pitted symptom diversity against symptom 
diagnosticity, it is of interest whether the second b-symptom in the sequence a-ac-b-b (Figure 
5.3, second row) was taken as further support for B and thus increased the B-proportion. 
Indeed, the second b-symptom led to an increase in fixation proportions towards the B-
chemical. This increase was even more pronounced when responding with B in comparison to 
A. Similarly, in other symptom sequences the repetition of the same symptom class induced 
further changes in fixation proportions. 
Response interval. Evidence accumulation continued until the response interval. When 
responding, fixation proportions were always highest for the chosen alternative. This was the 
case for all item types and responses plotted in Figure 5.3. Such increasing fixation 
proportions in favor of the chosen alternative have been described as gaze cascade effect. 
Fixation proportions on former locations of symptom classes. We defined twelve small AOIs 
around the twelve emptied rectangles that had contained information about symptom classes 
during learning. The small AOIs exceeded the border of a rectangle by half its height in each 
direction. AOIs were labeled according to the respective chemical’s role in a trial. The middle 
rectangle within each quadrant always contained a symptom class that was unique for this 
chemical and was therefore labeled a, b, c or d. Symptom classes in the remaining rectangles 
were associated with two chemicals and were therefore labeled with two letters: the first letter 
indicated the quadrant in which the rectangle was located and the second letter indicated the 
adjacent quadrant that contained this symptom class as well. For example, there were two 
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rectangles that contained the symptom class ab (e.g., skin). The AOI for the rectangle that was 
located in the A-quadrant was called ab and the AOI for the rectangle that was located in the 
B-quadrant was called ba.  
Similar to the analyses based on quadrant-AOIs, we computed the proportion of time 
that each small AOI was gazed at within one of the five time intervals for each trial and 
aggregated fixation proportions per symptom sequence and participant separated by 
diagnostic response. Figure 5.4 shows mean small-AOI fixation proportions for the same five 
symptom sequences that are shown in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.4 only shows fixation proportions 
for small AOIs associated with the two or three competing hypotheses. Fixation proportions 
for other small AOIs were negligible (cf. Figure 5.3).  
 
First interval. In the first time interval, fixation proportions were increased for the small AOI 
that had contained the symptom class of the presented symptom. If the first symptom was a, 
the a-AOI was fixated longer than any other small AOI (Figure 5.4, first till fourth row). Vice 
versa, if the first symptom was b, the b-AOI was fixated the longest (Figure 5.4, bottom row). 
Second till fourth symptom interval. Fixation proportions in subsequent time intervals reflected 
subjective interpretations of symptoms and symptom rehearsal. Similar to the quadrant-AOIs, 
they showed biased symptom processing in favor of the leading hypothesis. When an ab-
symptom was presented, both the ab- and ba-AOIs were gazed at. However, if A was the 
leading hypothesis, ab was fixated longer than ba (first, fourth and fifth row of Figure 5.4). 
Thus, symptoms were interpreted in the direction of the leading hypothesis (diagnosis 
momentum). Biased symptom processing was generally obvious when comparing fixation 
proportions for the same symptom sequence between trials with differing responses. In trials 
with A-responses, small AOIs in the B-quadrant were almost not fixated and in trials with B-
responses, small AOIs in the A-quadrant received only few fixations in symptom intervals 
following B-supporting symptoms (Figure 5.4).  
 Moreover, analyses of small AOIs revealed that previously heard symptoms were 
rehearsed (symptom rehearsal). For example, when an a-symptom was presented in the first 
symptom interval, fixation proportions towards the a-AOI were increased in subsequent 
intervals (Figure 5.4). The same can be seen for ab- and bd-symptoms. 
Response interval. When giving the response, fixation proportions were increased for those 
small AOIs that had contained the respective symptom categories in the quadrant of the 
chosen hypothesis (gaze cascade effect). 
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Figure 5.3 Mean proportions of fixation times in each interval that fell upon the A-, B-, C-, or D-
quadrants for four ambiguous symptom sequences with two contending hypotheses (A-responses left 
column, B-responses middle column) and one ambiguous sequence with three contending hypotheses 
(additionally D-responses right column). Error bars represent one standard error.  
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Figure 5.4 Mean proportions of fixation times in each time interval that fell upon the areas of interest 
around the rectangles containing symptom classes during learning. Four ambiguous symptom 
sequences with two contending hypotheses are shown that are separated in A-responses (left column) 
and B-responses (middle column). Additionally, one ambiguous sequence with three contending 
hypotheses is shown and fixation proportions before D-responses for this sequence are shown in the 
right column. Only those fixation proportions are plotted that correspond with the competing 
hypotheses (A and B or A, B and D). Error bars represent one standard error. 
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5.5 Discussion 
In everyday life, humans have to cope with ambiguous, uncertain situations. This is particularly 
clear when people have to find an explanation for a set of inconclusive observations. How do 
people cope with ambiguity in such challenging instances of diagnostic reasoning? Outcome 
data suggest that people strive for a coherent interpretation of observations. This claim results 
in a number of process assumptions: Interpreting new symptom information should be biased 
towards the leading hypothesis and information should be rehearsed and accumulated 
resulting in an hypothesis change when an alternative hypothesis receives more support than 
the previously favored competing explanation (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Lange et al., 
2012; Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011; Weber et al., 1993). However, observing these presumed 
processes directly was not possible before. We tested these process assumptions using 
memory indexing, a new method that is based on observing eye movements while participants 
solve memory-based reasoning tasks (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012). We 
provided evidence that eye movements indeed reflect the tendency to maximize coherence in 
diagnostic reasoning. We showed these effects with symptom sequences that were highly 
ambiguous and tested effects of presentation order and symptom diversity.  
At the beginning of a reasoning trial, gaze behaviour reflected the momentary 
probability of hypotheses given the presented symptom information. However, eye 
movements did not just reflect (automatic) retrieval processes initiated by hearing an 
auditorily presented cue. Instead eye movements reflected the dynamic updating of memory 
for hypotheses and symptoms. During subsequent symptom presentations, eye movements 
were predominantly directed to locations of symptom interpretations consistent with the 
leading hypothesis and not to all locations that were associated with the presented symptom. 
This finding is in line with previous research demonstrating symptom integration with varying 
symptom strengths (Jahn & Braatz, 2014). 
The use of ambiguous symptom sequences resulted in varying responses to the same 
sequence of symptoms and thus, afforded to analyze gaze behaviour by response. This 
analysis by response clearly showed that the final response developed in a process of biased 
symptom processing and maximizing coherence. In maximally ambiguous items (e.g., a-ab-ab-
b), the bias towards the initially leading hypothesis was reflected in response proportions. 
Gaze behaviour revealed how this advantage of the leading A-hypothesis developed but also, 
how the hypothesis change developed in the less frequent trials, in which the competing B-
diagnosis was chosen. By directly tracing biased symptom processing unobtrusively, memory 
indexing provides strong evidence for theories postulating coherence maximizing and 
information distortion (Kostopoulou et al., 2012; Russo et al., 1996; Wang et al., 2006).  
A subset of the symptom sequences pitted diagnosticity against diversity of 
symptoms (b and b against a and ac, and a and a against bd and bd). In the present study, 
response proportions indicated that participants went with diagnosticity slightly more often 
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and gaze behaviour showed that a second symptom from the same symptom class (b after b) 
was taken as additional evidence. This response tendency cannot be compared to a normative 
standard because critical information for computing a normative decision (causal structure, 
causal strengths, base rates, alternative causation, and presence of unstated symptoms) was 
implicit and unspecified. It is quite likely that participants would rather choose the diversely 
supported hypothesis if critical information favoring diversity was provided (Rebitschek, 
Krems, & Jahn, 2014). 
Bridging two lines of research, eye movements to emptied spatial locations on the one 
hand and diagnostic reasoning on the other hand, revealed the processing of ambiguous 
symptom information and allowed deep insights into the underlying cognitive processes. As 
the present memory indexing results underscore, tracing cognitive processes in highly 
complex tasks is crucial for a better understanding of human cognition and informs process 
models of reasoning and decision-making. In particular, memory indexing results on 
diagnostic reasoning may help in revising existing theories about diagnostic reasoning and in 
developing efficient support systems to guide diagnosticians and to prevent misdiagnoses and 
overconfidence.   
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5.6 Supplemental Material 
5.6.1 Mean Response Times 
Response times were computed after trimming outliers 3 SD above the individual session 
means (2.6 % of the data). One participant produced more than twice the average response 
time and was not included in the analysis of mean response times. Response times were 
measured from the onset of the response. Mean response times for a and b responses were 
aggregated per participant and item type (Figure A.5.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure A.5.1 1) Mean response times of A- and B-diagnoses for each symptom sequence with two 
contending hypotheses. 2) Mean response times of A- and B-diagnoses for each symptom sequence 
with A-, B- and C- or D-diagnoses for symptom sequences with three contending hypotheses. Error bars 
show one standard error.  
1) 2) 
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5.6.2 Mean Confidence Ratings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure A.5.2 1) Mean confidence ratings of A- and B-diagnoses for each symptom sequence with two 
contending hypotheses. 2) Mean confidence ratings of A- and B-diagnoses for each symptom 
sequence with A-, B- and C- or D-diagnoses for symptom sequences with three contending hypotheses. 
Error bars show one standard error. 
  
1) 2) 
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5.6.3 Fixation Proportions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.5.3 Mean proportions of fixation times in each interval that fell upon the a, b, c, or d quadrants 
for two ambiguous symptom sequences with two contending hypotheses and A- and B-responses and 
two ambiguous symptom sequences that only differ in the second symptom (b versus d) and A-
responses. Error bars represent one standard error.  
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Figure A.5.4 Mean proportions of fixation times in each time interval that fell upon the areas of interest 
around the rectangles containing information on symptom classes during learning. Two ambiguous 
symptom sequences with two contending hypotheses are shown that are separated in A-responses 
(left columns) and B-responses (middle column). Additionally, two ambiguous symptom sequences 
that only differ in the second symptom (b versus d) and A-responses are plotted at the bottom. Only 
those fixation proportions are plotted that correspond with the competing hypothesis (A vs. B or A, B 
vs. D). Error bars represent one standard error. 
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6 Summary and Conclusion 
Building on the research conducted on dynamic spatial indexing of multimodal events, this 
thesis focused on eye movements, both as a cause and as a consequence of memory retrieval. 
The main findings can be summarized as follows:  
Research objective 1: Eye movements during the retrieval of verbal information from 
memory are functionally related to retrieval performance 
When retrieving information that was auditorily presented during encoding, simultaneous to 
the presentation of an abstract symbol at a spatial location, people proportionally fixated on 
average 36 % of the time in the spatial area associated with the probed content. This is much 
higher than the chance level of 25 % (given four spatial areas) would predict. This behaviour is 
more pronounced when giving a correct response in comparison to an incorrect response. 
Whereas this relationship is only correlational, this study was also able to demonstrate that 
eye movements are functional by manipulating eye movement behaviour as an independent 
variable and measuring the effect of this manipulation on response accuracy and response 
times. Guiding the eyes away from the associated spatial location with the help of a salient 
spatial cue reduces retrieval performance by on average 10 %. Eye movements are thus 
functionally related to memory, even in terms of the retrieval of verbal information (Chapter 2). 
Research objective 2: Eye movements are not automatically launched to spatial locations. 
On the contrary, eye movements reflect the dynamic updating of information held in 
memory  
When presenting participants with the same information several times and probing this 
information in exactly the same manner, the looking-at-nothing behaviour is reduced (Chapter 
3). Additionally, research findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5 do also confirm to this 
conclusion: The execution of eye movements to associated spatial location depends on the  
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retrieval strategy (Chapter 4). Whereas using the similarity of a new object to stored instances 
in memory leads the gaze back to spatial locations associated with the retrieved exemplars, 
using an abstract rule does not. Furthermore, gaze behaviour reflects the dynamic updating in 
memory of hypotheses and symptoms (Chapter 5). Gaze behaviour was therefore only 
directed to symptoms associated with explanations that belonged to a set of contending 
hypotheses and not to all locations that were associated with a certain symptom. 
Research objective 3: Eye movements can be used as a direct behavioural correlate of 
memory processes involved in rule-versus similarity-based decision-making  
Eye movements have been employed as a tool to study memory-based binary decision-making 
and diagnostic reasoning (memory indexing). Chapter 4 describes how memory indexing can 
also be a useful tool to explore rule- and similarity-based decision processes.  Gaze behaviour 
was compared between participants that were instructed or who had spontaneously adopted 
an abstract rule, with participants using similarity to previously learned instances stored in 
memory. Gaze behaviour revealed that participants using similarity gazed back to associated 
spatial locations whereas participants using an abstract rule did not show this behaviour. 
Given the results on dynamic spatial indexing of multimodal events, this suggests that 
participants using the similarity strategy retrieve information about previously learned 
exemplars from memory, whereas this is not the case for participants using an abstract rule. 
Eye movements can in this way reveal differences in memory processes that are caused by 
different decision strategies. 
Research objective 4: Eye movements reveal the development of hypotheses in memory 
throughout the process of diagnostic reasoning of ambiguous symptom sequences from 
the first symptom presentation until the response  
Evidence has recently been published that demonstrates how memory indexing can be applied 
to the study of diagnostic reasoning. The experiment reported in Chapter 5 continued this line 
of research by studying ambiguous symptom sets in which the order of the presented 
symptoms varied and consisted of equal numbers of maximally diagnostic but non-diverse 
symptoms supporting one hypothesis, and less diagnostic but more diverse symptoms 
supporting another hypothesis. Ambiguous symptom sets permit different final diagnoses 
with this therefore allowing for the analysis of gaze behaviour dependent on the final 
response. Memory indexing traced how the diagnostic decision developed, and it revealed 
instances of hypothesis change and biases in symptom processing from the first symptom 
presentation until the participant’s response. Memory indexing thus provided direct online 
evidence for information distortion and coherence maximization in processing ambiguous 
information. 
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6.1 Eye Movements Reflect Memory Dynamics 
Different attempts have been made to explain how eye movements relate to memory. On the 
one hand, researchers assumed that eye movements are merely a byproduct or 
epiphenomenon of memory activity (e.g., Anderson, Bothell, & Douglass, 2004; Micic, 
Ehrlichman, & Chen, 2010). This school of thought recognizes eye movements as a 
consequence of memory retrieval, unable to feedback information into the retrieval process. 
An alternative perspective assumes that eye movements take an active role in memory 
processing (e.g., Ballard et al., 1997; Hollingworth, 2005a, 2005b, 2006). They feed visual 
information into the cognitive system, and are thereby an integral part of the updating process 
of multimodal memory representations. This updating process was described by Spivey and 
Dale (2011, p. 554) as follows: “The ongoing processes of cognition ‘spill over’ (before a 
decision is final) into the oculomotor system, causing it to prepare partially-active movements 
plans that are consistent with the gradually accumulating perceptual evidence […] This flow of 
information can be described in a continuous perception-action cycle (Neisser, 1976) and 
becomes an autocatalytic causal loop, in which cognition emerges.” The results of the 
experiment described in Chapter 2 of this thesis are in line with Spivey and Dale’s above 
account. If eye movements are merely an occurrence at the end of a chain of events as a 
consequence of memory retrieval, a gaze manipulation, as demonstrated in Experiment 2, 
should not have affected retrieval performance. This study did show however that retrieval 
accuracy does indeed vary with different gaze cueing conditions.  
Alternative explanations for the functionality of eye movements being directed 
towards blank spaces have been formulated. Importantly these explanations do not exclude 
each other. On the contrary, they emphasize different aspects of the retrieval process. Firstly, 
eye movements may act as a “facilitatory cue” (Johansson, 2013, p. 66). Re-enacting 
processes that were active during encoding (like the recreation of an eye movement towards 
an associated spatial location) increases memory activity of information stored in the 
multimodal memory representation (see Chapter 2 for a detailed literature review). Through 
this re-enacting process, the to-be-retrieved information becomes more available in memory 
(Platzer et al., 2014). Secondly, research on mental imagery has highlighted that eye 
movements are part of constructing and maintaining a mental image (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008; 
Brandt & Stark, 1997; Kosslyn, 1994; Laeng et al., 2014), thereby exploiting both the internal 
and external memory resources (O’Regan, 1992; Spivey, Richardson, & Fitneva, 2004) to 
reduce processing demands (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008; Brandt & Stark, 1997; Johansson et al., 
2012, 2010; Kosslyn, 1994; Laeng et al., 2014). This is true both for mental images constructed 
from visuospatial information as well as verbal information.  
Following this latter concept, one could assume that eye movements towards blank 
spaces act as mnemonic strategy. This seems plausible given the frequently reported 
behaviour of people knowing where something was written and then attempting to retrieve 
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what was written there. However, none of the participants in the here presented experiments 
reported that they used their gaze to structure the to-be-encoded information. Furthermore, 
eye movements are assumed to be highly automatic actions (Irwin, 2004; Rayner, 2009; van 
Gompel et al., 2007; Yantis & Jonides, 1981). Eye movements directed towards blank spaces 
are therefore an unlikely candidate for usage as a conscious mnemonic strategy.  
Although, there have been numerous examples demonstrating eye movements 
directed towards blank spaces (see Introduction) under a variety of conditions, are there 
situations were looking-at-nothing is not displayed? In this thesis, this was exemplified in the 
experiment described in Chapter 3, in which the same set of information was presented twelve 
times. It was also shown to occur in the first experiment described in Chapter 4, in which 
participants failed to gaze back to the instruction location during decision-making. A possible 
explanation for this observation could be that when information is highly activated in memory, 
people do not gaze back to associated spatial locations. Retrieving highly activated knowledge 
from memory needs less attentional resources (for an overview see Birnboim, 2003). 
Furthermore, the knowledge representation could have changed from an episode to a 
(abstract) semantic representation in which spatial representations did not play a role. For 
instance, long-term information retrieval is also possible without showing directed eye 
movements (Micic et al., 2010). Additionally, due to it no longer being necessary to update the 
knowledge representation given that the perceptual information becomes stable over trials. 
The network of associated knowledge hence becomes stable and does not afford the 
execution of a motor response to gather information from the external world (e.g., O’Regan, 
1992). 
In either case, such a situation should not be intermingled with one in which 
knowledge is stably represented in long-term memory and needs to be actively processed in 
order to make a decision (Chapter 4) or find a likely explanation for a set of observations 
(Chapter. 5): In the first case, looking-at-nothing depends on the retrieval strategy. When a 
retrieval strategy calls for the retrieval of past instances stored in memory, as is the case 
during a similarity-based judgment, looking-at-nothing occurs, but it fails to occur when 
applying an abstract rule (Chapter 4). Importantly, participants applying an abstract rule also 
knew the cue information by heart. Such strategy dependent looking-at-nothing has been 
shown for the comparison of non-compensatory to compensatory heuristic decision-making 
(Renkewitz & Jahn, 2010, 2012). In the experiment described in Chapter 5, the same symptom 
was associated with two different spatial locations. Each spatial location belonged to a larger 
spatial area representing different explanations. Participants only gazed at those spatial 
locations that were associated with explanations currently in the set of contending 
hypotheses. They did not gaze at spatial locations associated with identical symptoms that 
were associated with a different explanation (c.f. Jahn & Braatz, 2014). These findings are in 
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line with Hoover & Richardson (2008) who showed that participants only gazed towards an 
identical looking object, if that object was associated with the to-be retrieved information.  
To summarize, eye movements towards blank spaces depend on how information is 
represented in memory. Furthermore, evidence is accumulating that the eyes are not 
automatically launched to all associated spatial locations, but instead looking-at-nothing 
reflects the highly dynamic updating of information held in multimodal memory 
representations and in long-term memory. However, future research is needed to further clarify 
when eye movements are launched to blank spaces. 
6.2 Eye Tracking to Study Reasoning and Decision-Making 
To explain thinking processes, it is essential to describe changes in the underlying memory-
based mental representations (see Introduction). This however requires suitable methods. 
Outcome measures such as response data (e.g., the chosen alternative) can be used to 
differentiate between normative solutions to a problem (e.g., correct or incorrect conclusions), 
but, such measures are inappropriate to describe the underlying processes, given that often 
different processes result in the same outcome. Moreover, outcomes allow for the 
consideration of only a subset of observable behaviours (e.g., Renkewitz & Jahn, 2010, 2012). 
In comparison, process tracing permits the testing of hypotheses concerning intervening 
processes preceding a decision or inference (e.g., what information is retrieved from memory 
and in which temporal order). Many successful process measures have been developed; 
namely verbal protocols, thinking aloud, functional imaging, response times (e.g., the probe 
reaction task, Mehlhorn et al., 2011), and mouselab (Payne et al., 1993) (for an overview see 
Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2011). Eye movements were also considered a process measure, 
but only for the investigation of information derived from givens. Renkewitz and Jahn (2010, 
2012) and Jahn and Braatz (2014) have shown that eye movements can be used to study 
memory-based reasoning and decision-making by drawing upon findings on dynamic spatial 
indexing of multimodal events (the memory indexing method).  
 The results presented in Chapters 2 to 5 strengthen the assumption that eye 
movements can be used as a direct behavioural correlate for the retrieval of information from 
memory by demonstrating the tight interplay of eye movements and memory retrieval 
(Chapter 2), by showing that eye movements reflect which information is retrieved from 
memory (Chapter 4) and by clarifying which explanations belong to a set of contending 
hypotheses (Chapter 5).  
 The experiments presented in Chapter 4 demonstrate how memory indexing can be 
applied to the investigation of rule- versus similarity-based decision-making. Whereas the 
differentiation between an abstract rule and an exemplar retrieval process might evoke 
memories of long lasting debates about one or two processes (e.g., Hahn & Chater, 1998; 
Pothos, 2005), the purpose of this study is not to emphasize dichotomies. On the contrary, by 
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exploring underlying cognitive processes, this thesis endeavours to emphasize that it is the 
same cognitive system operating the same set of mechanisms to solve a task; a cognitive 
system that can either apply an abstract rule or compare a new observation with instances 
stored in memory. If this was not the case, this study would not have been successful in using 
memory indexing, which draws upon the cognitive mechanism of multimodal spatial indexing, 
to explore this topic. 
 In Chapter 5, this study showed that memory indexing can reveal the activation status 
of information held in memory from the first symptom presentation until the participants’ 
response. For each moment a new piece of information is presented, eye movements reflect 
the relative importance of this information in the light of other information, thus it reflects the 
integrated likelihood (cf. Jahn & Braatz, 2014) of a hypothesis held in memory, and allows the 
testing of process assumptions (e.g., evidence accumulation, diagnosis momentum, 
hypothesis change, see Chapter 5).  
In order to reveal memory-processes involved in reasoning and decision-making by 
applying the memory indexing method, some methodological issues should be taken into 
account: 
(1) Clear hypothesis about expected gaze events. It is of course an over simplification to 
assume that this study merely expounds the concept “Tell me where you look, and I tell you 
what you think”. This thesis instead aims to demonstrate that thinking is a highly complex 
process, and that eye movements are influenced by many factors (see Introduction). Precise 
assumptions are required to gauge which eye movements are expected given a certain 
thinking process. This point tackles the question of which dependent variable to use (e.g., 
movement, latency, or numerosity measures; for a comprehensive overview see Holmqvist et 
al., 2011) and where participants are expected to look (position measures, areas of interest), 
because: “process tracing is at its best when clearly formulated hypotheses exist that directly 
relate to process data” (Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2011, p. 737). 
(2) Unambiguous assignment of information to locations. In order to draw a conclusion as to 
what a certain gaze means, it is necessary that each location which can be subject to gaze 
behaviour is associated with one information unit of interest (e.g., one symptom, one piece of 
verbal information, one cue value).  
(3) Randomizing presentation order to control for gaze biases. As explained in the 
introduction, gaze behaviour is not only influenced by the top-down mechanism of interest, but 
is also affected by bottom-up factors. Additionally, people have a tendency to gaze at the 
center (Tatler, 2007), and in western societies there is the convention to read from left to right 
(e.g., Liversedge & Findlay, 2000). It is essential to take these natural gaze biases into account 
(e.g., by experimentally controlling them) when designing experiments. 
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(4) Control for prior knowledge. To give every information the same chance to be gazed at 
and thus to be processed, each piece of information should have the same likelihood of being 
retrieved from memory. Otherwise gaze behaviour will resemble the ease of retrieval and not 
the cognitive mechanism of interest. 
(5) Record enough data. Valid eye tracking data needs to measure the process of interest. 
Like response times however, the data may be subject to the influence of noisy data due to the 
unintentional recording of task-irrelevant processes (e.g., participants being distracted due to 
thinking for example about when the experiment might conclude). In order to gain enough 
experimental power and gain a good estimate of the behaviour of interest, it is essential to 
collect enough data points for each cell in the design and test a sufficient number of 
participants. 
(6) Method triangulation. Eye movements as a process tracing tool should not be seen as an 
alternative to other existing process measures or process models (e.g., computational models 
of reasoning and decision-making processes – see Chapter 4). Process data derived from eye 
movements should be used to supplement and support existing mathematical descriptions 
(see Weber & Johnson, 2009; Jahn & Braatz, 2014). Promising examples are provided by 
Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010), Krajbich, Lu, Camerer, and Rangel (2012), and Nederhouser 
and Spivey (2004). 
These challenges in successfully studying eye movements as a measurement to 
explore thinking processes demonstrate that this method is best applicable in a laboratory 
setting following a classical experimental approach. The alternative of the outside world poses 
a myriad of challenges given that almost always something is visible and therefore we 
continuously update our mental representations (e.g., Spivey & Dale, 2011). Consequently, the 
results obtained by memory indexing lack external validity. For example, a physician making a 
diagnosis would not have to retrieve all the necessary medical information solely from 
memory, but would combine test results and verbal reports with knowledge retrieved from 
memory. Nevertheless, it is important to isolate single cognitive mechanisms and study them 
in a laboratory setting, as this allows for the testing of precise hypotheses and the drawing of 
causal inferences; both necessary steps in suggesting explanations. Such findings can then be 
replicated in the field setting or used as starting point for more applied research questions.  
6.3 Future Research and Applications 
This final section provides an outlook for future research, and briefly discusses possible 
applications of the research findings presented within this thesis. 
With regard to the mechanisms that cause the looking-at-nothing behaviour, i.e. 
dynamic spatial indexing of multimodal events, it is of interest to identify if it is the overt 
movement of the eye per se, or if covert shifts of attention are sufficient to cause differences 
Chapter 6 
106 
in retrieval performance as elicited by a gaze instruction (see Chapter 2). Richardson and 
Spivey (2000) showed that people looked at blank spaces, even when they did not have to 
move their eyes to spatially index one of the four spatial areas during encoding (Experiment 5). 
Thomas and Lleras (2009) asked their participants to solve Duncker’s radiation problem. While 
doing so, participants had to either shift their attention (while keeping the eyes at the center of 
the screen) or move their eyes in an order that corresponded to the solution of the problem. 
Both groups solved the problem faster than a third group which was instructed to gaze at the 
center of the screen. These results suggest that attention shift in addition to eye movements 
appear to guide insight. Anja Prittmann (Prittmann, 2014) tested if in the looking-at-nothing 
paradigm eye movements are necessary to elicit differences in retrieval performance or if the 
same result can be obtained by merely shifting attention. Participants were only allowed to 
either move their eyes or to shift their attention when remembering auditorily presented pieces 
of information that had been associated to a spatial area during an encoding phase. The 
results suggested that covertly shifting attention towards the emptied spatial area does 
indeed lead to a better retrieval performance than covertly shifting attention away from the 
associated spatial area. Covert shifts of attention therefore were sufficient to cause 
differences in retrieval performance. Attention seems to be the key mechanism to 
understanding the relationship between eye movements and memory retrieval (Foos & 
Goolkasian, 2005), because attention determines which information is kept in working memory 
(Theeuwes et al., 2009). Future research should further investigate the role of visuospatial 
attention when explaining processes underlying looks directed at blank spaces. 
Chapter 5 reported a study in which reasoning was studied with the help of verbal 
information – the chemical accident task. Other methods exist however to explore reasoning, 
such as the so-called “Black Box” paradigm used for example by Baumann (2000), Keinath 
(2002) and Johnson and Krems (2001) to study reasoning. In a typical Black Box trial, 
participants must locate four or five atoms hidden in a box by shooting light rays into the box 
and observing where the rays exit. The Black Box paradigm permits the manipulation of the 
complexity of the reasoning task and the causal patterns. The rules are fairly simple, but the 
paradigm allows for a high number of possible hypotheses, which consequently makes it a 
difficult task (Johnson & Krems, 2001). In a pre-study, Sascha Strehlau tested if memory 
indexing is also applicable to the Black Box paradigm. In an experimental investigation 
Strehlau (2014) found that unexplained symptoms, i.e. the atom could not be located, did not 
affect the final conclusion any differently from symptoms that were explained. Gaze data 
revealed that these unexplained symptoms were still kept in working memory in order to be 
processed. Memory indexing combined with the Black Box paradigm thus appears promising 
in the investigation of memory processes underlying more complex reasoning scenarios. 
The experiments reported in this thesis assumed a cognitive process and measured 
eye movements to test process assumptions derived from the assumed processes. It would 
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also be interesting to observe eye movements and deduce the underlying cognitive process 
from the gaze patterns. Recent attempts of this kind have lead to differing results (Orquin & 
Mueller Loose, 2013). Jahn and Braatz (2014) were however successful in predicting the final 
diagnosis from the gaze pattern shown during the first symptom presentation. A more 
sensitive experimental manipulation (see recommendations in section 6.2) might allow 
predicting cognitive processes by analyzing gaze behaviour.  
This thesis combined the process tracing method, memory indexing, with outcome 
measures, like the decision to invite or reject a job candidate (Chapter 4) or the diagnostic 
response (Chapter 5). It could also be of further interest to combine memory indexing with 
other process tracing methods; for instance, memory indexing could be combined with 
functional imaging. Relating brain regions to memory-based thinking processes would allow 
for a detailed description of brain regions involved in thinking processes and allow for deeper 
insights into the functioning of these processes. Almost all manufacturers of eye tracking 
equipment now deliver appropriate hardware solutions (e.g. eye tracking glasses) to combine 
their equipment with functional imaging methods. To date, eye tracking has been mainly used 
to control for gaze behaviour in functional imaging studies (Holmqvist et al., 2011). 
Besides providing fundamental knowledge of how eye movements interact with 
memory processes both during rather simple recognition as well as complex decision-making 
and reasoning tasks, the results from the experiments reported in this thesis also have 
implications for more applied strands of research.  
A recent application of how knowledge about human decision-making, (i.e. the use of 
simple heuristics) can be used to guide diagnostic decisions has been demonstrated by Jenny 
and colleagues (Jenny, Pachur, Lloyd Williams, Becker, & Margraf, 2013). They applied a simple 
lexicographic fast and frugal decision tree as a tool to diagnose depression, and compared its 
performance to complex compensatory decision rules. The simple decision tree performed 
equally well to compensatory models. Such findings demonstrate how knowledge concerning 
the basic mechanism underlying human thinking can be used to develop reliable, simple, and 
therefore cost-efficient tutor-systems to guide a diagnostician’s decision. 
Jarodzka et al. (2012) demonstrated how visual search can be enhanced with the help 
of eye tracking in order to train medical students. Case videos of patients were presented to 
experts and their eye movements were recorded. These eye movements were superimposed to 
the case videos and presented to students. The students’ visual search performance for 
relevant features, i.e. symptoms and their clinical reasoning performance for new cases were 
increased after being trained using the experts’ eye movement videos. 
The human mind works as an information processor (Neisser, 1976). This metaphor 
has not only influenced and enhanced our understanding of the cognitive system but vice 
versa, when building information processing systems, the human mind serves as a role model 
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to optimize such systems. Neubert, Görlitz, and Benn (2001) for example developed an 
adaptive index based on the similarity of objects that speed up data base requests.  
This thesis aimed to investigate the looking-at-nothing behavior and possible 
applications to study memory-based thinking processes, thereby bringing together different 
strands of cognitive science: from perception and attention to reasoning and decision-making. 
Future research is necessary to further deepen the understanding of the fascinating 
interaction between eye movements, memory, and thinking to inform both cognitive and 
applied sciences. 
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